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I. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AS STRATEGIC ASSETS 
Today’s increasing globalization has made Western countries more aware 
of and concerned about remote incidents and conflicts, which has forced their 
respective military establishments to think critically about how to adapt their 
organizational structures to new challenges. Terrorism, insurgencies, and other 
types of irregular warfare pose a threat to Western democracies, not because the 
conflicts necessarily will spread to these countries, but because of the second-
order effects that come with these conflicts. Mass migration, massive drug 
export, diseases, and expanding regional instability are some of the side effects 
from the conflicts we see today. These contemporary threats and challenges call 
for a different type of military action than those for which most nations’ forces are 
organized and trained. Notwithstanding, there are many tasks in such scenarios 
that conventional forces not only can do, but also must do. Other tasks, however, 
must be carried out by specially designated, trained, equipped, and organized 
special operations forces (SOF), because conventional forces do not have the 
required skills or capabilities, or because the strategic risk is too high.  
Utilizing SOF properly has become a debated issue for many nations. 
SOF are strategic assets, “because of their ability to achieve political, military, 
psychological, and informational objectives that represent the foundational 
instruments of national power.”1 However, the respective strategic levels of the 
various nations do not always know what the notion of SOF means, and how 
these forces can be utilized in the nations’ interests. Even though SOF are 
generally acknowledged as an important asset in contemporary defense 
structures, each nation seems to struggle to find a good solution where SOF are 
given the autonomy and flexibility needed to function properly as a strategic 
asset. While some nations have created a separate SOF command at the 
                                            
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, 2008), ii. 
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national strategic level, other nations, like Norway, govern SOF through the 
services, and coordinate them with a limited capacity within the “conventional” 
strategic and operational levels.2 
At the Riga Summit in November 2006, NATO members agreed to 
implement several measures that would enhance the Alliance’s capacity to face 
contemporary threats and challenges. One of these measures was the NATO 
Special Operations Forces Transformation Initiative (NSTI), which is a program 
that aims to increase the capabilities of the SOF of NATO nations. Together with 
the NSTI, the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) emerged and took the lead 
in coordinating combined and joint SOF training, education, and operations within 
NATO. NSCC quickly became a big success in terms of connecting NATO 
members’ SOF units together, synchronizing and standardizing training and 
education, and supporting NATO’s ongoing theater special operations. On March 
1, 2010, NSCC was re-designated as the NATO Special Operations Headquarters 
(NSHQ). Ultimately, NSHQ’s goal is to create a NATO SOF environment 
consisting of high-level units, capable of conducting combined and joint operations 
for strategic decision-makers, and with strategic impact. In the NATO SOF Study, 
NSHQ has identified that “the critical ingredient to optimize [national] SOF is a 
dedicated national special operations organization to provide coherent, long-term 
stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspects of special operations.”3 
As with all NATO nations, Norway should follow up NSHQ’s endorsements 
by scrutinizing its own structure and developing arrangements from which both 
                                            
2 The national strategic level is, in NATO nations, most commonly divided into two sub-levels: 
the political-strategic level, which usually consists of a Department/Ministry of Defense, and the 
military-strategic level, which usually consists of a national joint defense staff. Some nations 
choose to organize their special operations forces directly under the political-strategic level, while 
others choose to organize them under the military-strategic level. 
3 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, ii. 
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Norway and NATO can benefit. This thesis addresses the strategic utilization of 
Norwegian SOF (NORSOF) and the pertinent organizational questions that arise.4 
A. NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Norwegian security policy has changed dramatically over the last two 
decades, from focusing on an anti-invasion defense to focusing on global 
influence through employment of political tools, including military forces. During 
the Cold War, the Norwegian Armed Forces were trained and equipped to fight 
the Soviet Union, a known and well-defined threat. A potential war was expected 
to be conventional, as the Soviets had strategic interests in controlling Norwegian 
territory and its coastline. The military units were trained, equipped, and 
employed to disrupt the first echelons of a Soviet invasion, and to prepare 
airfields and landing zones for NATO reinforcements. The roles of the Norwegian 
special operations forces were marginal, as was the size of the units: 
Marinejegerlaget [The Naval Commando Team] (MJL) was composed of 
as few as 16 men (a headquarters section and administration, and three four-
man patrols).5 Usually, four to eight conscripts made it through the selection each 
year, and some of them were offered a three-year contract after the compulsory 
military service. The main tasks of the unit were special surveillance and 
reconnaissance (SR), and small direct action (DA) missions. The unit was a 
standing operational unit, and kept one patrol on four hours’ notice-to-move until 
1990.  
                                            
4 NORSOF is not a formal term or organization, but an acronym that describes the two 
special operations communities in Norway, consisting of the Army SOF and the Naval SOF. The 
137 Air Wing is considered a part of the NORSOF community, as the unit is responsible for the 
development and employment of special air operations support from the Air Force. In governing 
documents, 137 Air Wing is not regarded as SOF, but it is tasked with support missions. 
5 The Norwegian word “marine” means “navy” or “naval,” and is not equivalent to the English 
word “marine.” The word “jeger” literally means “hunter,” but is also used to describe commandos, 
or military soldiers and units that possess specialized skills, e.g., “fallskjermjeger” 
(paratrooper/parachute commando), “infanterijeger” (infantry ranger/scout), or “kystjeger” (coastal 
ranger). 
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Hærens fallskjermjegerskole (HJFS), later Hærens jegerskole [The Army’s 
Commando School] (HJS), was established in 1962, primarily to train 
conventional Army reconnaissance units in military parachuting. However, in the 
mid-1960s, it started to produce its own paratroopers, designed for direct action 
and surveillance and reconnaissance far behind the enemy’s line.6 These were 
20–30 new voluntary conscripts each year, serving their 12 months’ compulsory 
military service in Fallskjermjegertroppen [The Paratrooper Platoon] (FJT). The 
missions of the platoon were similar to the ones of MJL, but the platoon was not 
operational, as it was a one-year educational program. After one year, some of 
the soldiers were selected for a HJS mobilization/reserve force. The rest of the 
soldiers were normally distributed to other reserve forces or Heimevernet [the 
Home Guard].  
In 1982, HJS had also assumed the responsibility to create a military 
counterterrorist force, Forsvarets spesialkommando [The Defense’s Special 
Commando] (FSK), primarily for use in the event of terrorist attacks on Norway’s 
numerous oil platforms. The unit was stood up by personnel from both MJL and 
FJT, and it consisted only of professionals (sergeants and officers) who had 
completed selection and one year of training in one of the two units. 
B. POST-COLD WAR TRANSFORMATION 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the absence of the Soviet Union as a 
dominating threat made Norwegian decision-makers understand that the 
Norwegian Armed Forces needed a transformation to be able to fill several and 
different types of roles.7 In order to support the Norwegian national security, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces was downsized and transformed into smaller, more 
flexible units, most of them capable of pursuing Norwegian interests both inside 
                                            
6 Tom Robertsen, Making New Ambitions Work: The Transformation of Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2006), 38. 
7 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Strength and Relevance: Strategic Concept 
for the Armed Forces [Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret], trans. Ministry of 
Defense, 9, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dok/veiledninger_brosjyrer/2005. 
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and outside the Norwegian borders. Operations in the Balkans since the middle 
of the 1990s, and in Afghanistan since 2001, are examples of considerable 
Norwegian military contributions, far from Norwegian soil but in concert with the 
new national security focus. The Norwegian strategic concept Styrke og 
relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret [Strength and Relevance: A Strategic 
Concept for the Armed Forces], highlighted the importance of a holistic approach 
to potential threats and international conflicts:  
Our security cannot be maintained through a one-sided focus on 
the conventional defence of Norwegian territory. On the contrary, 
the threat assessment entails that Norwegian security is best 
maintained through contributing to peace, stability and a [favorable] 
international environment. By doing so, we help reduce the risk of 
crises, armed conflicts and war, the spreading of conflicts and 
expansion of international terrorism.8  
During the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the last 20 
years, the two NORSOF units went through modernization and growth. In 1992, 
MJL changed its name to Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) and, in 1997, HJS 
changed its name to Hærens jegerkommando (HJK). In recognition of the fact 
that the entire unit had to be involved during overseas/“out-of-area” deployments 
and counterterrorist operations, the name was changed again in 2007 to 
Forsvarets spesialkommando/Hærens jegerkommando (FSK-HJK). The sizes of 
the units are classified, but their official Web sites refer to organizations that 
include maneuver squadrons, combat support squadrons, combat service 
support, and staff elements.9 To a certain degree, there has been some 
cooperation between the units during these years of development, but this has 
been limited to SOF-particular purchases and a few operations (e.g., two joint 
contingents in Afghanistan, in 2002). Their expanding capabilities have largely 
become redundant; both units share the same missions with only a few 
                                            
8 Forsvarsdepartementet, Strength and Relevance, 7. 
9 See www.fallskjermjeger.no for information on the Army SOF (FSK-HJK), and 
www.marinejeger.no for information on the Naval SOF (MJK). 
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exceptions, and can together sustain larger contributions in “out-of-area” 
operations, such as in the 18-months’ deployment to Afghanistan in 2008–2009.  
C. THE PROBLEM 
1. NORSOF and the Strategic Realm 
The current arrangement with two separate units within their respective 
services seems to be the model for the future; this has been emphasized 
repeatedly by political and military decision-makers, and is described in 
governing documents.10 NORSOF, like most NATO SOF units, are considered 
strategic assets. However, there is no joint NORSOF command at the strategic 
level in Norway. Parliamentary Bill no. 48 calls for measures that can facilitate 
better management and follow-up capacity at the strategic level, and some 
improvements have been made.11 In August 2009, staff at the strategic and 
operational levels doubled their number of SOF-related personnel. The strategic 
level consists of two sub-layers: the political-strategic (Ministry of Defense) and 
the military-strategic (Chief of Defense Staff) (see Figure 1). There are no SOF-
related personnel at the political-strategic level. However, there are four officers, 
including a Colonel or Navy Captain (O-6) at the military-strategic level, who are 
directly related to SOF. These four comprise a Special Operations Section within 
the structure of the Chief of Defense Staff’s Department of Operations, headed 
by a major general/rear admiral (O-8). This office has no command authority over 
NORSOF; they are the Chief of Defense’s advisors and action officers on SOF-
related matters within the staff. This arrangement is recognizable in the NATO 
SOF Study as a small version of the “National Military Staff Element for Special 
Operations.”12 Additionally, there are 12 officers, also headed by an O-6, at the 
                                            
10 E.g., Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, 
interesser og verdier [A defense for protection of Norway’s security, interests, and resources], 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48 (2007–2008), 38. 
11 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 74. 
12 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22–24. 
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operational level. These 12 comprise the so-called J-3 SOF, which is part of the 
Joint Operations. J-3 SOF personnel are the advisors and action officers at 
Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter [Norwegian Joint Headquarters] (NJHQ), and 
usually execute OPCOM or OPCON (on behalf of the Chief of Defense and/or 
the Commander of NJHQ) over NORSOF units abroad or in a domestic SOF 
operation.13 
 
Figure 1.   The Strategic Level in Norway 
 
 
                                            
13 In accordance with NATO terms, OPCOM (Operational Command) is “the authority 
granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, 
to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed 
necessary.” OPCON (Operational Control) is “the authority delegated to a commander to direct 
forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are 
usually limited by function, time, or location.” See NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-
6) (2009), http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm, 2-O-3. 
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2. NORSOF and Jointness 
Since FSK-HJK and MJK belong to their respective services, i.e., the 
Army and the Navy, there are few coordinating arrangements, in terms of force 
production (force management, force generation, and force development). For 
operations, NJHQ coordinates the deployments, employments, and logistics. For 
larger materiel projects/procurements, Forsvarets logistikkorganisasjon [Defense 
Logistics Organization] coordinates the efforts. Without a coordinating body with 
the authority to supersede the services’ individual interests, there is little room for 
unity of effort and harmonization of capabilities. Both units develop themselves 
independently, and often with a competitive mindset, which does not necessarily 
benefit NORSOF’s overall interests. The result is redundant capabilities in some 
areas, and lack of crucial capabilities in other areas.14 
3. Questions 
Despite the doubling of officers at the strategic level (from two to four) and 
operational level (from 6 to 12), numerous factors logically raise the question why 
there is no strategic NORSOF command in Norway. As noted in the NATO SOF 
Study, the “national military element for special operation” has some downsides. 
It cannot provide authoritative direction to the SOF units, and it has no direct 
control over the SOF units in the services.15 Synchronization and coordination of 
the units is cumbersome (or impossible) in this type of arrangement. The 
increasing sizes of the NORSOF units and their complex and delicate missions, 
in addition to the contemporary security environment that includes more irregular 
warfare-type operations, should call for an assessment of whether a separate 
command should be one of the measures that are mentioned in Parliamentary 
Bill no. 48.  
                                            
14 Author’s own observations, in addition to views expressed through conversations with 
NORSOF personnel. See also Robertsen, Making New Ambitions Work. 
15 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 23–24. 
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This thesis is meant to be such an assessment, and it will answer the 
following research question:  
“Which organizational changes have to be made to optimize the strategic 
utilization of the Norwegian Special Operations Forces?” 
In order to answer the question above, the research will answer the 
following supporting question first: “Why is it necessary to change the Norwegian 
Special Operations Forces’ organizational design?” 
4. Methodology 
Based on the assumption that NORSOF needs to make changes to its 
current organizational model, this thesis will use lessons learned from two 
relevant case studies where recent changes have been made, in addition to an 
analysis of factors that are relevant for a potential change in the Norwegian 
organizational model.  
First, four factors are identified as relevant to answer the supporting 
question of this thesis: “why is it necessary to change NORSOF’s organizational 
design?” The factors validate the hypothesis that NORSOF are not adequately 
utilized as strategic assets, and that an increased utilization at the strategic level 
is in the nation’s interest, and in accordance with governing documents.16 The 
four factors are: 
 Governing documents, doctrine, and policy, including political 
intentions for NORSOF; 
 Norway’s relationship with NATO; 
 The security environment; and 
 The three main types of national SOF leadership. 
                                            
16 The term “strategic leverage” means a particular organization’s influence, importance, 
and/or impact at the strategic level. No strategic leverage means that the organization’s actions 
have no effect or impact at the strategic level. Full strategic leverage means that the 
organization’s actions and advice make a great impact at the strategic level, and that the strategic 
level to a large degree depends on or benefits from the organization’s advice and/or action. 
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Second, two case studies of the transformation of Canadian Special 
Operations Forces (CANSOF) in 2006 and Polish Special Operations Forces 
(POLSOF) in 2007 examine how strategic leverage can be changed. Before their 
transformations, Canada and Poland had national staff elements for special 
operations in their respective defense staffs, similar to the Norwegian 
organizational design today; the tactical SOF units were governed through their 
services, and the two staff elements at the strategic level had little authority and 
no command relationship over the tactical units. By measuring nine indicators on 
SOF’s strategic stewardship and joint capabilities before and after the 
transformations in Canada and Poland, variation in the strategic leverage is 
observed. As the two cases generally show comparable trends in increased 
leverage at the strategic level, it is assumed that a similar transformation in 
Norway can increase NORSOF’s leverage equally. Likewise, negative results 
and discrepancies among the indicators can be studied to avoid a similar 
outcome in a Norwegian transformation by identifying the origins of the negative 
trends. Interviews and background research were used to measure the strategic 
leverage in the two case studies. 
Third, the four factors that were identified in Chapter II are analyzed, 
based on the lessons learned from the case studies of CANSOF and POLSOF 
and the author’s knowledge on the NORSOF organizational design. Deductions 
are consecutively derived from the analysis. 
Fourth, based on the deductions from the analysis of the Norwegian case 
and the lessons learned from the case studies of CANSOF and POLSOF, the 
thesis question “which organizational changes have to be made to optimize the 
strategic utilization of NORSOF?” is answered. An organizational model for 
NORSOF is recommended, and additional recommendations that will increase 
NORSOF’s strategic leverage are listed.  
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5. Scope 
The two foreign case studies, CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM, were 
selected for several reasons. For this thesis, relevant cases with available 
unclassified material were needed. Canada and Poland are both members of 
NATO, and they have recent experiences from creating their respective SOF 
commands at the strategic level. Even though both nations today have somewhat 
bigger SOF communities than Norway, the comparison still is relevant. The size 
of the NORSOF community does not invoke a different approach on the strategic 
leadership than those of Canada or Poland. The number of operators who carry 
out “standard SOF tasks,” such as Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance, 
Direct Action, and Military Assistance, are not very different from the number of 
NORSOF operators. However, the new SOF organizations in Canada and 
Poland have added new capabilities after the creation of their respective 
commands, for instance special air operations capabilities and organic chemical, 
biological, radiation, and nuclear (CBRN) specialists. 
In the case of Canada, this study will examine three books that have been 
written on the Canadian SOF. In addition, interviews were carried out with 
CANSOFCOM key players in today’s organization and from the creation of the 
command. There are many similarities between Canada and Norway, in terms of 
political issues. They are both “Arctic nations” and engaged in the development 
of “The High North.” Both nations also put their very good relationships with the 
United States as a crucial part of their security policy. However, these 
relationships seem to be challenged in both countries by the desire to posture as 
“neutral” peacemakers/-keepers, instead of obedient states that always comply 
with the desires of U.S. decision-makers. Canada’s relationship with the United 
States also is strongly influenced by their interests in their common borders and 
the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command. 
In the case of Poland, there is little literature on the topic, but the Polish 
SOF community generously opened its doors for a visit and interviews with key 
personnel. Poland has a different security policy view than Canada and Norway; 
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as a new member of NATO, and with a “never again communism” attitude from 
its time in the Warsaw Pact, it seems prone to lean toward a tighter relationship 
with the United States than Norway. It seems clear that Poland uses its SOF 
actively in achieving its strategic aims. For this thesis, it is interesting to 
determine if the creation of POLSOCOM mattered in contemporary and future 
strategic utilization of SOF in Poland. 
Since NATO nations usually keep information about their SOF 
organizations at a classified level, little in-depth material is available for this 
unclassified thesis. However, the NATO SOF Study provides research and 
analysis, based on visits and interviews on 12 of the NATO members that have 
SOF, in addition to conversations with personnel from five other nations that 
provide representatives to the NSCC (NSHQ), and even nations outside the 
NATO alliance.17 The NATO SOF Study provides the NATO members the 
minimum and desired requirements for SOF at all levels, with focus on the 
strategic level. It does not reveal any of the participation interview objects’ 
statements, because such statements are classified, or sensitive. Both personnel 
and nations have been made anonymous, which makes it difficult to know in 
which context each statement was given.. Some interviewees stated that if “what 
[NSCC] was writing from the conversations were communicated back within their 
respective defense establishments, [the interviewees] were done.”18 Still, the 
NATO SOF Study is presumably the most reliable research there is on NATO 
SOF, since the interviewees were promised such discretion in return for speaking 
openly. 
Notwithstanding, the NATO SOF Study is written by NSHQ, which is a 
major stakeholder in a strong NATO SOF community. Its suggestions are not 
“cheap solutions for low-budget countries,” but optimized organizations that also 
will benefit NATO (in terms of troop contributions to NATO operations, NSHQ 
                                            
17 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 3–4. 
18 NSCC officer, email message to author, February 20, 2009. 
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augmentation, etc). However, the Norwegian alignment with NATO directions 
and guidance is historically well established, so the NATO SOF Study is the most 
reliable and accurate document to use as a standard for Norwegian ambitions. 
Three types of SOF leadership are listed in the NATO SOF Study, and will 
be evaluated in this thesis: “National Military Staff Element for Special 
Operations,” “Special Operations Component Command,” and “Special 
Operations Service.”19 These models assume different types of roles and tasks, 
and the recommendations will include proposals and examples of such tasks for 
a Norwegian model. 
6. Measurements 
In order to measure the benefits and drawbacks of different national SOF 
leadership models, this thesis will use the requirements and standards that apply 
to NATO members and their SOF as they are described in the NATO SOF 
Study.20  Its list of roles and capabilities for a “world class special operations 
force” will be used to measure the individual cases before and after the creation 
of a SOF command.21 A full score on a variable means that optimal conditions 
are present, i.e., the conditions are “as perfect, functional, and effective as 
possible.”22 The lowest score means that the conditions are not present at all. 
7. Translations 
Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Norwegian are by the author. 
                                            
19 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22–30. 
20 Ibid., 29–30. 
21 The term “world class special operations force” is used in the NATO SOF Study, and lists 
specific requirements that need to be fulfilled in order to use the term to describe an organization. 
All these requirements are reflected in the questions that were provided to the interviewees, e.g., 
“the ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special operations 
and national SOF.” 
22 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 3. 
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II. FACTORS 
A. GOVERNING DOCUMENTS, DOCTRINE, AND POLICY 
In accordance with NATO, deciding how to govern, develop, and employ 
national SOF is considered a national concern.23 However, there are often 
specific requirements linked to combined SOF contributions, as there are in 
conventional NATO operations. While national strategic concepts and documents 
describe the intended use of a national SOF, NATO publications provide 
guidance on the conduct of allied joint special operations. This chapter will 
pursue Norwegian documents that are pertinent to the management of SOF, as 
well as relevant NATO publications that may have an influence on the Norwegian 
arrangements. It occurs that there is a strong relationship between the 
Norwegian security policy and Norway’s stake in NATO. Norway’s national 
interests are somewhat dependent on the country’s ability to comply with NATO 
requirements and demands. It is therefore relevant to search for congruence 
between the national strategic concept and NATO’s guidance and requirements 
for SOF.  
1. Political Intentions for NORSOF 
In 2008, the Norwegian government submitted its Parliamentary Bill no. 48 
Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier [A Defense for 
Protection of Norway’s Security, Interests, and Resources], proposing a 
restructuring of the strategic and operational level of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces (NAF). The subsequent Iverksettingsbrev for Forsvarssektoren 
[Implementation Letter for the Defense Sector] (2009–2012), issued by the 
Minister of Defense, instructs the Chief of Defense to implement the 
recommendations from Parliamentary Bill no. 48. Some of the decisions from this 
                                            
23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, 2008), 29–30. 
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process have an impact on NORSOF. A paragraph from the Implementation 
letter notes that NORSOF consists of [only] FSK-HJK and MJK, and that air 
assets are support to the two units.24 Hence, 137 Luftving (137 Air Wing) is not 
considered as part of NORSOF, but has support duties to the latter. 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48 refers to the use of SOF, and states that SOF are 
defined as “strategic forces, and are in terms of command [& control] associated 
with the highest practical level.”25 In addition, it states that “due to the nature of 
special operations, it is extremely important that the chain of command is clear 
and unequivocal, and responds quickly, consisting of as few layers as 
possible.”26 The Implementation Letter for the Defense Sector notes that the 
three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are responsible for SOF’s force 
production, even though SOF are strategic joint assets.27 The Implementation 
Letter also states that the “special operations forces will continue developing; 
with focus on solutions where competence and capacity is maintained and 
developed, while the arrangement becomes more cost-effective and practical.” 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48 additionally explains that “measures will be assessed in 
order to facilitate an improved senior follow-up and management of the SOF at 
the strategic level.”28 
In sum, Parliamentary Bill no. 48 expresses a political will and intention to 
further develop NORSOF, and emphasizes that SOF, including NORSOF, are 
                                            
24 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Iverksettingsbrev for Forsvarssektoren 
[Implementation Letter for the Defense Sector] (2009–2012), 38. 
25 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, 
interesser og verdier [A defense for protection of Norway’s security, interests, and resources], 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48 (2007–2008), 63. 
26 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 63. 
27 Forsvarsdepartementet, Implementation letter for the Defense Sector defines Force 
production as “The total process and activity that conduce to prepare forces ready for effort and 
includes education and training, human resources management, development of tactics, 
organization of forces, and materiel procurement,” 38.  
28 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 74. 
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strategic assets. The document does not explain how NORSOF should develop, 
but mentions that the strategic management needs improvement. Even though 
Norwegian documents do not formulate an end state for the development of 
NORSOF, there seems to exist a tacit desire to support a further development 
that puts NORSOF among the leading SOF nations in NATO, i.e., “world class 
SOF.”29 
2. Norway’s Strategic Concept 
Unlike the United States, Norway does not have a single inter-
departmental strategic policy document that spans all means of national power, 
such as the military, diplomacy, economics, etc. However, the array of strategic 
documents issued by the Ministry of Defense describes the holistic approach to a 
national security policy, and reflects the government’s priorities and areas of 
concentration. While political intentions and guidelines are provided in 
Parliamentary Bill no. 48, the Norwegian national security policy and Norway’s 
national interests are described in Evne til innsats: Strategisk konsept for 
Forsvaret [Capability for Effort: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Defense]. 
The latter reflects the main priorities of the national security policy and the 
national military policy that are stated in the Parliamentary Bill no. 48.30 
The holistic approach to Norwegian security policy is comprised in five 
predominant objectives in Capability for Effort:31 
 To prevent war and the development of various threats against 
Norwegian and collective security; 
                                            
29 This assumption is supported by several statements on NORSOF from Norwegian 
decision-makers, such as the Minister of Defense and chief of Defense. See for example 
http://www.bt.no/nyheter/innenriks/Viser-frem-elitesoldater-437643.html.  
30 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Evne til Innsats: Strategisk konsept for 
Forsvaret [Capability for Effort: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Defense], 4. 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Evne-til-innsats_strategisk-konsept-for-
Forsvaret.pdf. 
31 Ibid., 8.  
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 To contribute to peace, stability, and the development of an 
international legal system that is directed by the UN; 
 To ensure Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights, interests, and 
values, and to protect Norwegian freedom of action toward political, 
military, and other pressure; 
 Together with its allies defend Norway and NATO against strikes 
and attacks; and 
 To safeguard the society against strikes and attacks by 
governmental and non-governmental actors. 
In general, Norway looks beyond the Cold War-era objectives for its 
defense. It is not enough merely to ensure sovereignty and prevent war and 
other threats; Norway must influence the global development and stability in a 
way that supports its national interest.  
Recognizing that Norway needs the ability to take responsibility for its own 
security, the government intends to use military forces as a tool for providing the 
politicians with good grounds for decision-making and a greater space for 
freedom of action.32 Because the traditional difference between “national 
security” and “international security” has blurred, overseas operations may have 
direct or indirect impact on the security in Norway.33 It is clearly understood that 
Norway’s national security depends on the nation’s ability to contribute with 
relevant forces in multi-national operations.  
Norway is a member of NATO, but stands outside the European Union 
(EU). This special situation makes the country very reliant on NATO. Within the 
United Nations framework, NATO is considered the “cornerstone of Norwegian 
                                            
32 Forsvarsdepartementet, Capability for Effort, 50. 
33 Ibid., 52. 
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security and defense policy.”34 Capability for Effort acknowledges that fulfilling 
NATO’s requirements to its member nations is an important means for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces to solve their full range of tasks.35 It is also particularly 
important for Norway to act as a responsible and compliant member of NATO 
and to combine its national interests with a solid and continuous contribution to 
NATO operations. Likewise, Norway seeks to maintain its good relationship with 
the EU through visible participation in military EU-led operations. 
Finally, Capability for Effort recognizes that the overall joint capability has 
priority, not the individual services’ isolated capabilities. The importance of the 
services may be reduced in the future, since most military operations are 
conducted by two or more components in a joint framework.36 The strategic 
concept also mentions that crucial competence must be maintained and 
developed, while organizational structures that are adequately [adaptive to a 
dynamic environment] must be established.37 
3. Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 
Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine describes SOF as a 
“special forces component [that is] commanded and organized on lines similar to 
those with other Armed Forces components.” It also states, “special operations 
should be used to achieve aims of high or critical importance at a strategic or 
operational level.”38 
                                            
34 Forsvarsdepartementet, Capability for Effort, 32. 
35 Ibid., 75. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 55 
38 Forsvarsstaben [The Defense Staff], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 
2007 [Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine], trans. The Defense Staff (Oslo: The Defense Staff, 
2007), 125. 
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B. NORWAY AND NATO 
NATO repeatedly is referred to as “the cornerstone of Norway’s security 
policy,” and there is broad popular support in Norway for the country’s 
membership in the alliance.39 Following NATO doctrine and development is the 
Norwegian standard rather than the exception. For instance, the Norwegian Joint 
Doctrine uses the same terminology and definitions regarding SOF missions and 
capabilities as NATO did in its allied joint doctrine for special operations. Until 
recently, there has been no guidance from NATO on national organizational 
issues regarding SOF. Because of the increased use of SOF in almost any 
NATO involvement, particularly after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, (9/11) the organization seems to put more emphasis on the 
development of special operations capabilities within its member nations, in order 
to pursue a strong SOF capability for NATO operations. 
1. Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) 
As earlier described, the Riga Summit in 2006 precipitated several 
enhancements of the NATO SOF community, such as the creation of NSHQ. 
This organization provides a flag officer direct link between NATO SOF and 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and coordinates and synchronizes NATO 
SOF force generation and operations. Additionally, it develops and publishes 
NATO SOF policies and doctrines in order to foster interoperability and 
standardization within NATO. 
One of the first major products issued by NSHQ was the Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5). This unclassified document does not 
dictate to NATO member nations how to execute national command and control 
over its SOF, as it is primarily written for an allied joint force and subordinate 
                                            
39 Grete Faremo, ”Med evne til innsats – det norske Forsvaret 2010,” (speech to Oslo Military 
Society, Oslo, Norway, January 4, 2010), http://www.mil.no/start/article.jhtml?articleID=192360. 
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component commands.40 However, AJP-3.5 describes NATO SOF as strategic 
assets, and suggests certain criteria that should be used when evaluating SOF 
employment.41 It also states that “in all cases, commanders exercising command 
authority over SOF should: a) [p]rovide a clear and unambiguous chain of 
command, and b) [p]rovide sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, 
conduct, and support the operations.”42 
2. The NATO SOF Study 
A more suitable document for evaluating a national organization for SOF 
is the NATO SOF Study. As mentioned earlier, NSHQ interviewed SOF 
personnel from 12 different NATO nations, and analyzed the roles and tasks of a 
national SOF organization. The three different types of national SOF 
organizational models offered are based on the types of organizations that 
already exist in NATO countries. The study is clear on the point that it is up to 
each nation to decide its own organizational model in order to provide 
“appropriate and optimal stewardship of SOF.”43 Even though the study does not 
dictate NATO nations’ decisions, it emphasizes that “[i]t is important to note that 
SOF are strategic assets that are employed to achieve strategic effect.”44 Also, it 
concludes that even though the various nations may find themselves at different 
stages of development, there are certain common characteristics that “any 
national special operations organization must possess in order to create a world 
class SOF:”45 
                                            
40 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 
(AJP-3.5) (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), xiii. 
41 Ibid., 1–5. 
42 Ibid., 3–6. 
43 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, ii. 
44 Ibid., 9. The statement is a quote from MC 437/1 Military Committee Special Operations 
Policy, June 14, 2006. 
45 Ibid., 37. 
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 Direct access to senior defense leadership; 
 Structure itself into a lean organizational architecture to facilitate 
agility; 
 Capacity to influence the career development of SOF operators and 
SOF enabling personnel; 
 Establishment of a SOF training and education system; 
 Deployable joint special operations headquarters with dedicated 
enablers; and 
 Ability to procure non-standard equipment and services rapidly. 
3. Norway’s Role in NATO 
Through a proactive membership in NATO, Norway has a viable chance to 
influence more on the global scale than through other organizations. In a speech 
to Oslo Militære Samfund [Oslo Military Society], Minister of Defense Grete 
Faremo noted that Norway plays a role in the European and global security 
policy. She said that Norway has pushed for a discussion within the strategic 
level in NATO on how to balance between out-of-area operations and traditional 
operations in defense of NATO countries’ territories. Faremo emphasized that 
Norway does not subscribe to an “either-or” situation, but still wants NATO to 
refocus and strengthen its core tasks, such as deterrence, cooperation within 
situational awareness and intelligence gathering, and allied training and 
exercises. Moreover, NATO should prioritize “deployable capacities that cover 
the entire spectrum of crisis, including high-intensity operations.”46  
Faremo proposes a tight relationship between Norwegian interests and 
the future NATO. A strengthening of NATO’s traditional core tasks will increase 
Norway’s security, since the structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces is too 
small to defend Norway’s territory alone. A strong NATO with ready and capable 
                                            
46 Faremo, ”Med evne til innsats” (speech). 
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forces is vital to Norway in territorial defense setting. Simultaneously, Norway 
can continue its “selective” out-of-area operations within NATO, deploying small 
contributions to support Norwegian foreign policy. Faremo clearly expresses that 
Norway must contribute with relevant capabilities, but she also wants the 
contributions per se to facilitate access to the decision-making processes in 
NATO, so that Norway can influence the global security policies. 
The Norwegian political scientist Janne Haaland Matlary describes a 
viable potential for small states, including Norway, to influence decision-making 
processes within international organizations, like the United Nations, NATO, and 
the European Union. Matlary implies that member nations that contribute with 
relevant forces have some influence with regard to in bello decisions, and 
virtually no influence with regard to ad bellum decisions.47 Since the lead nation 
of a UN operation most often is one of the major powers, the possibility to gain 
substantial influence through UN operations is very limited.48 This leaves Norway 
with only one practical option in terms of gaining substantial influence through an 
organization. Relevant contributions to NATO operations can open up 
opportunities for gaining influence, which can affect Norway’s national strategy 
and policy. Inherently, a SOF capability governed by a well-functioning 
organization at the strategic level should precipitate an additional dimension of 
highly relevant means for Norwegian decision-makers. 
C. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
There are no direct conventional military threats against Norway today. 
The combination of a stable region, Norway’s membership in NATO, and a well-
functioning diplomacy are crucial ingredients in the nation’s security situation. 
                                            
47 Ad bellum decisions refer to the decisions that are made before a war, e.g., whether the 
operation/intervention is going to take place at all. In bello decisions refer to the decisions during 
a war/operation, i.e., how the operation is being carried out. 
48 Janne Haaland Matlary, “Dangerous Dysfunctions? Governing Integrated Military Force in 
Europe,” in Denationalisation of Defence, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary and Øyvind Østerud 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 71–88. 
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However, as part of the globalization, Norway’s security environment is to a large 
degree shaped outside the country’s borders. Defense and security 
establishments from all parts of the world describe the security environment as 
“increasingly complex and unpredictable.”49 Insurgencies, terrorism, piracy, and 
other irregular threats in remote, unstable regions are increasingly a concern for 
Norway and challenge the nation’s security.50 Terrorist growth or insurgency in 
one region may lead to second-order effects in other regions, e.g., increased 
support to extreme factions, international crime organizations, drug export, mass 
migration, and refugee problems. Likewise, an intolerable level of piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden can affect Norwegian shipping and jeopardize Norwegian lives, as 
Norway is one of the largest shipping nations in the world and transits a large 
number of its merchant ships through the gulf.  
By deploying military forces to remote regions, Norway seeks to achieve 
multiple objectives. First, it wants to achieve peace and stability in that region. 
Also, as mentioned earlier, Norway wants to show the international community 
that it participates in an effort to prevent irregular threats from increasing and 
spreading to other regions, and ultimately Norway. Finally, it can participate in 
the decision-making processes that apply to the in bello decisions, to adjust the 
international effort into courses of action that support Norwegian values and 
interests. To achieve these goals, Norway needs professional, experienced, and 
versatile military forces that are trained for all types of environments and 
challenges. 
                                            
49 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 11. 
50 The United States, the United Nations, NATO, and other organizations do not have a 
common term that describes the environments, threats, and conflicts that are antonyms of 
conventional wars, or state-to-state conflicts. Some of the terms used are asymmetric 
threats/warfare, irregular threats/warfare, unconventional threats/warfare, low-intensity conflicts, 
small wars, new wars, etc. Some nuances differ between these terms, and they may be used in a 
variety of ways to describe different aspects of the environment.  
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D. THE THREE TYPES OF NATIONAL SOF LEADERSHIP 
The NATO SOF Study proposes three main types of national SOF 
leadership models. Even though each nation has its own unique leadership 
arrangements for its SOF, any model will normally fall under one of the 
categories below. In this research, the term “custodian” is used. The term means 
a dedicated superior proponent, i.e., either a command or a staff element that 
ensures management and oversight over SOF. 
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1. Model One: National Military Staff Element for Special Operations 
Model One (Figure 2) is the most common model in countries where SOF 
has not been fully developed as a strategic asset, or in countries where the 
strategic level has a small military staff. The “National Military Staff Element for 
Special Operations” is a SOF office among other offices at the strategic level, 
usually located in the Chief of Defense Staff’s operations section or plans 
section. The staff element has no command authority over national SOF, but 
functions as the actions officer and senior SOF advisor to the Chief of Defense 
and/or the Minister of Defense.51 
 
Figure 2.   National Military Staff Element 
 
 
                                            
51 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22. 
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Figure 3 shows the main responsibilities of a national military staff element 
for special operations as outlined in the NATO SOF Study.52 
 
Figure 3.   National Staff Element for Special Operations responsibilities 
                                            
52 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 24. 
National Military Staff Element for Special Operations 
 Serving as the senior SOF advisor to the Minister of Defense and chief 
of Defense to educate and inform on the capabilities, limitations, optimal 
employment, and requirements of national SOF 
 Developing a joint SOF vision to serve as a guide for unifying the 
service SOF units 
 Developing national SOF policy, doctrine, training, exercises, 
operational procedures, and acquisition 
 Integrating the SOF perspective and capabilities into defense guidance, 
strategic plans, joint operational plans, joint publications and doctrine 
 Serving as the primary coordinating authority among the service SOF 
units and with conventional forces 
 Working cooperatively with the military services to ensure that SOF 
units maintain and develop their capabilities 
 Monitoring and reporting on SOF operations, activities, joint training, 
and exercises 
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2. Model Two: Joint Special Operations Command 
Model Two (Figure 4) is in the NATO SOF Study referred to as a “Special 
Operations Component Command.”53 Notwithstanding, the document also uses 
the more precise term “Joint Special Operations Command,” as the conventional 
forces do not necessarily have to be organized in component commands.  
 
Figure 4.   Special Operations Component Command 
The joint special operations command is sometimes established in 
addition to the national military staff element for special operations. In other 
cases, it is the only staff element at the strategic and operational level. The joint 
special operations commander, normally a flag officer, is the senior SOF advisor 
to the Minister of Defense, Chief of Defense, and the Armed Forces Operational 
Headquarters commander, and is responsible for planning, coordination, 
                                            
53 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 25. 
 29
deployment, and employment of joint special operations. Within its organization, 
it should also have the capability to deploy a joint special operations task force 
headquarters, preferably with the potential of forming the cadre of a Combined 
Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) for NATO or 
other coalition operations. 
Despite having command authority over the tactical SOF units, the joint 
special operations commander is normally not responsible for certain force 
production activities (force development and force management), as these still 
belong to the services. Personnel from the Army SOF, Naval SOF, and Air Force 
SOF are still part of their respective services, and will be educated, paid, 
promoted, etc, through these individual services’ systems, unless the joint special 
operations command has been given specific tasks within some of these areas. 
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The NATO SOF Study lists the following main responsibilities of a joint 
special operations (component) command:54 
 
Figure 5.   Joint Special Operations Command responsibilities 
                                            
54 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 26–27. 
Joint Special Operations Command 
 Serve as the senior SOF advisor to the conventional joint operations 
commander 
 Developing joint SOF vision, policy, long-term strategy, and doctrine to 
integrate and harmonize service SOF units and enabling capabilities 
 Planning, coordinating, and conducting joint special operations 
independently or in combination with a joint conventional force 
commander 
 Identifying operational requirements and the necessary resources 
(equipment, assets, enablers, logistics support) 
 Establishing a standing deployable joint task force headquarters for the 
command and control of national joint special operations or combined 
joint force special operations 
 Managing programming and acquisition of SOF-specific equipment, 
and rapidly procuring mission-specific equipment, supplies, and 
services 
 Resourcing, planning, coordinating, and conducting joint and combined 
SOF training and exercises to standardize SOF tactics, techniques, 
and procedures 
 Establishing evaluation criteria to certify the ability of the service SOF 
units to meet the necessary standards for executing designated SOF 
missions 
 Designing tailored educational opportunities for SOF personnel and 
those personnel that support or enable SOF 
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3. Model Three: Special Operations Service 
Model Three (Figure 6) gives equal status to the SOF commander as to 
the other service commanders.55 
 
Figure 6.   Special Operations Service 
The commander of a “Special Operations Service” is a separate 
management staff, and holds all force production responsibilities, such as 
recruiting, educating, training, and paying, in addition to the responsibilities of the 
joint special operations command in Model Two. The focus of a special 
operations service often shifts from joint operational matters to force production 
matters, because of the inherent responsibilities that normally consume service 
staff capacities. Even though this model should provide a national SOF with the 
highest degree of flexibility and autonomy, an understaffed or inexperienced 
headquarters could be hampered by the wrong priorities and cumbersome 
                                            
55 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 27. 
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executive work because of all the force production responsibilities. 
Notwithstanding, a well-organized and experienced special operations service is 
the only type of organization where SOF can develop itself and its personnel 
independently, and make its own priorities within all aspects of operations, force 
production, and logistics. This model is often perceived as an end state among 
SOF personnel in most nations, as there seems to be a common discontentment 
within SOF communities about the conventional services’ lack of understanding 
for special operations needs.56 
                                            
56 Author’s observations from conversations with SOF personnel from various countries. 
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The NATO SOF Study lists the following main responsibilities of a special 
operations service:57 
 
Figure 7.   Special Operations Service responsibilities 
                                            
57 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 28–29 
Special Operations Service 
 Developing the SOF vision and long-term strategy that is aligned with 
national defense guidance 
 Developing SOF-specific policy derived from broader defense policy 
guidance 
 Serve as the senior SOF advisor to the conventional joint operations 
commander 
 Developing joint SOF vision, policy, long-term strategy, and doctrine to 
integrate and harmonize service SOF units and enabling capabilities 
 Planning, coordinating, and conducting joint special operations 
independently or in combination with a joint conventional force 
commander 
 Identifying operational requirements and the necessary resources 
(equipment, assets, enablers, logistics support) 
 Establishing a standing deployable joint task force headquarters for the 
command and control of national joint special operations or combined 
joint force special operations 
 Managing programming and acquisition of SOF-specific equipment, and 
rapidly procuring mission-specific equipment, supplies, and services 
 Resourcing, planning, coordinating, and conducting joint and combined 
SOF training and exercises to standardize SOF tactics, techniques, and 
procedures 
 Establishing evaluation criteria to certify the ability of the service SOF 
units to meet the necessary standards for executing designated SOF 
missions 
 Designing tailored educational opportunities for SOF personnel and 
those personnel that support or enable SOF 
 34
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 35
III. CASE 1: CANADIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
The next two chapters of the thesis consist of the two case studies of the 
Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) and the Polish Special 
Operations Forces (POLSOF). In both countries, a joint special operations 
command has recently been created at the strategic/operational level: 
CANSOFCOM was created in 2006, and POLSOCOM was created in 2007. The 
purpose of the case studies has been to identify effects that have impact on the 
strategic leverage of SOF, and examine if there is a potential for a better 
strategic utilization of SOF in Norway by following some of the experiences made 
by CANSOF and POLSOF. In both case studies, the NATO SOF Study’s 
description of abilities of a “world class special operations force’” has been used 
to measure the respective national special operations organizations’ strategic 
leverage.58 The two cases have a somewhat different approach. Hence, the 
methodology used in both cases will be described separately.  
The case study of CANSOF discloses that the transformation of the 
Canadian Forces in 2005–2006 increased CANSOF’s leverage at the strategic 
level. CANSOF went from being an ad hoc organization with only one tactical unit 
and a limited staff at the strategic level, to becoming a “world class special 
operations force.” With only one exception, all indicators showed a better 
utilization of CANSOF as a strategic asset.  
                                            
58 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, 2008), ii–iii. The NATO SOF Study also lists, as a requirement, the ability to 
provide tactical SOF enablers in its Annex A. These are: Air, Maritime, and Ground Mobility, 
Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, Liaison, 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), All-Source Intelligence, Medical, Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD), Logistics, Psychological and Information Operations, and Air Force Ground Personnel. A 
thorough study of CANSOFCOM’s and POLSOCOM’s status within these enablers has not been 
conducted, because of the inherent classification issues, as well as the problem of defining the 
levels of “adequate amount” in each case. 
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A. METHODOLOGY 
The case study is primarily based on Canadian literature on SOF and 
interviews with key personnel. Three relevant books on CANSOF and special 
operations, which were written in the period between 2004 and 2006, were 
examined. The history of CANSOF from its participation in World War II was 
analyzed in order to identify key events that might have had an impact in the 
development of CANSOF and the present conditions. Additionally, key personnel 
within the CANSOF community were interviewed in September 2009, during a 
visit to CANSOFCOM’s Headquarters in Ottawa, Canada. Interviews were 
conducted with the following personnel: 
1. (Name undisclosed), senior CANSOFCOM officer, with service 
from JTF2 
2. (Name undisclosed), senior CANSOFCOM officer, with service 
from JTF2 
3. (Name undisclosed), senior CANSOFCOM warrant officer, with 
service from JTF2 
4. (Name undisclosed), a former commanding officer JTF2, and 
former member of one of the “Tiger Teams” which did the 
conceptual work that led to the creation of CANSOFCOM, on behalf 
of the Chief of the Defense staff 
5. Colonel (Ret.) Clyde Russell, former director of Counter Terrorism 
Special Operations (CTSO) (telephone interview) 
6. Colonel Bernd Horn, former Deputy Commander CANSOFCOM, 
and co-editor/-author of the three books that are the main 
background literature for this case study 
A questionnaire and the NATO SOF Study were sent to all the 
interviewees (except from interviewee number 4) the week before the interviews 
took place. However, not all of the interviewees had had the time to review the 
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documents by the actual interview. All of the interviewees were asked the same 
questions regarding the strategic utilization of CANSOFCOM, which were based 
on in the NATO SOF Study. As many of the answers from the different 
interviewees were identical, and in some cases “too direct,” the source of each 
sentence has not been identified. Hence, the six interviewees have been cited 
equally. 
Since there have not been interviews with personnel outside the 
CANSOFCOM community, and because all of the interviewees have a stake in 
the organization and its history, there is a chance that the sample is biased. 
However, all the interviewees appeared forthright and unconstrained by political 
pressure during the interviews, and often appeared critical to various aspects of 
the organization. Most of them have experience from CANSOF before and after 
the transformation, and would have a personal stake in both periods. In some 
answers, there was a big gap between some of the interviewees. This was most 
often caused by different perceptions from the different levels, for instance: how 
much should one absent condition in a list of more than one conditions count? 
These situations sometimes created outliers, and will be commented accordingly, 
as a summary of the comments from the interviewees is included. Neither of the 
questions is weighted more or less than others, but a comment is provided in 
those cases where outliers are identified. The distribution of the answers to each 
question is depicted in Appendix B—Statistics from CANSOFCOM.  
The interviewees were given questions they could answer with their level 
of agreement/disagreement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Each question was asked twice: once for the period before the creation of 
CANSOFCOM and once for the current condition (as of September 2009). 
B. HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
The various special activities that were carried out during World War II are 
generally considered as the starting point of the Canadian Special Operations 
Forces. Canadians participated in both clandestine operations and guerrilla 
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warfare, led by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), and uniformed 
raiding operations under the command of Combined Operations Headquarters.59 
The most famous special operations unit, with a significant participation of 
Canadians, was the First Special Service Force (FSSF)—once known as the 
“Devil’s Brigade.” FSSF was a combined U.S./Canadian unit with approximately 
1,700 effectives, and it is assessed that one-third of these were Canadians.60 
The FSSF was initially designed, organized, and trained to conduct sabotage 
missions on large industrial targets deep in enemy territory.61 During the winter 
1942–43, FSSF’s expected mission, “Project Plough,” an assault on the 
hydroelectric power plant at Vemork, Norway, was cancelled. Subsequently, the 
existence of the unit was questioned, but General Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief 
of Staff, wanted to keep it as a “special infantry ‘shock’ formation.”62 In 1943, 
FSSF was transferred to Norfolk, Virginia, for amphibious training, and it carried 
out several successful missions in the European/Mediterranean Theater, as well 
as the Pacific Theater, between August 1943 and November 1944.63  
In the decades after World War II, Canada did not develop its own SOF 
capability. Some “special” units were created in the late 1940s: the Canadian 
Special Air Service was tasked to “keep the techniques employed by [British 
Special Air Service] persons during the war alive in the peacetime army,”64 and 
the Mobile Striking Force, which was a conventional airborne brigade. The former 
only was operational for one to two years, and the latter was part of the defense 
                                            
59 Sean M. Maloney, ”Who has served the Wind?: A Historical Overview of Canadian Special 
Operations Forces,” in Casting Lights on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special 
Operations Forces, ed. Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 184. 
60 Ibid., 188. 
61 Bret Werner, First Special Service Forces 1942–44 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2006), 4. 
62 Ibid., 11. 
63 Ibid., 13. 
64 Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski, Canadian Airborne Forces Since 1942 (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing Ltd, 2006), 17–19. 
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against large-scale Soviet operations in the Arctic.65 Apparently, the Cold War 
did not clearly necessitate the use of SOF in Canada or precipitate a Canadian 
need for such forces with expeditionary capabilities.  
In 1976, Canadian Forces formed the Special Service Force (SSF). The 
unit conducted training exchanges with foreign SOF units like Special Air 
Service, Special Boat Service, U.S. Special Forces, and U.S. Navy Sea Air Land 
(SEAL) teams. However, its tasks were not special operations tasks, as the unit 
was designed for use on NATO’s flank as part of Allied Command Europe (ACE), 
the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, and the United Nations 
Standby Battalion commitment. Hence, the unit was later characterized as a light 
infantry brigade.66 Another unit that has been associated with special operations 
is the Canadian Airborne Regiment, which was created in 1968. Even though it 
was “labeled as the nation’s strategic reserve,” the regiment was a light infantry 
force intended for conventional operations.67 It was disbanded in 1995, as a 
direct result of the Somalia affair, where a Somali teenager had been tortured 
and killed by members from the Canadian Airborne Regiment.68  
In 1993, when the Canadian Forces took over the domestic 
counterterrorist responsibility from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 
the first SOF unit, Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), was created.69 It is worth noting 
that a significant number of the personnel who formed JTF2 in 1992–93 were 
                                            
65 Horn and Wyczynski, Canadian Airborne Forces Since 1942, 20–21. 
66 Maloney, ”Who has served the Wind?” 193. 
67 Bernd Horn in Tony Balasevicius, ”Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole,” in Casting 
Lights on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces, ed. Bernd Horn 
and Tony Balasevicius (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 249. 
68 Donna Winslow, The Parliamentary Inquiry into the Canadian Peace Mission in Somalia, 
1. http://www.dcaf.ch/pcaf/ev_brussels_020712_winslow.pdf. 
69 The National Defense, “About JTF 2” in National Defense and the Canadian Forces, 
http://www.jtf2-foi2.forces.gc.ca/ajt-sfo/index-eng.asp. 
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soldiers with service in the Canadian Airborne Regiment.70  Because of the 
Somalia affair, this connection turned out to be a burden for the new 
counterterrorist unit. As with most other new SOF units around the world, JTF2 
faced many challenges within its own national system. Senior military and civilian 
leaders from the conventional environments and the political defense community 
distrusted JTF2 because of its members’ “unconventional” posture: grooming 
issues, lack of military behavior, “exaggerated secrecy,” apparent arrogance (“I 
can’t talk to you, because I’m special”), and alleged links to the Canadian 
Airborne Regiment during the Somalia affair.71 
Despite these critiques, JTF2 developed as a counterterrorist unit and 
evolved to meet the contemporary requirements and threats the following years. 
It conducted special operations within other mission types than counterterrorism, 
and the unit and its individual soldiers always delivered when a task was given to 
them. 
Little was known about JTF2’s existence outside the Canadian Forces. In 
general, Canadians did not think of special operations as a Canadian way of 
conducting military operations. Many Canadians thought of Canadian Forces as 
a United Nations peacekeeping force, or an “emergency force” that was designed 
for relief operations and for aiding disaster victims in the Third World.72 However, 
in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the press and the public strongly 
criticized the Canadian government for not supporting its brother nation enough. 
As a response to these aggressive attacks, the Canadian Defense Minister 
revealed the existence of the secret unit JTF2, and informed that it had already 
deployed to Afghanistan and participated in Operation Enduring Freedom. The 
immediate effect of this revelation was overwhelming. Canadians not only were 
                                            
70 Bernd Horn (author and former Deputy Commander CANSOFCOM), in interview with 
author, Kingston, Canada, September 1, 2009. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Maloney, ”Who has served the Wind?” 181. 
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satisfied, but also proud, that their military forces were able to help the United 
States with competent special operations forces.73 Suddenly, special operations 
were perceived to “fit perfectly with the Canadian way of war.”74 In the 
momentum of general support from the public, the press, and other decision-
makers, the Canadian Defense Minister put pressure on the military leadership to 
double the size of JTF2.75 Despite resistance against the doubling, it was hard to 
stall the enlargement of the unit.76  The impetus from the newly appointed Chief 
of the Defense Staff in 2004, General Rick Hillier, to transform the Canadian 
Forces, made the expansion almost irreversible.77  
Before the transformation, JTF2’s link to the strategic and operational levels 
was the Counter Terrorism Special Operations (CTSO) cell, which consisted of four 
men in 2003, and increased its number to 22 by February 2006, when 
CANSOFCOM stood up. The Director of CTSO was a Colonel, and he reported to 
“Number Three” in the CF chain of command at that time, the Deputy Chief of the 
Defense Staff. In accordance with the NATO SOF Study, CTSO would fall under the 
definition of a National Military Staff Element for Special Operations, and had limited 
capacity to follow up JTF2 in all strategic and operational matters.78 The forthcoming 
transformation would also include the creation of CANSOFCOM, and a completely 
different organizational focus on SOF. 
                                            
73 Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius, Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives 
on the Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), 13–14. 
74 Ibid., 14. 
75 Ibid. 
76 The resistance was directly related to the strong belief held by CTSO and others that 
quality is more important than quantity. There also existed opinions among personnel outside the 
CANSOF community that SOF should not expand. 
77 Bernd Horn, ”Special Operations Forces: Uncloaking an Enigma,” in Casting Light on the 
Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on the Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 
2007), 19. 
78 See the NATO SOF Study, 22-24, for the description of National Military Staff Element for 
Special Operations. 
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C. TRANSFORMATION OF THE CANADIAN FORCES 
In 2005, the Canadian Forces (CF) carried out an organizational 
transformation that primarily focused on the operational level. While the three 
traditional “environments” (services, i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force) still 
maintained their responsibility for force generation and force development, three 
(conventional) operational commands were created: 
 Canada Command (Canada COM), which is “responsible for 
Canadian Forces routine and contingency operations in Canada 
and North America” 
 Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), which is 
“responsible for the planning and conduct of all Canadian Forces 
operations outside North America” 
 Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), which 
“provides operational support for CF activities and missions at 
home and abroad including functions such as logistics, military 
engineering, health services and military police”79 
Ultimately, as an important part of the transformation, CANSOFCOM was 
created. Today, the command is at the same level as the other operational 
commands: Canada COM, CEFCOM, and CANOSCOM. However, 
CANSOFCOM distinguishes itself from the other commands because it is 
responsible only for force employment; it also performs force generation and 
force development of its own forces, with a few exceptions (e.g., some 
responsibilities over the 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron are retained 
by the Air Force). Hence, CANSOFCOM is regarded as “the fourth environment” 
of the Canadian Forces. Currently, the Commander of CANSOFCOM is a 
Brigadier General (O-7), but reports directly to the Chief of the Defense Staff 
(CDS), like the three-star commanders (O-9) of the other commands. The 
                                            
79 National Defense, the [Canadian], National Defense and the Canadian Forces, 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/. 
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interviews revealed that CANSOFCOM is moving toward a status as a special 
operations service, and can then be seen as Canada’s “fourth environment,” in 
addition to the fourth command (Figure 8).80 There are still some responsibilities 
left in the other services, but it seems likely that CANSOFCOM has the leverage 
and capacity to take over more of these in the future, as the organization matures 
and the other services have less stake in the force production of SOF.  
It seems clear from all literature and interviews that three special incidents 
made the creation of CANSOFCOM possible: the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
United States; the subsequent deployment of CANSOF to Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001; and General Hillier’s power to transform CF’s 
organization. Particularly, two persons within the CANSOF community, Colonel 
(ret.) Clyde Russell and Brigadier General D. Michael Day, were repeatedly 
mentioned as critical for CANSOF’s ability to influence the CF transformation 
process adequately, in order to obtain an outcome that would turn CANSOF into 
a “world class special operations force.” 
 
 
Figure 8.   Canadian Forces structure 
                                            
80 Organizational chart is from a CANSOFCOM command brief presented to the author in 




With the 2006 transformation of CANSOF, new tactical capabilities were 
added to the special operations environment: Canadian Special Operations 
Regiment (CSOR), 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS), and 
Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU). 
CSOR was created in 2006 as an enabler for JTF2 “to address a 
capability gap that existed prior to its creation.” It is located at Petawawa, 
Ontario, and is the primary CANSOF unit for Defense, Diplomacy, and Military 
Assistance (DDMA). Its mission is “[t]o provide a high readiness, agile and robust 
force capable of supporting and conducting a broad range of operation missions 
both at home and abroad.”81 
The special operations helicopter squadron 427 SOAS is based at 
Petawawa, Ontario. Its mission is “[t]o provide CANSOFCOM agile, high-
readiness special operations aviation forces capable of conducting special 
operations across the spectrum of conflict at home and abroad.”82 
CJIRU is CANSOFCOM’s immediate Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
and Nuclear (CBRN) response capability. The unit has three key mandates: to 
respond to CBRN events in conjunction with other elements of the National 
CBRN Response Team, to provide an agile integral part of the CANSOFCOM 
Immediate Reaction Task Force (IRTF), and to produce a planning, and advisory 
capability to CF expeditionary operations. Its mission is [t]o provide timely and 
agile broad based CBRN support to the Government of Canada in order to 
prevent, control and mitigate CBRN threats to Canada, Canadians and Canadian 
interests.83 
                                            





D. INTERVIEWS WITH CANSOFCOM KEY PERSONNEL 
In the following section, the answers from the interviewees are compiled, 
question-by-question, together with comments by the author. The first six 
questions (1A—1F) indicate the level of CANSOF’s strategic impact before and 
after the creation of CANSOFCOM, by examining indicators on the strategic 
custodian’s ability to carry out various tasks.84 Each question is answered by 
each interviewee twice:  
 “Was there a joint strategic custodian before the establishment of 
CANSOFCOM, with the ability to … (capability)” and 
 “Is there a joint strategic custodian after the establishment of 
CANSOFCOM, with the ability to … (capability).”  
The next three questions (2A—2C) indicate the level of CANSOF’s ability 
to conduct combined and joint special operations, in accordance with the NATO 
SOF Study’s requirements to a “world class SOF.” Each question is asked twice: 
  “Did CANSOF have the ability to … (activity)“ and 
 “Does CANSOF have the ability to … (activity).” 
The findings from both periods appear chronologically under the same 
heading. 
Figure 9 depicts that all indicators, except for one (1D), have improved 
after the creation of CANSOFCOM. Moreover, the three factors that are 
assessed as the most important for optimized strategic utilization of CANSOF 
(1A, 1B, and 2A), show a significant improvement in the CANSOFCOM model, 
compared to the old organization. 
                                            
84 In this research, the term “custodian” means a dedicated superior proponent, i.e., either a 
command or a staff element that ensures management and oversight over SOF. 
 46
 
Figure 9.   CANSOF’s strategic leverage by indicators 
1. Questions and Responses—Strategic Stewardship 
a. Question 1A  
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establish-
ment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to provide centralized stewardship, 
authority, and direction to joint special operations and national SOF? 
Before the transformation in 2006, the CTSO was the element that 
provided centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to special operations and 
national SOF with 22 men in the cell. However, there was only one SOF tactical unit 
(JTF2) at that time, and the main task of that unit was domestic counterterrorism. 
CTSO was able to carry out its responsibilities mainly because the amount of tasks 
was manageable, and because all members of the CTSO were experienced 
personnel. The CTSO did not have a command relationship to JTF2, but a 
coordinating relationship at the strategic/operational level. With only one tactical 
SOF unit, this seems to have been a well functioning model, since there were no 
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prioritization issues between numerous tactical units, and because JTF2 and CTSO 
were “single point of contacts” for each other at both levels. Two outliers focused on 
CTSO’s lacking command relationship, and gave this question a low score. 
Average score: 3.8 
The interviewees indicated that there has been a significant 
increase in CANSOFCOM’s ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, 
and direction to joint special operations and national SOF, compared with the 
CTSO cell. One part of the explanation is the bolstered manpower in the 
command. Another explanation is the organizational design from the 
transformation of CF that allows CANSOFCOM to be a force employer (FE), 
force generator (FG) and force developer (FD) at the same time, and that the 
Commander of CANSOFCOM is now at the same level as the commanders of 
the other operational commands and the environments (services).  Some of the 
interviewees pointed out that the command still suffers from growing pains, and 
that it consists of very many people who are not familiar and experienced enough 
in the SOF realm. “It takes ten years to build up ten years of experience,” one 
interviewee noted. 
Average score: 6.3 
b. Question 1B 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establish-
ment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to access senior defense leaders directly 
and advising them on SOF? 
The Director of the CTSO reported directly to the Deputy Chief of 
the Defense Staff (DCDS), who was the number three power in the Canadian 
Forces’ chain of command. Despite a well-functioning relationship with the 
DCDS, the interviewees pointed out that the office had a limited exposure and 
ability to reach out outside of the Department of the National Defense (DND). 
Average score: 5.0 
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While the Director of CTSO reported to number three in the chain of 
command, the DCDS, Commander CANSOFCOM now reports directly to the 
number one in the chain of command, the Chief of the Defense Staff, and has 
routine face time with the Minister of National Defense (MND). This difference 
has been crucial in the ability to utilize CANSOFCOM at the strategic level, 
because direct access to the Chief of the Defense Staff increased the confidence 
in CANSOF dramatically. One interviewee said that the government is more than 
happy to deploy SOF now, because of the confidence that is a result of the 
human factor between the actors at the strategic level. 
Average score: 6.8 
c. Question 1C 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establish-
ment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to control a separate budget for joint 
special operations and SOF-specific items? 
Before the transformation, the budget was held at the tactical unit, 
JTF2. Hence, CTSO did not control a separate budget, and CTSO’s impact on 
the use of JTF2’s budget was very limited. Since there was not a particular need 
for a budget for joint special operations with only one SOF unit, this arrangement 
appears to have functioned well. The various interviewees perceived this 
question differently. Some scored it relatively high, because it worked well, while 
others gave it a low score, because the CTSO did not control the budget itself. 
Average score: 3.9 
Today, CANSOFCOM has its own budget, and controls it 
completely. Only two of the interviewees gave a slightly lower score than 7 
(strongly agree) regarding CANSOFCOM’s ability to control a separate budget. 
The main reason was the rigid procurement processes in a larger organization. 
Average score: 6.6 
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d. Question 1D 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establish-
ment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-
peculiar items? 
Because the organization was smaller before the transformation, 
and because procurements were carried out at the tactical level, where the 
expertise was, acquisition of SOF-peculiar items was expedited rapidly. CTSO 
did not control the process; it enabled it. 
Average score: 6.3 
Some of the interviewees highlighted the “paradoxical situation,” 
as an expanded staff and a separate budget did not make the rapid 
acquisition of SOF-peculiar items faster or better. There are now more units to 
serve within the SOF community, and CANSOFCOM will, in most cases, 
examine the needs and requirements from all its sub-units before it 
effectuates any procurement. This “constrained freedom of action” has slowed 
down the process remarkably for JTF2; however, the other units within 
CANSOFCOM have easier access to better equipment now, and seem to 
benefit from the slow, but thorough, procurement processes. The staff for 
procurement issues has become bigger, and there is a better potential now. 
One of the interviewees also pointed out that the appetite for equipment has 
also increased, as the expectations and desires at the tactical level increase 
in line with the growing CANSOF organization. Procurements that are carried 
out today were not always attainable earlier, as there now is a better capacity 
to handle bigger projects. Nevertheless, the issue of slower procurement 
processes seems to be the most central friction point between JTF2 and 
CANSOFCOM during the creation of the latter. In sum, it appears that the 
overall capacity to carry out the total process of procurements for all types of 
SOF-specific items has been better, but that the “impatient” tactical level  
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suffers from a lower speed than earlier. The outlier that gave this question a 
low score emphasized that the acquisition process is far from as rapid and 
effective as it should be. 
Average score: 5.2 
e. Question 1E 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establish-
ment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to conduct and facilitate joint SOF 
training, exercises, and education? 
The CTSO cell did conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, 
exercises, and education. All these tasks were carried out before the 
transformation, but from the tactical level. Because the coordination and 
facilitation that actually existed was adequate, some interviewees gave this 
question a high score. Others, however, focused on CTSO’s lack of capacity to 
“own” these processes, and gave the question a low score. 
Average score: 3.8 
Currently, CANSOFCOM has a small J7 section that has a limited 
capacity to conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, exercises, and education. 
Training and exercises are normally planned, coordinated, and executed at the 
tactical level. However, there seems to be a conscious choice behind this 
decentralized model. CANSOFCOM avoids a strong focus on harmonizing the 
training calendars between the tactical units, because it does not want to take 
away a tactical commander’s freedom of maneuver to be able to surge and flex 
his training program to accommodate his needs. In case of joint training and 
exercises, the designated task force commander will plan, coordinate, and, 
facilitate the collective training, but it is eventually certified by the CANSOFCOM 
J7 staff. One example is the training and preparations related to CANSOFCOM’s 
security role in the Olympic Games in Vancouver 2010: the task force 
commander planned, coordinated and executed the training at the tactical and 
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“low operational” level, which would include maritime and air assets, Regional 
Joint Task Force (RJTF) commanders, Royal Military Canadian Police (RCMP) 
commanders, and tactical units. CANSOFCOM would coordinate at the strategic 
and “high operational” level, which would include CEFCOM, Canada COM, Chief 
of the Defense Staff (CDS), Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), Chief of Defense 
Intelligence (CDI), and other departments. There are some limitations in 
CANSOFCOM’s ability to reach out to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in order to 
exercise special operations with support from conventional forces. As the 
Commander of CANSOFCOM is outranked by the other operational and service 
commanders, and because he is at the outside of conventional hierarchy, he has 
little leverage to overrule the conventional CF’s priorities. Therefore, he lacks the 
ability to exercise joint special operations with external assets. 
In terms of professional military education, CANSOFCOM 
personnel identified the lack of a centralized training establishment as a shortfall. 
Even though the organization and its units run SOF-related courses, there is no 
Canadian “SOF school” yet. CANSOFCOM has authority for developing its own 
SOF training establishment; however, authority has not yet been granted to fill 
the positions in this establishment (one of the interviewees compared this 
unsatisfying situation with “you can drive wherever you want, but you can’t have 
a car”). The interviewees emphasized different aspects of this question. Some 
thought that the lack of a J7 or a training unit hampers CANSOFCOM’s ability to 
conduct and facilitate joint training, exercises, and education, while others were 
generally more satisfied with the force development of the CANSOF units. 




f. Question 1F 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establish-
ment of CANSOFCOM, with the ability to influence or manage the career 
development of SOF personnel? 
The CTSO did not have the capacity to prioritize career 
development of SOF personnel. With a very small staff, CTSO would have to 
focus on economics, manning, and missions, instead of a “systematic cultivation 
of the human resource.” 
Average score: 3.3 
After the creation of CANSOFCOM, the ability to influence and 
manage the career development has increased dramatically. With a much bigger 
staff than what CTSO had, CANSOFCOM has been able to work out 
arrangements that support the notion of cultivating the human resource within the 
SOF realm. CANSOFCOM is in the process of establishing SOF “occupations,”85 
and arrangements that prevent the other environments (services) from pulling 
SOF people back to the conventional units. One of the interviewees said that this 
is concretized through a “three tier” system. Tier 1 reflects “pure SOF personnel” 
who have been identified as future commanders and key personnel; tier 2 
reflects key personnel who will “come and go” between CANSOF and the 
conventional CF; tier 3 reflects personnel who temporarily serves in CANSOF, 
and will return to the conventional CF after his/her assignment in a SOF job. 
CANSOFCOM has very little influence over the air personnel within its 
organization (427 SOAS and air personnel in the CANSOFCOM staff), because 
personnel issues, including career development, are retained by the Canadian 
Air Force. In sum, CANSOFCOM can fully control “badged” personnel, but still 
                                            
85 CF MIL PERS INSTR 02/08 defines “Occupation” (or “Military Occupation”) as: “The 
fundamental grouping of personnel used for the Personnel Life Cycle of Activities. Each Military 
Occupation comprises a grouping of related jobs having similar duties and tasks and requiring 
similar competencies. Occupations include one or more entry-level jobs, followed by jobs at 
several subsequent developmental levels. An Occupation may or may not be sub-divided into 
Sub-occupations.” http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/pd/pi-ip/doc/02-08-eng.pdf. 
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has some way to go in order to be able to fully influence and manage the career 
development of SOF all its personnel. The command is organized to continue to 
improve these issues. 
Average score: 5.9 
2. Questions and Responses—Combined and Joint Capabilities 
a. Question 2A 
Did/does CANSOF have the ability to deploy and employ expeditio-
nary SOF tactical units capable of performing special operations in harsh, un-
certain, hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments in concert with 
other SOF from NATO members and partner nations? 
Even though JTF2 was intended for domestic CT operations, it had 
some limited capabilities to deploy an expeditionary SOF unit to harsh, uncertain, 
hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments. The reason why a CT unit 
had these skills was mainly that the majority of JTF2 initially came from the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment, and had valuable experience from “green” (field) 
training and operations. When JTF2 was created, its personnel selection process 
reflected the unit’s focus on its CT mission, and resembled a U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) type selection. Following JTF2’s first deployment to 
Afghanistan after 9/11, the decision was made to make the unit look more like 
the British Special Air Service (SAS) than the FBI. Hence, the selection course 
went through a transformation, and started focusing more on “green” disciplines, 
similar to the SAS selection. Deployments would be ad hoc before the creation of 
CANSOFCOM, but because there was only one unit, this was not very 
problematic to coordinate. CTSO was able to deploy several SOF lines of 
operations overseas, and had the ability to command JTF2 operations on behalf 
of DCDS, as strategic communications allowed a direct line from the TF 
commander to CTSO. In cases where a larger warfighting TF deployed, such as 
the one in Afghanistan in 2001, CTSO would have to change (over) operational 
control (CHOP) to the theater commander. 
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One interviewee gave this question a low score, because he 
focused on what he perceived as CTSO’s lack of ability to employ SOF tactical 
units compared to CANSOFCOM’s ability today, and thought that this was very 
important to address. The other interviewees disregarded this detail. 
Average score: 4.8 
Today, CANSOFCOM can deploy and employ expeditionary SOF 
task forces in all types of environments, all over the world. There are now more 
people involved in deployment and employment processes; however, the 
capacity has somewhat diminished, because the amount of tasks has increased. 
Even though CANSOFCOM has become a much better force employer, the 
strategic needs and desires to utilize its services has overwhelmed its capacity. 
In contrast to the period before CANSOFCOM was created, the 
strategic level is now capable of employing any type of CANSOF elements 
abroad. Also, it commands and controls discreet missions, or other missions in 
the national interest of Canada while CANSOF elements are OPCON to a theater 
commander; Commander CANSOFCOM will be the one “agreeing to pull the 
strategic trigger,” after the task force commander has vetted the mission and 
given his “tactical thumbs-up.” 
Average score: 6.5 
b. Question 2B 
Did/does CANSOF have the ability to establish a deployable joint 
special operations command element capable of commanding and controlling 
these SOF tactical units independently or as part of a larger national or 
multinational force? 
CTSO had a limited ability to establish an ad hoc joint special 
operations command element; i.e., it facilitated a deployment of JTF2, and 
provided resources to augment the deployed element. An example of this was 
the initial deployment of JTF2 to Afghanistan in 2001. CTSO never had the 
 55
capability to deploy itself. Most of the interviewees gave this question a high 
score, because CANSOF had repeatedly deployed a joint SOF command 
element with its tactical operators. However, the single outlier noted that this 
should be CTSO’s task, not the task of the JTF2 staff. 
Average score: 4.4 
The interviewees’ scores varied because of their different 
perceptions of the question. Most interviewees recognized that CANSOFCOM is 
now capable of establishing multiple deployable joint special operations 
command elements, as it has formalized a concept of task organizing its forces. 
However, one interviewee noted that the job of preparing and maintaining a 
deployable joint SOF command element is CANSOFCOM’s, not the tactical units 
within CANSOFCOM. Some task forces are pre-designed, and the responsibility 
for the different types of mission has been given to a commander of one of the 
tactical units. The organizational design will be based on the type and complexity 
of the operation. The task force personnel are never from only one single unit, as 
it will get the required personnel from CANSOFCOM’s total organization. 
CANSOFCOM is not capable of deploying or hosting a Combined 
Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) or a 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) in a multinational 
special operation. This is, however, not a goal for CANSOFCOM, as its priority is 
to dimension itself for domestic operations. Notwithstanding, the Canadian 
concept of task organizing its deployed forces includes a staff element that has J-
1 through J-8 capabilities, like the one CANSOFCOM currently has in 
Afghanistan. As noted by one of the interviewees, the command runs operations 
out of its headquarters in Ottawa, but it does not deploy out of Ottawa. 
CANSOFCOM’s tactical units are capable of sustaining task forces permanently 
in-theater, and run multiple lines of operations simultaneously. The task forces 
are capable of plugging into whichever organization they become a part of, but 
they are primarily dimensioned to deploy tactical units. The lack of a deployable 
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command and control element from the strategic/operational (CANSOFCOM) 
level infers certain shortfalls: communications equipment intended for tactical use 
may be utilized for operational/strategic communications. One interviewee noted:  
You can’t say that the headquarters has the capability of doing 
something, and then download the functional responsibility onto the 
unit  . . . You structure units; they’re funded, equipped, mandated, 
trained, prepared to do certain things. If you start hiving-off 
something as significant as a C2 node from the unit, you’re 
depriving it from its ability to do something else. 
Another shortfall is the lack of experienced personnel. 
CANSOFCOM is still nascent, in terms of special operations expertise and 
streamlined deployments with highly competent and experienced personnel at 
the operational level for special operations.  
Average score: 5.3 
c. Question 2C 
Did/does CANSOF have the ability to establish SOF combat 
support and combat support forces and capabilities dedicated to enabling joint 
special operations and national SOF? 
CTSO used to do a lot of shaping work, in terms of providing 
combat support forces to JTF2, but there were no combat support units 
dedicated for SOF mission before the establishment of CANSOFCOM. 







CANSOFCOM has made some progress after the creation of the 
command. The implementation of 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron 
(SOAS) and the creation of Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) and 
the Combined Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU) have leveraged 
CANSOFCOM’s flexibility and capacity to conduct special operations at a 
broader scale than before.86 
Average score: 5.3 
D. ANALYSIS 
Two key factors facilitate an optimal strategic utilization of CANSOFCOM: 
1) the organizational design of the new CF structure that allows the Commander 
of CANSOFCOM to own all SOF processes; force generation, force deployment, 
and force employment; and 2) the commander’s ability to have direct access to 
the Chief of Defense and the Minister of National Defense is paramount. 
Reporting to number one in the chain of command, Chief of the Defense 
Staff, has dramatically improved CANSOFCOM’s ability to build the required trust 
in the senior strategic leadership for a more appropriate and optimized utilization 
of CANSOF. However, a critical limitation in the model appeared to be the rank of 
the Commander of CANSOFCOM compared with the other operational 
commanders (O-9). However, this has been improved somewhat. At the time of 
the interviews, the rank of Commander CANSOFCOM was colonel (O-6), but he 
was promoted to the rank of brigadier general as of January 1, 2010. Since 
CANSOFCOM does not still have experienced badged officers with a higher 
rank, this limitation cannot be solved immediately. Even though it seems obvious 
that the Commander of CANSOFCOM must have a higher rank in order to 
function appropriately at the flag level, the solutions are few: an inexperienced 
                                            
86 Some of the interviewees included an assessment of combat service support (CSS, i.e., 
logistics, etc) while they assessed the Combat Support (CS, i.e., operational and fire support). As 
there are clearly more CS assets available and trained today than before the transformation (427 
SOAS, CJIRU and CSOR), and as CANSOFCOM has not established its own SOF CSS Unit, this 
may have resulted in a lower score than expected in the after condition. 
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(conventional) commander, or promotion of an experienced SOF officer that is 
“too young” for a higher level (in accordance with the CF personnel and career 
procedures). CANSOFCOM is now an operational command, in addition to an 
“environment”; with a few exceptions, especially within CANSOFCOM’s air 
personnel, the command can influence and manage the career development of 
its own personnel. 
CANSOFCOM appropriately controls its own budget, but seems to have 
problems with expediting rapid acquisitions of SOF-peculiar items, as the number 
of sub-units has increased. High technology and better (lighter, faster, smaller, 
etc) equipment is often seen as instrumental in the necessary development and 
improvement SOF units. Not being able to expedite such equipment rapidly 
enough causes friction and dissatisfaction in the system, especially at the tactical 
level where adequate equipment (in numbers and quality) is often perceived as 
one of the most important factors for mission success. “Institutionalized” slow 
procurement processes may very well cause a degree of mistrust at the tactical 
level, and can potentially degrade its confidence in the strategic level. In order to 
ensure an optimized relationship between strategic and tactical level, this issue 
must be addressed by CANSOFCOM. A world-class SOF must have 
institutionalized its ability to expedite rapid procurements of crucial equipment. 
CANSOFCOM does not yet conduct or facilitate joint SOF training, 
exercises, and education. However, the tactical units ensure that training and 
exercises are carried out in accordance with requirements, and the arrangements 
appear to function reasonably well. Additionally, CANSOFCOM is in the process 
of establishing a SOF Training Unit, which will be able to assist all levels of 
CANSOFCOM with training, exercises, and education. This will also support 
CANSOFCOM in its role to educate defense leadership and personnel from the 
other environments and commands on the appropriate development and 
employment of SOF. Thus, the establishment of an SOF Training Unit infers a 
potential to increase the strategic utilization of CANSOF in the future. 
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With the implementation/creation of CSOR, 427 SOAS, and CJIRU, 
CANSOFCOM appears to have a fairly well functioning organization that can 
provide appropriate combat support to most types of SOF missions. The 
integration with conventional units for special operations is not adequately 
developed yet. One of the identified shortfalls was the commander’s disability to 
influence the conventional forces’ priorities and willingness to exercise support to 
special operations. This shortfall can be mitigated by some of the measures 
mentioned above: allow the Commander of CANSOFCOM a more appropriate 
(higher) rank, and increase the capacity to educate the conventional forces in the 
importance of proper employment and support of special operations. As 
CANSOFCOM does not have a dedicated combat service support unit in its 
organization yet, it will have to rely on the support element in the tactical units, as 
well as support from the conventional units in the other commands. Again, an 
appropriate level support from the conventional forces requires a higher rank and 
the capacity to educate other parts of the CF on the SOF realm. 
CANSOFCOM has a pragmatic method of employing its forces; no 
missions are given to one single unit, but to pre-planned or ad hoc task 
forces with the required personnel for each mission. This method seems to 
support a good economy of force. However, the command does not have the 
ability to deploy a sustainable CJFSOCC, CJSOTF, or SOCCE. Key 
personnel from CANSOFCOM did not express this capability as a 
requirement or a goal either, as the domestic CT mission denies a 
deployment of a large amount of staff officers out of Canada. 
E. CONCLUSION 
After the creation of CANSOFCOM in 2006, Canadian SOF became 
“world-class special operations forces.” The command naturally still suffers from 
some growing pains; however, it is noteworthy how far it has developed its role 
as a special operations component command in only four years. Moreover, the 
command is moving toward the status as a special operations service. 
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CANSOFCOM is appropriately utilized at a strategic asset, and it appears to be a 
Level III SOF in accordance with the NATO SOF Study’s “Criteria for NATO SOF 
Capability levels.”87 Only one factor denies it from attaining the highest level 
(Level IV): its inability to establish and sustain a CJFSOCC for a considerable 
time without depriving the command’s ability to sustain and/or carry out its 
domestic counterterrorism responsibilities.  
                                            
87 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, Annex C, C1-C2. 
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IV. CASE 2: POLISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
The creation of the Polish Special Operations Command (POLSOCOM) in 
2007 has increased POLSOF’s influence and importance at the national strategic 
level.88 Before the creation, only the counterterrorist unit Grupa Reagowania 
Operacyjno-Manewrowego (GROM) had access to the strategic level and 
conducted special operations that may have had a strategic impact. Starting in 
2007, POLSOCOM develops toward a role as a framework nation for NATO 
SOF. This will provide Poland with an opportunity to lead NATO special 
operations, and therefore set the agenda and participate in high-level decision-
making within NATO. This research also identifies challenges that may have 
negative impact on POLSOF’s development timeline and their capability to plan 
and conduct the entire range of special operations from the operational to 
strategic level. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This case study is based primarily on interviews and conversations with 
various personnel from the POLSOF community. Some background information 
was retrieved from POLSOCOM’s official Web site, as well as from briefings that 
were received by the author during his visit to POLSOCOM. The interviews were 
conducted in February 2010 at POLSOCOM headquarters in Krakow, and at 
GROM’s facilities in Warsaw. Most of the POLSOCOM members who were 
interviewed in Krakow had served in at least one of the three SOF units: the 





                                            
88 The strategic level in Poland is divided into two sub-levels: the political-strategic level, 
which consists of the Cabinet of Ministers (the government), including the Minister/Ministry of 
National Defense, and the military-strategic level, which consists of the General Staff. 
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(1. PSK), or the maritime SOF unit, Morską Jednostkę Działań Specjalnych 
(often referred to as “Formoza”).89 The following persons from the POLSOF 
community were interviewed: 
1. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer 
2. (Name undisclosed), Main Expert Special Operations Matters 
POLSOCOM and former Commander of GROM 
3. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 1. 
PSK 
4. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 1. 
PSK and GROM 
5. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 1. 
PSK 
6. (Name undisclosed), senior POLSOCOM officer, with service in 
Formoza and GROM 
7. (Name undisclosed), senior GROM officer 
In order to prepare the interviewees for the questions before the actual 
interviews, a questionnaire was sent via the Polish liaison officer two weeks in 
advance. With only one exception (interviewee number 1), adequate time was 
given to discuss every question thoroughly with the interviewees. The 
questionnaire was, as well as the interviews, in English. All the interviewees 
spoke English, but some minor language challenges occurred. These were to a 
large degree solved by using the liaison officer as an English-Polish “interpreter,” 
as he could explain the full meaning of each question in Polish (if necessary), as 
well as he could help the interviewees with difficult words and terms in English. 
                                            
89 In the Polish Armed Forces, the Army is often referred to as “the Land Forces.” This 
research will use the term “the Army.” 
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The answers and opinions of the interviewees are firstly described, and then an 
analysis follows, with a holistic assessment of the POLSOF organization. 
Since there have not been interviews with personnel outside the 
POLSOCOM community, and because all of the interviewees have a stake in the 
organization and its history, there is a chance that the sample is biased. 
However, all the interviewees appeared forthright and unconstrained by political 
pressure during the interviews, and often appeared critical to various aspects of 
the organization. Most of them have experience from POLSOF before and after 
the transformation, and would have a personal stake in both periods. In some 
answers, there was a big gap between some of the interviewees. This was most 
often caused by different perceptions from the different levels, for instance: how 
much should one absent condition in a list of more than one conditions count? 
These situations sometimes created outliers, and will be commented accordingly, 
as a summary of the comments from the interviewees is included. Neither of the 
questions is weighted more or less than others, but a comment is provided in 
those cases where outliers are identified. The distribution of the answers to each 
question is depicted in Appendix C—Statistics from POLSOCOM. 
B. HISTORY OF THE POLISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
As of 2010, POLSOCOM consists of three tactical combat commands of 
battalion-regiment sizes. Two of them originally were designed to carry out 
special operations in support of their respective components: the Army and the 
Navy. The third unit was originally a paramilitary police unit with focus on both 
domestic and foreign counterterrorism and irregular threats, Even though Poland 
has had SOF, or “specialized units,” since before World War II, the units that 
exist today did not evolve into their current form until the 1990s.90  
The Army special operations unit was originally a reconnaissance 
company that was established in 1957 in Krakow. Throughout the next decades, 
                                            
90 Jaroslaw Jablonski, The Role of History in Creation and Design of Polish Special 
Operations Forces, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 8. 
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the unit expanded and changed its name several times. In 1961, it changed its 
name to 26th Reconnaissance Battalion, and later it moved from Krakow to 
Dziwnów and changed its name again to 1. Assault Battalion.91 In 1986, the unit 
moved to its current location in Lubliniec, and in 1993 it changed its name to 1. 
Special Forces Regiment. It got its current name, 1. Pułk Specjalny Komandosów 
[1. Special Commando Regiment] (1. PSK), in 1995, after it had reached 
operational readiness the year before.92 The unit is commonly referred to as “the 
Special Regiment.” 
The maritime special operations unit is based on a special marine scuba 
diving squadron that was established in 1975. The unit developed throughout the 
years, and changed its name to Special Action Department in 1987. Three years 
later, it changed its name to Scuba Diving Special Group.93 The unit’s main 
mission since its creation has been to conduct special operations in order to 
support Polish naval operations. When the unit became a part of POLSOCOM in 
2007, it changed its name to Morską Jednostkę Działań Specjalnych [Martime 
Special Action Unit] (MJDS), but is usually referred to as “Formoza.”94  
Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego [Operational Maneuver 
Response Group], or GROM (pron. “gromm”), was established as part of the 
national police force in 1990, and its main focus was to counter terrorism and to 
carry out other sensitive missions that required covert or clandestine actions. The 
unit was given a high priority, both economically and operationally, and it was 
                                            
91 Information is based on a 1. PSK command brief provided to the author from one of the 
interviewees. 
92 Wojsko Polskie [Polish Armed Forces], “Wojska Specjalne” [POLSOCOM], official Web 
site. http://www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl. 
93 POLSOCOM’s official Web site in English refers to “scuba diving.” However, it is more 
correct to use the term “frogman/frogmen.” 
94 Two reasons were provided to explain the nickname “Formoza.” One refers to the unit’s 
location at a torpedo test platform on a small island outside the coast of Gdynia and its similarity 
with the location of Taiwan (previously called Formosa) off the coast of China. The other reason 
given was that “Formoza” is the name of the snake that is depicted in MJDS’ insignia. 
 65
allowed to select personnel from other specialized military units and the police to 
develop its proficiency. In 1999, GROM was transferred from the Police to the 
Ministry of National Defense. Contrary to other tactical units, GROM did not 
report through any of the services or to the General Staff, but directly to the 
Minister of Defense. 
Before 2002, there was nobody at the strategic level who was dedicated to 
SOF subject matters. As the units carried out missions in support of their 
respective services (1. PSK and MJDS) and for the Ministry of National Defense 
(GROM), there seemed to be little or no need for jointness between them. They 
sometimes trained or exercised together, but there were no concepts or 
organization to conduct joint special operations.  
C. THE CREATION OF POLSOCOM 
At the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, the Polish Minster of Defense 
announced that Poland would commit itself to provide special operations forces 
as the main contribution to NATO in the future. As a result of the Prague Summit, 
six officers stood up a “Special Operations Forces Cell,” in order to act as 
advisors to the General Staff on special operations matters.95  The cell was 
organized under the General Staff’s P-3 (equivalent to J-3, or operations 
directorate). Later, in 2003, an “Assistant Chief of Staff SOF” emerged, and 
subsequently the Special Operations Forces Cell merged with this function. After 
the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, as a result of the Special Operations 
Transformation Initiative, a new “Special Forces Directorate” was created within 
the General Staff. This staff took over the Assistant Chief of Staff’s functions, with 
a two-star flag officer in charge and approximately 30 personnel in the staff. The 
function of the staff was limited to advising the General Staff on special 
operations matters. 
                                            
95 This staff is recognized in the NATO SOF Study as a “National Military Staff Element for 
Special Operations.” The interviewees who mentioned this staff element were not sure of an 
English translation of its name. Some of them referred to it as a “directorate,” while others used 
the more appropriate terms “cell” or “office.” 
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After the NATO Riga Summit in 2006, Poland incorporated the creation of 
POLSOCOM in its National Security Strategy for 2007, and two main courses of 
action for the development of a future POLSOF were submitted: 
 The first course of action was developed by the Commander of 
GROM, Brigadier General Roman Polko, and proposed a build-up 
around the already-existing “strategic” asset: GROM. This would 
necessitate a transfer of 1. PSK and MJDS to GROM, and then an 
expansion of GROM’s staff and organization in order to build a 
strategic/operational command with all the necessary enablers and 
support assets.  
 The second course of action was developed by the Assistant Chief 
of Staff SOF, Major General Jan Kempara. He suggested the 
creation of a strategic/operational special operations command with 
equal status to the existing services. In this model, GROM, 1. PSK, 
and MJDS would become subordinate tactical units to the 
operational command. 
The Ministry of National Defense submitted the two courses of action to its 
principle strategic partner, the United States. The latter replied that it endorsed 
Kempara’s course of action (number two), and that it would contribute with 
support from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the 
build-up of that model. Hence, with a significant support from the USSOCOM, 
POLSOCOM was established in Krakow on January 1, 2007. Some modifications 
to the proposed model followed; the most important one was that GROM 
continued to receive its budget directly from the Ministry of National Defense 
instead of receiving it from POLSOCOM.96 
                                            
96 For a short period of time after the creation of POLSOCOM, GROM’s budget was part of 
POLSOCOM’s budget. In 2008, however, the Ministry of National Defense changed it back to the 
old arrangement, i.e., GROM currently received its budget directly from the Ministry of National 
Defense, but is organizationally subordinate to POLSOCOM. 
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Currently, POLSOCOM assumes the status as a special operations 
service, with force production responsibilities (Figure 10).97 However, the 
organization does not include any air assets, which would have made the full 
responsibility of force production more difficult. In addition to its status as a 
service and an operational command, POLSOCOM also aims at becoming a 
NATO framework organization for Combined Joint Forces Special Operations 
Component Command (CJFSOCC) by the end of 2014. 
 
Figure 10.   Polish Forces structure 
D. INTERVIEWS WITH POLSOCOM KEY PERSONNEL 
In the following section, the results from the interviews have been 
comprised and commented. The first six questions (1A—1F) indicate the level of 
POLSOF’s strategic impact before and after the creation of POLSOCOM, by 
                                            
97 Organizational chart is a modified version of a chart e-mailed from a POLSOF officer to the 
author on April 4, 2010. 
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examining indicators on the strategic custodian’s ability to carry out various 
tasks.98 Each question is answered by each interviewee twice:  
 “Was there a joint strategic custodian before the establishment of 
POLSOCOM, with the ability to … (capability)” and 
 “Is there a joint strategic custodian after the establishment of 
POLSOCOM, with the ability to … (capability).”  
The next three questions (2A–2C) indicate the level of POLSOF’s ability to 
conduct combined and joint special operations, in accordance with the NATO 
SOF Study’s requirements to a “world class SOF.” Each question is asked twice: 
 “Did POLSOF have the ability to … (activity)” and 
 “Does POLSOF have the ability to … (activity).”  
The findings from both periods appear chronologically under the same 
heading. 
The findings from the interviews show that all indicators have improved 
after the creation of POLSOCOM. However, the average score still is not high 
enough to disregard some of the challenges in the POLSOCOM model. Even 
though the creation of the command appears to have prompted a higher degree 
of jointness within the POLSOF community and a closer connectivity with NATO 
SOF, there are still concerns that need to be dealt with in order to optimize the 
strategic utilization of POLSOCOM. Most of these concerns are rooted in the lack 
of integration of GROM personnel into POLSOCOM’s staff organization, and 
POLSOCOM’s lack of personnel with SOF experience and mindset. 
The staff elements that existed before the creation of POLSOCOM will be 
referred to as the General Staff Special Forces Cell (GSSF). 
                                            
98 In this research, the term “custodian” means a dedicated superior proponent, i.e., either a 
command or a staff element that ensures management and oversight over SOF. 
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Figure 11.   POLSOF’s strategic leverage by indicators 
1. Questions and Responses—Strategic Stewardship 
a. Question 1A  
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment 
of POLSOCOM, with the ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and 
direction to joint special operations and national SOF? 
Before the creation of POLSOCOM in 2007, the GSSF would be 
the joint body at the strategic level that had something to do with SOF as a 
subject matter. However, this cell was neither a command nor capable of acting 
as a custodian. It was largely comprised by personnel with little or no SOF 
background, and it did not have a mandate to command, control, or even 
coordinate activities between the tactical units. Its purpose was mainly to advise 
the General Staff on SOF matters, but the lack of SOF experience rendered the 
cell ineffective and somewhat superfluous. The GSSF did not assume any 
command functions or have any impact on the management of the tactical SOF 
units. Moreover, the vast majority of the staff officers had no SOF background, 
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little knowledge about special operations, and they were not able to advise the 
General Staff properly on such matters. Even though the GSSF consisted of an 
increasing number of personnel, none of the interviewees considered them as 
useful or beneficial to the special operations community; not even as advisors. 
Finally, there was little or no link between the tactical units and this strategic 
level, as GROM reported to the Ministry of National Defense, and 1. PSK and 
MJDS reported to their services. 
Average score: 1.3 
The majority of the interviewees assessed the situation as 
significantly better now than before, while one outlier addressed his concern 
about a more cumbersome stewardship between the strategic level and GROM 
today. Most of the interviewees recognized the young command’s growing-pains 
with inexperienced personnel as the main reason for not functioning optimally. 
After its creation, POLSOCOM has assumed the role as a joint strategic 
custodian for all POLSOF units. While 1. PSK and MJDS used to be tasked by 
the conventional services before 2007, POLSOCOM is now able to safeguard the 
proper use of its subordinate tactical units. However, there are still some 
challenges. First, the command is nascent and consists to a large degree of 
personnel with little knowledge about SOF. In a complex and dynamic 
environment, POLSOCOM still is not experienced enough to function optimally 
as a SOF staff, and much effort currently is put into educating POLSOCOM 
personnel in SOF-specific matters. Second, the command relationship between 
POLSOCOM and GROM is still a challenge. Since GROM receives its budget 
directly from the Ministry of National Defense, POLSOCOM is not capable of 
directing GROM freely. The interviewees largely agreed that POLSOCOM’s 
ability to provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special 
operations and national SOF is not optimized yet. 
Average score: 4.6 
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b. Question 1B 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment 
of POLSOCOM, with the ability to access senior defense leaders directly and 
advising them on SOF? 
Even though there was a staff element dedicated to advise the General 
Staff in special operations matters before the creation of POLSOCOM, the 
interviewees agreed that it did not fulfill that role, or any other useful role that they 
knew of. It consisted of personnel without experience and knowledge about special 
operations, and had little or no leverage at the strategic level. Notwithstanding, GROM 
had a direct command relationship to the Minister of Defense, and the commander 
also was authorized to talk directly to the Chief of Defense Staff. Two of the 
interviewees pointed out that this must be accounted for as “access to senior leaders 
directly.” Other interviewees recognized this direct contact between the tactical and 
strategic level as very useful, but disregarded it as a joint strategic custodian.  
Average score: 2.6 
The majority of the interviewees assessed that the ability to access 
senior defense leadership has become better after the creation of POLSOCOM. 
However, most of them also recognized that the GROM Commander still is the only 
person with direct contact with the Minister of Defense, and that the situation is not 
optimal from a joint command’s perspective. The commander of POLSOCOM is the 
only two-star flag officer among the service commanders, as the other commanders 
have three stars. Some of the interviewees noted that this gives POLSOCOM less 
leverage at the strategic level. One of the interviewees explained that only two 
persons from POLSOCOM work in the General Staff in Warsaw as of 2010. 
However, the plan is to increase this number to approximately ten persons, by 
establishing “POLSOCOM Warsaw Office” during 2011. This should increase 
POLSOCOM’s ability to advice and influence senior defense officers in the future.  
Average score: 3.6 
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c. Question 1C 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment 
of POLSOCOM, with the ability to control a separate budget for joint special 
operations and SOF-specific items? 
The GSSF did not have a separate budget, as the units received 
their money through their respective services. The fact that GROM’s budget 
came directly from the Ministry of National Defense is the only reason why some 
of the interviewees did not answer “condition not present” (0 points).  
Average score: 0.7 
Today, POLSOCOM controls its own budget, with one significant 
exception. As mentioned earlier, GROM still has a separate budget from the 
Ministry of National Defense and is neither monitored nor controlled by 
POLSOCOM or the General Staff. POLSOCOM’s budget; however, it is 
scrutinized by the General Staff, and often is subject to interference by the latter. 
Some of the interviewees expressed their concern about this issue, as it both 
jeopardizes the operational security, and opens it up for interference from 
conventional personnel in the General Staff (e.g., officers in the General Staff 
might question POLSOCOM’s prioritizations, or even refuse a particular 
purchase or project). Additionally, the high number of personnel without SOF 
background in POLSOCOM hampers the full effectiveness of controlling the 
budget, especially with regard to purchase of SOF-peculiar items. In sum, the 
interviewees generally expressed that POLSOCOM does not control its budget 
optimally, but that the situation is comfortable. 





d. Question 1D 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment 
of POLSOCOM, with the ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar 
items? 
The GSSF did not expedite any acquisitions or carry out material 
projects. Except from GROM, the units acquired equipment through their 
respective services. With its separate budget, GROM carried out rapid 
acquisition of SOF-peculiar items by itself, and only to its own organization. 
Average score: 0.7 
Today, POLSOCOM is responsible for acquisition of equipment to 
the subordinate units. However, three factors were pointed out as the main 
reason why POLSOCOM’s ability to do this is not flexible or optimal enough. 
First, the lack of personnel with deep knowledge and experience about SOF 
tactical equipment and requirements makes the command often turn to GROM 
for assistance, instead of doing the process itself. Second, the General Staff has 
the final word in acquisition processes that are carried out by POLSOCOM, and 
may change or stop these if needed. Finally, GROM’s separate budget makes it 
somewhat cumbersome for POLSOCOM to control all processes within its 
subordinate units. Even though GROM has almost unrestricted ability to expedite 
the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar items, POLSOCOM has not. In some 
cases, GROM personnel have to assist or take over POLSOCOM’s tasks when 
SOF-specific items are being acquired. 




e. Question 1E 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment 
of POLSOCOM, with the ability to conduct and facilitate joint SOF training, 
exercises, and education? 
The GSSF did not conduct or facilitate joint training, exercises, or 
education. One outlier rated a fairly high score (4), based on the fact that the 
tactical units actually carried out joint training and exercises before the creation 
of POLSOCOM. 
Average score: 1.1 
The situation has become better after the creation of POLSOCOM, 
but many of the interviewees pointed out the need for a subordinate joint-SOF 
training center. The two main factors that have made the situation better are the 
increased support from USSOCOM and its subordinate units, such as Joint 
Special Operations University, and the support from NATO and its NATO SOF 
Headquarters (NSHQ). Especially personnel in the POLSOCOM staff benefits 
from the training and education that is provided by NSHQ, as staff personnel 
constantly are being sent to NSHQ’s courses at different levels. Notwithstanding, 
some of the interviewees highlighted that sending personnel to the United States 
and to other NATO countries is both expensive and time consuming, and that a 
joint SOF training center that will be established after 2012 will improve this case 
in the future. 
Average score: 3.9 
f. Question 1F 
Was/is there a joint strategic custodian before/after the establishment 
of POLSOCOM, with the ability to influence or manage the career development of 
SOF personnel? 
GSSF had no capacity to influence or manage the career 
development of SOF personnel. The individual units’ career development was 
 75
managed differently through their respective services. When GROM transferred 
from the Police to the Armed Forces in 1999, the unit’s personnel kept their 
Police salary supplements, which resulted in a significantly higher average 
income than personnel from the other units in the Armed Forces, including MJDS 
and 1. PSK. Some of the interviewees assessed this fact as relevant, since it 
plays a role in the situation after the creation of POLSOCOM. 
Average score: 1.6 
Today, POLSOCOM has a limited ability to influence and manage 
the career development of SOF personnel, due to several reasons. First, 
POLSOCOM has since its creation had problems with acquiring experienced 
SOF personnel to its command. The tactical units had few or none to give away, 
and the very few who actually came from the tactical level had little 
understanding in working at the operational/strategic level. Hence, there are few 
people with adequate insight about SOF and the capability to develop a joint 
career development for POLSOF personnel. Second, there are national rules and 
arrangements that are beyond POLSOCOM’s mandate to cope with. One 
interviewee mentioned that the Armed Forces’ arrangements for commuters are 
poor, and discourage people from other districts of Poland to commute.99 Hence, 
the arrangements favor a situation where only personnel who want to move to 
the Krakow district work there. As mentioned earlier, GROM personnel have 
higher salary than the others while working in the tactical unit. If an officer from 
GROM starts working in POLSOCOM, he will lose the GROM supplements, and 
subsequently lose a significant amount from his income. This has resulted in a 
situation where no one from GROM wants to work in the POLSOCOM staff. The 
majority of the interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that 
POLSOCOM was not able to help GROM personnel keep their supplements if 
they are transferred to POLSOCOM. Not being able to integrate GROM 
                                            
99 Some of the examples given were poor quarters for commuters; fewer tickets reimbursed 
than purchased; and time-consuming constraints, such as the requirement to use trains instead of 
airlines over long distances. 
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personnel into POLSOCOM often was referred to as the number one reason for 
not being able to influence and manage the career development of SOF 
personnel, as the inclusion of such personnel is critical for this effort. The core of 
experienced SOF personnel in Poland is within GROM, but GROM personnel are 
hard to include, because there are few or no incentives for them to contribute to 
this necessary effort. One of the interviewees also explained that it is not enough 
with only one or a few persons from GROM in POLSOCOM; there needs to be a 
significant amount of them there in order to “get things done,” and it seems very 
little likely that this will happen in the foreseeable future. 
Notwithstanding, POLSOCOM continuously sends its personnel 
(mainly operations, plans, and intelligence) to the formalized NATO SOF Training 
and Education Program (NSTEP), as well as to various courses at Joint Special 
Operations University, in order to build up their SOF capabilities within the staff. 
This is the first step to manage a career path for SOF personnel at a higher level 
than the tactical.  
Average score: 3.9 
2. Questions and Responses—Combined and Joint Capabilities 
a. Question 2A 
Did/does POLSOF have the ability to deploy and employ expeditionary 
SOF tactical units capable of performing special operations in harsh, uncertain, 
hostile, denied, and politically sensitive environments in concert with other SOF from 
NATO members and partner nations? 
Before the creation of POLSOCOM, GROM was the only unit that 
was designed for and able to deploy as a tactical SOF unit in any type of 
environment. However, a transfer of authority to the regional commander was 
most often required, as the Ministry of National Defense or GROM itself had very 
limited capacity to employ its deployed detachments from Poland. Additionally, 
GROM did not have organic or designated air assets with SOF capabilities, and 
had to rely on external support if these were needed. MJDS’ and 1. PSK’s role 
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was to carry out special operations in support of their component services’ 
operations, and they were not traditional expeditionary forces dedicated for 
strategic out-of-area special operations.  
Average score: 3.3 
While GROM planned and carried out every aspect of a 
deployment before, POLSOCOM is now involved in GROM deployments. For 
GROM, these processes have become more cumbersome. However, 
POLSOCOM’s existence has made it possible for Poland to employ and deploy 
more SOF capabilities than before, even though the ability to employ is still not 
fully developed. POLSOCOM follows up the development of especially MJDS 
and 1. PSK as expeditionary capabilities, and is also in the process of developing 
a staff organization that is deployable for Task Force level deployments. This is 
scheduled to be fully operational capable in 2014. The main obstacle in this 
process is, again, the lack of experienced SOF personnel within the POLSOCOM 
staff.  
Average score: 4.6 
b. Question 2B 
Did/does POLSOF have the ability to establish a deployable joint 
special operations command element capable of commanding and controlling these 
SOF tactical units independently or as part of a larger national or multinational 
force? 
There was no such capability before the creation of POLSOCOM. 
The only exception would be the tactical staff in GROM’s organization, which was 
not considered a joint command element. 
Average score: 0.4 
POLSOCOM has offered NATO to be a framework nation for NATO 
SOF, and are in the process of establishing a deployable Combined Joint Forces 
Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) cadre, capable of 
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commanding and controlling national SOF, NATO SOF, or other coalition SOF 
operations. In addition to the preparations of staff personnel, a combat service 
support unit is being formed, in order to facilitate base set-up and support 
command and control infrastructure. Most of the interviewees were optimistic 
about this process, while some of them expressed their concerns about the lack 
of integration of GROM personnel in this effort, as well as the limited integration 
of SOF air in POLSOCOM. 
Average score: 4.7 
c. Question 2C 
Did/does POLSOF have the ability to establish SOF combat 
support and combat support forces and capabilities dedicated to enabling joint 
special operations and national SOF? 
Only GROM had the types of mission that require combat support 
from external combat support forces before the creation of POLSOCOM. This 
was done on a case-by-case basis, or by cooperation with preferred units. There 
were no dedicated combat support units for SOF before 2007. 
Average score: 1.6 
Today, a combat support and combat service support squadron 
that will consist of approximately 700 men and women is being developed in 
Krakow, co-located with POLSOCOM. The new unit will consist of three 
squadrons with the respective tasks: 
 Facilitate command and control infrastructure, including strategic, 
operational, and tactical communications 
 Logistics, including the most typical branches of combat service 
support  
 Various types of intelligence support, including human intelligence 
and signal intelligence 
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This new unit will be a significant contribution to POLSOCOM’s 
efforts, as well as to MJDS and 1. PSK. As most of these enabling capabilities 
are embedded in GROM’s organization already, there is less use for them in 
support to GROM operations. The lack of assigned air assets is still a major 
concern for optimal use in national special operations and operations abroad, 
and such capabilities are not included in the planned organization. 
Average score: 4.0 
E. ANALYSIS 
The creation of POLSOCOM appears as a necessity to develop the 
special operations forces for the Polish strategic ambitions for its SOF. The 
arrangements before the 2007 were not viable, partly because the services had 
too strong impact on the force production processes of their respective SOF 
units, and jointness was hard to nurture; only a joint strategic SOF command 
could provide centralized stewardship, authority, and direction to joint special 
operations. The GSSF did not have the knowledge, mandate, or leverage to do 
any of this. Today, POLSOCOM fulfills these tasks, with one significant 
exception: it does not fully control GROM, because of the latter’s separate 
budget from the Ministry of National Defense. Before the creation of the 
command, Poland had to choose between two options that both had their 
advantages and disadvantages: breed the existing, well-functioning link between 
GROM and the Ministry of National Defense, or build a service-size 
superstructure that would include GROM, but diminish the existing link between 
the tactical and strategic level. In order to fully provide a centralized stewardship, 
authority, and direction, POLSOCOM must take over (or share) GROM’s good 
relationship with the Minister of Defense. However, this cannot be done yet, and 
it should only happen if certain organizational criteria are met first: GROM 
personnel must be included in the POLSOCOM staff structure, and the future 
POLSOCOM Warsaw Office must earn the trust and confidence of the Ministry of 
National Defense, the General Staff, and the tactical SOF units. 
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The current POLSOCOM organization is a “correct” type of special 
operations service or special operations component command, in accordance with 
the NATO SOF Study. It has separate headquarters with subordinate tactical units 
with either equal status, or tasks and priorities that are defined by the 
strategic/operational command. However, the lack of SOF-experienced personnel, 
especially personnel with operator background from GROM, impedes 
POLSOCOM in performing its role as a joint strategic custodian. The fact that very 
few arrangements are set up to facilitate a significant impact of GROM personnel 
in POLSOCOM is alarming. An optimized joint POLSOF depends on a significant 
number of GROM personnel in POLSOCOM, including officers in decision-making 
positions. Into the foreseeable future, the POLSOCOM staff will probably not be 
able to plan and carry out all types of special operations; for instance, time-
sensitive counterterrorist operations, without experienced GROM personnel in the 
right positions. On the other hand, today’s organization might be more suitable for 
planning and conducting typical contemporary NATO SOF operations, such as 
non-kinetic operations (strategic reconnaissance and surveillance, military 
assistance, faction liaison, etc.) and traditional direct actions.  
With hindsight, one can contemplate the effects of the alternative option for 
POLSOF. If all units had been organized under GROM, as proposed by Brigadier 
General Polka, the result could very likely have become a big, “tactical” unit with 
suboptimal arrangements. The two other tactical units, MJDS and 1. PSK, might 
have been marginalized by GROM’s institutionalized mindset and prioritizations. 
However, GROM already had the needed experience and strategic leverage, and 
could also very well have been able to facilitate a strategic/operational command 
with support from the other units. Since GROM already was a separate unit 
outside the conventional structure, POLSOF could have earned the strategic 
leverage cheaply if all SOF units had supplemented GROM’s organization instead 
of today’s model; GROM was already “there.” Notwithstanding, this research did 
not focus on all the details of the rejected proposal; there could have been other, 
more important reasons for the turndown of that option. 
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The future of POLSOCOM’s organization seems like a dilemma because 
of the mentioned situation: should POLSOCOM take over GROM’s budget, and 
then eliminate the only direct link between the Minister of Defense and the SOF 
community, or should GROM continue to be treated differently from the other 
units in the future? One example would be if GROM functions as a Tier 1 unit 
with special, separate missions and command relationships outside 
POLSOCOM. Notwithstanding, the build-up of the POLSOCOM Warsaw Office 
appears to be a step in the right direction. If this office has the right personnel, 
with the experience, credibility, and SOF knowledge, it has the potential to forge 
a better relationship between POLSOF and the strategic level. It might, however, 
take some years before the Warsaw Office reaches the same level of trust and 
confidence as GROM already has at the strategic level today. POLSOCOM 
should therefore not oppose the current relationship between GROM and the 
Ministry of National Defense, but rather support it as long as the future Warsaw 
Office does not have the desired leverage at the strategic level yet. 
It would appear POLSOCOM has a hard time getting access to the senior 
military leadership in Poland, even though the command is equal to the other 
services. Today, the Commander of POLSOCOM has direct access to General 
Staff personnel, including the Chief of Defense Staff, and the GROM commander 
has access to the Minister of Defense. In order to exert leverage at the strategic 
level, more personnel from POLSOCOM should have direct access to senior 
military and political leaders. Advising non-SOF personnel on SOF matters is 
always a challenge, and requires both insight and integrity. POLSOCOM’s main 
problem today is that its staff does not have the capability (or, more likely, the 
possibility) to exert access to all necessary parts of the Polish Armed Forces 
structure. The physical distance between Warsaw and Krakow serves as an 
obstacle for an optimized communication between POLSOCOM and the strategic 
decision-makers. The future POLSOCOM Warsaw Office will provide an 
opportunity to improve this situation. The proximity to the Ministry of National 
Defense and the General Staff is paramount, but the Warsaw Office will still 
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depend on personnel with the right qualifications and personal skills, and with the 
ability to communicate well with both the strategic level in Warsaw and the 
POLSOCOM staff in Krakow. Sending personnel with little or no SOF 
background will not automatically give POLSOCOM the desired and necessary 
access to senior defense leaders, or the ability to advise decision-makers 
properly on SOF.  
POLSOCOM’s ability to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-peculiar 
items is promising, even though it is far from optimal yet. The POLSOCOM staff’s 
knowledge about the rapidly increasing technology in the SOF realm is limited, 
and the staff sometimes has to ask especially GROM for assistance, since there 
are more experienced personnel there. POLSOCOM needs dedicated personnel 
with good links to the tactical units, and with the right experience on the above-
mentioned processes. Additionally, POLSOCOM needs to overcome the 
challenges it has with interference from General Staff personnel; the final 
approvals for acquisitions should stay at POLSOCOM’s level, or at least be 
limited to a formal and very limited approval process, where for instance the 
Chief of Defense signs the approval after POLSOCOM’s Warsaw Office has 
given him POLSOCOM’s recommendations. Hopefully, POLSOCOM’s ability to 
control its own budget and expedite all types of acquisitions for its units will 
improve, but it will probably take years before the Polish bureaucracy is 
outmaneuvered, and the POLSOCOM logistics personnel have acquired 
adequate experience and streamlined connections with the tactical units. 
The establishment of a joint training center in 2012 appears necessary for 
improved jointness between the units. Even though the tactical units have 
somewhat separate missions, the need for joint SOF deployments and 
operations seems inevitable, just as it does in other NATO nations. In order to 
optimize the preparations and conducts of such joint deployments, arrangements 
need to be in place to facilitate jointness between the units. A crucial part of the 
training center’s mission should be education, not only training and exercises. 
Hopefully, the future training center will be able to concentrate on conceptual 
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issues, rather than operators’ techniques and procedures. It seems the tactical 
units maintain good skills at the tactical level, while there is no SOF-peculiar 
education earmarked at the junior officers’ level and up, except for the education 
that is provided by USSOCOM and NSHQ. The future training center should 
have the capacity to educate its instructors in the United States and at NSHQ, 
and then form its own instructor base with enough expertise and integrity to teach 
the rest of the POLSOCOM community. Hence, the training center provides a 
good opportunity for POLSOCOM to connect the units, and to create and 
develop operational concepts and SOF personnel pipelines. However, the future 
center is probably just as dependent on integrating GROM personnel as the 
POLSOCOM staff itself. Without GROM personnel (as well as MJDS and 1. PSK 
personnel), the training center will very likely lose its credibility among the tactical 
units.  
POLSOCOM needs to develop a thorough plan for its future training 
center. The plan must address the level of expertise of the instructors, the 
center’s prioritized activities (education, exercises, or training), the target 
audiences (only SOF, or combat service support, etc.), the level of training 
(operational, tactical, technical, etc.), and issues like audits, certifications, and 
personnel pipelines/career paths. Such a plan must be developed in concert with 
the tactical units, in order to assure jointness and credibility throughout the 
process of establishing and operationalizing the training center. Simultaneously, 
arrangements should be developed so that enough experienced personnel from 
GROM, MJDS, and 1. PSK are motivated to fill the billets at the center. An 
important issue would be that GROM personnel can keep (or even raise) their 
salary supplements even though they are transferred to another unit (the 
POLSOCOM staff or the training center). Economic incentives are probably not 
enough, however. Other aspects should be assessed, such as the location of the 
training center; permanent detachments to the tactical units; commuter 
arrangements; and rank and career promoting arrangements for the instructors. 
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Since a large part of the POLSOCOM staff consists of non-badged 
personnel, and even personnel without any background from the tactical SOF 
units, some changes seem essential: a certain percentage of the billets in the 
POLSOCOM staff should consist of badged personnel with operational 
experience.100 Also, some of the most important positions in the staff, especially 
decision-making positions, must be reserved for badged personnel from GROM, 
MJDS, and 1. PSK. Personnel at the lower levels need to understand that there 
are jobs that are earmarked for personnel with a particular background at the 
higher levels. In order to motivate the personnel to plan their career path early 
toward special positions in POLSOCOM, they must understand that they are 
wanted and that such a plan is necessary for promotions and a life-long career in 
the SOF community. It is therefore important that career plans are developed to 
secure that special personnel have special rights and opportunities all the way up 
to the flag officer level. Again, inclusion of the tactical units in this development 
process seems to be paramount for its success. Unfortunately, POLSOCOM’s 
main challenge continues to be how to motivate enough personnel from the 
tactical units to participate in such an effort. 
Polish SOF has a good reputation within NATO and the United States for 
its ability to provide expeditionary SOF tactical units capable of performing 
“any” type of special operation, and in “any” environment. GROM’s ability to 
“plug and play” into U.S. operations was well known before the establishment of 
POLSOCOM. Today’s organization will result in more forces to choose from, 
and increase POLSOF’s ability to send tactical units anywhere in the world. 
Since GROM now has an extra layer to report through, however, the processes 
before and during a deployment might seem more cumbersome today than 
before. Being able to employ its units while deployed is probably POLSOCOM’s 
biggest challenge in this matter. Again, experienced personnel with SOF 
                                            
100 In the NATO SOF community, “badged” means that a candidate has passed a SOF unit’s 
selection process, and often some additional required training that is seen as necessary to 
function as an operator in the unit. Different units have different selection processes and criteria 
for their definitions of “badged.” 
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background are needed throughout the organization, in order to optimize 
POLSOCOM’s ability to both employ and deploy its forces. 
In addition to employing and deploying its national forces, POLSOCOM 
has announced that it will be able to provide NATO with a framework nation 
cadre for a CJFSOCC in 2014. POLSOCOM seems very compliant toward 
NATO’s requirements and develops the CJFSOCC capabilities exactly in 
accordance with the proposed documents from NATO. Nations with framework 
nation capability for SOF are needed in NATO, and the Polish contribution will be 
welcomed. POLSOCOM must assure that it has the capacity both to deploy a 
CJFSOCC and a national Joint Special Operations Task Group headquarters 
independently (e.g., for another area of operations). This can be very personnel 
consuming in the future, and is dependent on experienced personnel. 
Apparently, POLSOCOM takes NATO’s requirements for enabling 
capabilities very seriously. The creation of a combat support and combat service 
support unit will improve POLSOCOM’s flexibility in terms of supporting its 
combat units, and enable joint or single service operations. GROM probably does 
not need much of this support, as it has its own enablers. Subsequently, it will be 
important that GROM’s and POLSOCOM’s enablers develop side-by-side, and 
avoid fighting for the same resources (personnel, equipment, etc.).  
The lack of air assets dedicated for POLSOCOM is disturbing, especially 
since POLSOCOM needs the assets and the expertise as a framework nation for 
all types of special operations. Examples from other nations’ special operations 
organizations show that it is difficult to include air assets into a joint special 
operations command or a special operations service. The national air force 
almost always will have a strong opinion about such a transfer of forces, and 
there are force production issues that come with airplanes and air personnel and 
operations that require a highly “air specialized” organization. Even though many 
of the interviewees expressed a desire to own all facets of the air assets and the 
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pertinent force production processes, examples from other NATO nations 
suggest that alternative arrangements sometimes are preferred.101  
POLSOCOM’s compliance with NATO requirements is positive, especially 
since it pursues the status as a framework nation. Following NATO publications 
and guidelines makes it easier for the organization to create the right types of 
enablers and combat support capabilities immediately, rather than spending 
valuable time and resources on trials and errors.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Indicators show that the creation of POLSOCOM in 2007 has improved 
Poland’s ability and means to utilize SOF at the strategic level. The main 
difference between the situations before and after the creation of POLSOCOM is 
that GROM was a unit utilized by the strategic level, while POLSOCOM has the 
potential to influence the national strategy by giving Poland leverage at the global 
arena.  
GROM’s situation before 2007 was comfortable, as the unit had direct 
access to the Minister of Defense and Chief of Defense Staff, and was directly 
subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The unit had ample means for its own 
management and procurements, good arrangements for rapid acquisition of 
SOF-peculiar items, good salary arrangements for its personnel, and a number of 
operational successes on its record. The creation of POLSOCOM changed 
GROM’s hegemony as a strategic asset, but seems to facilitate an opportunity for 
Poland to have a global reach, i.e., at the strategic level in NATO. As a future 
framework nation for NATO SOF, Poland may get access to more decision-
                                            
101 One of the models is that the national air force retains the entire force production 
processes, but dedicated airplanes and personnel are assigned for special operations. Another 
model is that the SOF command/service takes over the forces and the force production 
processes, but the air force retains certain parts of the latter, for instance flight safety, pilot 
education, aircraft maintenance, and so on. 
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making processes within NATO, including ad bellum and in bello decisions.102 
Additionally, Poland has more strategic capabilities to offer its primary strategic 
partner: the United States. 
However, there are some challenges in the Polish model that need to be 
addressed. GROM’s leverage at the strategic level is slowly diminishing, as the 
unit now is organized under POLSOCOM, and not directly under the Minister of 
Defense, as before 2007. The lack of experienced personnel with SOF 
background in POLSOCOM may have negative impact on the staff’s ability to 
take over GROM’s well-developed relationship with the strategic level in Poland. 
Since the Commander of POLSOCOM answers to the Chief of Defense (in a 
General Staff that is in a different city), it is difficult to maintain an equally good 
leverage at the strategic level, especially before the POLSOCOM Warsaw Office 
has been established.  
GROM’s existing budget relationship with the Ministry of National Defense 
may seem like an organizational dysfunction. However, as long as POLSOCOM 
is a nascent command that still lacks the expertise and integrity that GROM 
already has, the mentioned relationship between the Ministry of National Defense 
and GROM is a strong link between the POLSOF community and the strategic 
level, and should continue to exist. Only when POLSOCOM recognizes that it 
undoubtedly has adequate abilities to access senior defense leaders, and advise 
them on SOF, alternative arrangements for GROM’s budget should be 
discussed. If GROM’s missions and status turn out to be separate from the rest 




                                            
102 Ad bellum decisions refer to the decisions that are made before a war, e.g., whether the 
operation/intervention is going to take place at all. In bello decisions refer to the decisions during 
a war/operation, i.e., how the operation is being carried out. 
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This research has identified four crucial challenges that need to be 
addressed properly in the future, in order to make POSOCOM a world-class 
special operations force. Failing to do so may even result in a reduced ability 
to utilize POLSOF as strategic assets: 
 Arrangements that motivate personnel from the tactical units, 
especially GROM, must be established, in order to increase the 
number of experienced personnel in the POLSOCOM staff, the 
Warsaw Office, and the future training center. If GROM personnel 
are neither included in the processes nor the future organization, 
POLSOCOM’s ability to plan and conduct national and 
expeditionary special operations from an operational level may be 
limited to so-called “white SOF operations.”103 Additionally, 
POLSOF’s reputation among other NATO nations may even get 
hurt if the amount of “SOF-inexperienced” personnel is 
conspicuous. POLSOCOM should spend a lot of effort to solve this 
problem. The most significant issues in this case are to allow 
GROM personnel to keep, or even increase, their supplementary 
salary if they work in POLSOCOM, and to construct career paths 
that have distinct incentives for potential career officers in the 
tactical units. Notwithstanding, it seems that additional measures 
also are considered necessary to motivate GROM personnel. A 
project to identify such measures would be appropriate. 
 POLSOCOM needs to consolidate and guard an organization or a 
network that has the ability to access and advise senior military and 
political decision-makers on SOF. The POLSOCOM Warsaw Office 
                                            
103 The terms “white SOF” and “black SOF” are not official. However, they are regularly used 
to distinct SOF units that focus on counterterrorist operations and hostage release operations 
(black SOF) from the other SOF units that focus on the principal special operations tasks, such as 
SR&S, DA, and MA (white SOF). Several nations also use the terms Tier 1 and Tier 2 (and 
sometimes Tier 3) to differentiate between the tasks, readiness, and/or priority between SOF 
units. 
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is a step in this direction, but it is paramount that this body consists 
of experienced staff personnel with SOF background, and the 
integrity to address and challenge strategic decision-makers. 
 The establishment of a training center and a combat 
support/combat service support squadron seems important for the 
development of POLSOCOM. These two units are also dependent 
on highly qualified personnel, in order to develop and function 
properly. Finding qualified personnel for these billets might be 
difficult, as the tactical units struggle to keep their best officers and 
enlisted personnel already. Especially a labor shredding from the 
tactical units to the training center is painful and sometimes 
dangerous, as every unit has a limit in terms of vacancies and 
experience/inexperience among its personnel. A careful choice of 
the location and salary arrangements for the training center might 
have a significant impact on the success of its establishment and 
development. 
 The Commander of POLSOCOM must possess the same rank as 
his equivalent service commanders, in order to achieve the same 
level of influence and trust at the strategic level as the other 
services. Even though the commander is a flag officer, this is 
normally not enough. POLSOCOM suffers from the fact that the 
other service commanders have a higher rank, as the former will 
always be the junior officer in any discussion in the General Staff. 
The other services might argue that the rank is irrelevant, but 
almost every special operations force in the world has experienced 
that it in the end of the day, it is not. 
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V. CASE 3: NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) currently are not 
optimally utilized as strategic assets, and organizational changes should be 
made to improve Norway’s special operations capabilities for the future. A 
different organizational design for NORSOF can give Norwegian political and 
military decision-makers a better tool to support national interests, by controlling 
and coordinating NORSOF efforts more deliberately through a joint special 
operations command at the strategic level. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The case study is based on the author’s inside knowledge of the subject 
matter, and his personal relationships with NORSOF personnel and processes. It 
is likely that most stakeholders inside and outside the NORSOF community 
already have their personal opinions that make them biased.104 Since NORSOF 
has not been through a transformation like the Canadian Special Operations 
Forces (CANSOF) or the Polish Special Operations Forces (POLSOF), potential 
interviewees are likely to judge the current organizational arrangements for 
NORSOF and compare them either with existing organizations in other countries, 
or with perfect solutions, rather than realistic ones. While CANSOF and POLSOF 
interviewees have had the opportunity to evaluate their respective organizations 
both before and after the transformations, it is likely that stakeholders in Norway 
would compare their current organization with hypothetical alternatives that might 
amplify the low or high score of the latter. Hence, interviews with Norwegian 
stakeholders would reflect the interviewees’ desires, and not their real 
observations. A case study based on such interviews would not have been 
                                            
104 “Stakeholder” means any person or organization that has a stake in NORSOF, its tactical 
units, their economy, acquisition projects, bases, etc. For example, the Army, the Navy, the 
Defense Staff, and the Chief of Defense. “Inside the NORSOF community” means all the 
personnel within the tactical units, in addition to the four NORSOF personnel working in the 
Defense Staff and the 12 NORSOF personnel working in the Norwegian Joint Headquarters 
(Forsvarets hovedkvarter). 
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analogous to the before-after design that is used in the two former case studies. 
Three types of biases could have been expected if a research method similar to 
the case studies of CANSOF POLSOF had been used: 
 Some NORSOF representatives might fear that a low score on the 
current organization is perceived as lack of confidence in their 
“conventional” senior officers, rather than dissatisfaction with the 
model. In this case, interviewees might be prone to give the current 
model a higher score than their actual perception indicates. 
 NORSOF representatives who want a different model for NORSOF 
(either a joint command or a special operations service) are prone 
to give the current model (national military staff element for special 
operations) a lower score. 
 Stakeholders outside the NORSOF community, for instance 
decision-makers in the Army, the Navy, or the Defense Staff, are 
likely to disfavor a change that gives NORSOF more power, 
money, or personnel than what it has today, i.e., a model that gives 
themselves less influence and power over NORSOF. 
This case study firstly describes the current 2010 organizational design for 
NORSOF within the Norwegian Armed Forces structure. Secondly, the four 
factors that were listed in Chapter II are analyzed. Deductions are derived 
consecutively from the factor analysis, as well as from congruent findings from 
the case studies of CANSOF and POLSOF, if these apply. As a result of the 
analysis based on the three case studies, a recommended organizational model 
for NORSOF frames the conclusion of this thesis in Chapter VI, as well as 
pertinent policy recommendations that are based on the recommended 
organizational model. 
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B. THE CURRENT NORWEGIAN DEFENSE STRUCTURE 
1. The Ministry of Defense 
Forsvaret (the Defense, or the Norwegian Armed Forces) is one of four 
establishments/agencies under the Norwegian Ministry of Defense. The other 
establishments/agencies are Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (Norwegian National 
Security Authority), Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment), and Forsvarsbygg (Norwegian Defense Estates Agency). The 
Chief of Defense is the only active duty four-star flag officer in Norway.105 There 
is no assigned office or billets with special focus or responsibility on special 
operations matters within the Ministry of Defense. 
2. The Norwegian Armed Forces 
The Norwegian Armed Forces is organized with 11 commanders who are 
directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense (Figure 12). Three of these are three-
star flag officers: Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Armed Forces Operational 
Headquarters, and Chief of Norwegian Intelligence Service. The other eight flag 
officers are two-star generals or admirals, and among these are the chiefs of the 
services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Home Guard).106 The respective services 
assume administrative control over the NORSOF tactical units.107 In addition to 
the above-mentioned units, ten administrative units are subordinate to the 
Defense Staff, but not considered directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense.  
                                            
105 In accordance with the Norwegian constitution, the King of Norway is the Commander-in-
Chief of Norwegian Armed Forces. He is therefore also a four-star general in the Army and the Air 
Force, and a four-star admiral in the Navy. Retired generals keep their rank after retirement. 
106 The Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Home Guard, and Defense Information 
Infrastructure are called generalinspektør (Inspector General) in Norwegian. However, their 
responsibilities are not similar to U.S. inspectors general. They are responsible for all force 
production, i.e., force generation, force development, and force providing, within their respective 
domains. Their command relationship is referred to as administrative control. 
107 NATO (AAP-6) defines administrative control as “exercising authority over subordinate or 
other organizations (or other activities) in areas such as personnel administration, finance, 




Figure 12.   Commanders directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense 
3. The Defense Staff 
The Defense Staff is headed by the Chief of Defense Staff, a three-star 
flag officer who is also the Armed Forces’ second in command. The staff is 
divided into four divisions: Personnel, Operations, Finance and Management, 
and Organization. The Special Operations Section is one of five sections in the 
Operations Division and consists of four officers (as of June 2010): an O-6 
(Section Head), an O-5 (Army representative), and two O-4s (Navy and Air Force 
representatives). The section functions as the action officers and advisors on 
special operations matters to the Chief of Defense and the Defense Staff. It is 
worth noticing that the Special Operations Section reports to number three in the 
chain of command, similar to the arrangement in Canada before the creation of 
CANSOFCOM (the Counter Terrorism Special Operations cell reported to their 
number three, the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff). 
4. The Norwegian Joint Headquarters 
The Chief of Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) is a three-star flag 
officer who is directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense. As depicted in Figure 
12, the SOF element at the headquarters is subordinate to Chief J-3 (one-star), 
who is subordinate to Chief Operations (two-star). The Chief of J-3 SOF is an O-
6, and his responsibilities span all operational issues pertinent to special 
operations, such as planning and execution of live operations and exercises, 
creation of operation plans (OPLAN) and standing orders, and coordination of 
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joint exercise schedules. Additionally, the Chief of J-3 SOF is Commander 
NJHQ’s advisor on special operations matters. On August 1, 2009, J-3 SOF 
increased its number of billets from six to 12 officers. The number is a minimum 
requirement to maintain an adequate 24/7/365 manning.  
 
Figure 13.   NORSOF units and representation at the three levels 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Governing Documents, Doctrine, and Policy 
Like Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) and the 
Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, Parliamentary Bill no. 48 
clearly states that NORSOF are strategic assets and associated with the highest 
practical level, even though reality shows that this may be disputed.108 The 
current use of these forces does not seem to have a particular strategic impact, 
other than the inherent political profit at the national or international arenas that 
                                            
108 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, 
interesser og verdier [A Defense for protection of Norway’s security, interests, and resources], 
Parliamentary Bill no 48 (2007–2008), 63. 
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comes with the announcement of a deployment, or during the deployment itself 
(e.g., "we have special operations forces deployed in a NATO operation, 
therefore we contribute"). 
The Parliamentary Bill no. 48 also states that “it is important that the chain 
of command is clear and unequivocal, consisting of as few layers as possible.”109 
There is, however, little practical interface between the two units and the 
strategic realm. During exercises and operations, the tactical SOF units are 
usually OPCOM to Commander NJHQ. This command relationship is executed 
by J-3 SOF, but the latter has little power to decide or influence the development 
of the tactical units, budget priorities, training objectives, etc., because these 
issues are owned by the force providers, i.e., the services. Exercises are usually 
planned within the respective services, as the force providers are responsible for 
“the total process and activity that conduce to prepare forces ready for effort and 
includes education and training, human resources management, development of 
tactics, organization of forces, and materiel procurement.”110 Some exercises, 
particularly joint counterterrorist exercises and allied (NATO or Partnership for 
Peace) exercises, are planned and conducted by NJHQ. In these cases, the 
FSK-HJK and MJK reports directly to Chief of J-3 SOF, who may function as a 
joint special operations component commander.111  
Through the administrative chain of command, Commander FSK-HJK 
is one of eight commanders who reports directly to the Chief of the Army. 
The Chief of the Army is located at Bardufoss, Northern Norway, so there is 
less face-to-face interaction between the two commanders than if they were 
co-located. With the current organizational design for the Army, FSK-HJK’s 
command relationship within the service is appropriate. It could have been 
                                            
109 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 63. 
110 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Iverksettingsbrev for Forsvarssektoren 
[Implementation letter for the defense sector] (2009-2012), 38. 
111 The other components are the land component, the maritime component, and the air 
component. 
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optimal if the Chief of the Army and his staff were located somewhat closer 
to FSK-HJK (Rena), for instance Oslo. 
MJK, however, has four layers of commanders/staffs up to the Chief of 
Defense. Commander MJK’s rank is O-5, but he reports to the Commander 
Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group, who is also an O-5. The latter reports 
to the Commander of the Fleet, a one-star (O-7), who finally reports to the Chief 
of the Navy (O-8). These three commanders and their staffs are all located at the 
same naval base as MJK: Haakonsvern, Bergen. The Norwegian Naval Special 
Warfare Group consists of three conventional units in addition to MJK and a 
SOF/conventional training center, and may be headed by a Commander with 
service from any of these units (i.e., he does not necessarily have any special 
operations background). Remaining three levels below the Chief of the Navy, and 
four levels below the Chief of Defense, MJK is, in fact, as far away from the 
strategic level as a command unit can get in Norway. This organizational 
structure is cumbersome, and counters what the Parliamentary Bill no. 48 
expresses about a “chain of command [that] is clear and unequivocal, consisting 
of as few layers as possible.”112 If done properly, all synergies from the existing 
organizational model can be exploited in a future reorganization: the remainder of 
the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group would still be organized, equipped, 
and trained to conduct combat support and combat service support to both 
special operations (i.e., MJK) and to conventional naval operations.113 
Hence, the “practically short chain of command” exists during some 
exercises and operations, but most often is limited to a monitoring function by the 
NJHQ J-3 SOF during operations. The strategic level is seldom involved during 
SOF exercises, but has a distinct decision-making role before deployments. It 
                                            
112 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 63. 
113 Marinens jegervåpen (Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group) consists of MJK, 
Kystjegerkommandoen (Coastal Ranger Commando), Minedykkerkommandoen (Norwegian 
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Commando), Taktisk båtskvadron (Tactical Boat Squadron), 
and Marinens jegervåpen treningssenter (Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Training Center).  
 98
also has a monitoring function during operations, since the operational level 
(NJHQ) usually is delegated OPCOM over deployed forces. FSK-HJK is at the 
appropriate level within its service, while MJK’s situation is not optimal; the 
commander has too many layers of other commanders and staffs between 
himself and the Chief of the Navy, and cannot have direct contact with the latter 
(or others at the strategic level) without consent or presence from his superior 
commanders or staffs. A shorter chain of command is also in accordance with 
NATO doctrine for special operations, as well as findings from the NATO SOF 
Study.114 
The special operations air component, 137 Luftving (137 Air Wing) is 
responsible for providing air support to the two former.115 The government’s 
Implementation letter to the Defense sector states that NORSOF consists [only] 
of FSK-HJK and MJK. The letter mentions 137 Air Wing as a supporting unit, and 
not a part of NORSOF, as the air wing also conducts conventional operations.116. 
Not having air assets that are fully dedicated to special operations is not optimal, 
as a big portion of all special operation requires air support. Norway has a 
reduced ambition for its special air operations capabilities, as it does not have 
dedicated special air operations assets, but capable special air operations 
assets.117 With such a reduced ambition, organizational arrangements must be 
optimized in order to facilitate as good support as possible to NORSOF. 
Currently, both Special Operations Section and NJHQ J3 SOF have one O-4 
billet each earmarked for air force personnel. Special air operations personnel 
must be implemented in the future NORSOF organization, in order to ensure 
compliance with NATO requirements for special operations capabilities and to 
ensure a flexible and proper use of the air assets. Hence, a future NORSOF 
                                            
114 See, for instance, AJP-3.5, 3–6. 
115 Forsvarsdepartementet, Parliamentary Bill no. 48, 74. 
116 Forsvarsdepartementet, Implementation Letter, 38. 
117 Definitions in accordance with AJP-3.5, C8-C9. 
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command or service should have a limited number of force production 
responsibilities over the special air operations assets, and ensure a well-
functioning relationship with the Air Force, in order to optimize the use of these 
limited assets. 
 Deduction 1: MJK’s level in the Navy’s administrative chain of 
command should be similar to FSK-HJK’s level; the Commander of 
MJK should report directly to the Chief of the Navy. 
 Deduction 2: Commander MJK’s rank should be the same as 
Commander FSK-HJK’s rank, i.e., Navy Captain (O-6). 
 Deduction 3: Special air operations capabilities must be optimized 
by including competent Air Force personnel in the NORSOF 
community, including a future joint special operations command or 
service. The division of force production and operational 
responsibilities between the joint NORSOF leadership and the Air 
Force must be as perfect and functional as possible. Further 
assessments are necessary to ensure the proper use of special air 
operations capabilities. 
Evne til innsats: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret [Capability for Effort: 
Strategic concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces] emphasizes that Norway’s 
security policy depends on NATO, and that joint capabilities have priority over the 
individual services’ capabilities. The strategic concept sees out-of-area 
operations as instrumental to Norway’s national interests, and calls for flexible 
forces with the ability to operate in domestic and international environments, as 
well as the creation of “organizational structures that are adequately dynamic.”118 
The current organizational arrangement for NORSOF is based on 
compartmentalized representation at the different levels, but without a unified, 
                                            
118 Forsvarsdepartementet [Ministry of Defense], Evne til Innsats: Strategisk konsept for 




cohesive power that functions as a proponent for joint development and efforts. 
Unfortunately, the current relationship between the two tactical units can be 
described as competitive, rather than cooperative. Without a strong joint 
NORSOF custodian with executive power and authority, the two units are likely to 
continue to compete, rather than cooperate. Their orders and budgets come from 
the services, and usually are followed by instructions that benefit the respective 
services, not a joint effort. In order to assure an organization that is able to 
operate in a joint, dynamic environment, a national military staff element at the 
strategic level is not adequate. One of the national staff element’s most important 
tasks is to coordinate special operations plans, activities, and requirements with 
the services and the other military and defense political establishments.119 After 
two of the Norwegian chiefs of services (Army and Navy) moved from Oslo (out 
of the Defense Staff) to their respective main bases (Bardufoss and Bergen), 
such coordination has become more difficult for the Special Operations Section. 
Increasing the manning of the Special Operations Section might improve its 
coordinating capability, but it still lacks the authority for joint efforts. As the NATO 
SOF Study indicates, and as the two case studies in this thesis confirm, only a 
SOF commander has the authority to establish “unity of effort among the service 
SOF units, by integrating and harmonizing their individual capabilities.”120 Such a 
command is seen as a milestone in every NATO nation that has created one, 
and is the appropriate model for national SOF that need to achieve national 
security objectives.121 Notwithstanding, the NATO SOF Study also explains that 
a joint special operations command most often exists in addition to a special 
operations staff element, not necessarily in place of one. If a joint special 
operations command is not co-located with the national defense staff, SOF 
                                            
119 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, 2008), 22. 
120 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, iii. 
121 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 27. 
 101
representation still is important. In order to maintain a daily relationship with the 
strategic level, there needs to be a permanent representation by SOF in the 
Defense Staff, either by an embedded special operations staff element, or by a 
permanently detached liaison element from the joint special operations 
command. 
The NJHQ J-3 SOF is dimensioned to deploy NORSOF units to areas 
of operation, and to follow up administrative issues pertinent to NORSOF 
operations. As it is not yet fully manned, as of 2010, it is difficult to know if the 
J-3 SOF will be capable of employing NORSOF units and conducting out of 
area special operations, as well as maintaining its counterterrorist 
responsibility and capability. J-3 SOF can report directly to the Chief of NJHQ 
if necessary (i.e., it can bypass the Chief of J-3 in sensitive cases). During the 
bi-annual exercise COLD RESPONSE, J-3 SOF normally assumes the role as a 
cadre for a Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component 
Commander (CJFSOCC) for the participating nations.122 Even though the 
effort throughout the years is known as a success, the exercises show that 
such a task is time and personnel consuming, and that the J-3 SOF is not 
dimensioned to function as a joint special operations command over a long 
period of time. Moreover, NJHQ’s geographical location is in Bodø, Northern 
Norway, and a 90-minute flight from Oslo. This necessitates an extensive use 
of video teleconference (VTC) with the Defense Staff, in order to provide the 
desired impact at the strategic level. However, the two previous cases show 
the importance of a geographical proximity between SOF and strategic 
decision-makers. In the Canadian case, CANSOFCOM personnel were 
satisfied with the arrangements: they were within walking distance from the 
Defense Staff and the Ministry of Defense (in the same building, but on 
different floors). In the Polish case, it was obvious that the distance between 
                                            
122 Sometimes the exercise has had a different name than COLD RESPONSE. Also, before 
2007, the special operations component was called a Combined Joint Special Operations Task 
Force (CJSOTF). 
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Polish Special Operations Command (POLSOCOM) in Krakow and the 
General Staff in Warsaw is a challenge. POLSOCOM’s solution is to increase 
its Warsaw Office to approximately ten officers. 
 Deduction 4: The Norwegian Defense organization should develop 
a separate special operations command at the strategic level, as 
this would provide politicians and senior defense decision-makers 
with better grounds for decision-making and a greater space for 
freedom of action than with the current structure.  
 Deduction 5: Combat support to special operations (as well as 
conventional operations) should be formalized in the Norwegian 
Naval Special Warfare Group’s mission statement and in its 
subordinate units’ mission essential task lists. 
 Deduction 6: Even if a joint special operations command is 
established, the roles as advisors and SOF action officers should 
persist within the strategic and operational levels; either as liaison 
officers from the joint special operations command, or as part of the 
Defense Staff and NJHQ, like the current arrangements. 
2. Norway and NATO 
NATO’s importance in Norway’s security policy is noteworthy, because 
NORSOF is a budding agent to enhance this relationship. NORSOF has a good 
reputation within NATO for its efforts in operations; however, there is a potential 
to utilize NORSOF better at the strategic level, and actively include NORSOF 
actions in Norway’s security policy. NORSOF can be a tool for Norwegian 
decision-makers to participate in and influence NATO’s in bello decisions. 
Additionally, NORSOF can develop its network with other SOF units that may 
have access to senior defense leadership within their respective countries. Of 
course, all member nations in NATO want to influence the decision-making 
processes within the alliance, but an important factor for all of them is to 
contribute with relevant forces. A required capability within NATO is special 
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operations framework nations.123 If Norway develops such a framework nation 
capability within a national special operations command, NORSOF can facilitate 
and lead special operations within an area of operations that Norway considers a 
national security interest. A joint special operations command acts as the link 
between national decision-makers at the strategic level and the deployed 
combined joint forces special operations component command (CJFSOCC); it 
advises its national decision-makers on the appropriate employment of its forces, 
and it facilitates, mans, and instructs the CJFSOCC cadre in accordance with 
national strategic intentions. Notwithstanding, developing such a capability is 
neither cheap nor quickly and easily done. When the Polish Special Operations 
Forces Command was created in 2007, one of its main objectives was to build a 
special operations framework nation capability within 2012. In 2010, Poland was 
forced to postpone the due date for its readiness to 2014.  
For a small nation like Norway, developing a special operations framework 
nation capability is complex, but achievable. It can either be done alone or in 
cooperation with another nation (or nations), but it has to be a long-term goal. It 
takes time to develop the adequate mass of personnel, and the required 
knowledge and experience on special operations and CJFSOCC staff 
responsibilities. Norway’s role as a special operations framework nation during 
big NATO exercises demonstrates that NORSOF already has a potential. The 
long-term profit from such a goal is clear: a direct access to in-theater operational 
and strategic levels, and an opportunity for Norway to influence in bello decisions 
and NATO SOF’s modus operandi. An example would be to influence the degree 
of kinetic versus non-kinetic operations, or the focus on compliance with 
international law at the tactical level.  
Another similar approach to increase Norwegian influence within NATO is 
to take on additional decision-making billets at the NATO SOF Headquarters 
                                            
123 AJP-3.5 defines “special operations framework nation” as “[a] special operations force 
troop contributing nation that is capable of providing the framework for a combined joint force 
special operations component command.”  See AJP-3.5, LEX-6.  
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(NSHQ), or at in-theater SOF headquarters. In order to claim such billets, 
NORSOF must continue to contribute with relevant SOF assets to NATO 
operations. Norway should have an organization that can rotate qualified 
personnel into these positions. The remarkable momentum in the development of 
NATO SOF, after NSHQ was created in 2006, demonstrates that NSHQ is the 
only viable hub for a successful development of national SOF communities in 
NATO. NSHQ provides a common NATO SOF doctrine, certification programs, 
operational support to current operations, etc. Norway must continue to comply 
with NATO SOF requirements and participate actively in the development of 
NATO SOF. This includes participation in NATO SOF exercises, implementation 
of NATO SOF standards (e.g., planning procedures, certification processes), and 
providing qualified personnel to prioritized NATO SOF billets.  
An important, but less recognized, SOF strength is the recognition within 
the SOF network worldwide. Respected SOF units or nations may get access to 
other highly respected SOF units, i.e., one might get access to units that play a 
strategic role for their nations, or to information that may not be shared through 
other channels. Such information could be related to operations and intelligence 
during planning and operations, or development of new equipment and 
capabilities that are not accessible to conventional forces yet. MJK and FSK-HJK 
have good relations with preferred foreign SOF units, but these relationships and 
networks are not fully exploited at the operational or strategic levels, since the 
SOF staff officers at the Defense Staff and NJHQ are too few and have too many 
tasks to fulfill within their own organizations. A separate special operations 
command with an SOF commander is likely to prioritize facilitation and 
maintenance of such “strategic” networks, and exploit the benefits from them. Its 
officers will be able to move away from the primary role as advisors and action 
officers for senior defense leaders, toward a role as national SOF 
representatives, with a wider range of responsibility and an increased flexibility to 
prioritize such network-building. Notwithstanding, the roles as advisors and 
action officers must be maintained, but these roles are easier to fulfill in a less 
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cumbersome organization: a separate special operations command will have to 
permanently send its “liaison officers” to the appropriate levels (like 
POLSOCOM’s Warsaw Office), and/or the Special Operations Section and J-3 
SOF must continue to exist within their respective staffs. 
 Deduction 7: In order to increase the nation’s influence within 
NATO, Norway should consider developing a special operations 
framework nation capability for NATO operations. A national joint 
special operations command can facilitate the personnel and 
infrastructure of a future Norwegian-led CJFSOCC and coordinate 
national strategic interests with the deployed assets.  
 Deduction 8: In order to increase the nation’s influence within 
NATO, NORSOF should increase its focus on fostering adequate 
NORSOF personnel for decision-making billets throughout the 
NATO SOF community, such as NSHQ and in NATO operations. A 
joint special operations command must be able to prioritize, control 
and coordinate NORSOF’s relationship with other nations’ SOF 
commands and units, and develop these relationships in a manner 
that supports Norway’s national interests. 
3. The Security Environment 
The predicted security environment has an impact on both SOF and 
conventional forces. It is very likely that Norwegian military forces will continue to 
deploy to foreign areas and operate in complex and unpredictable environments. 
The borderline between special operations and conventional operations is not 
always clear during irregular warfare, and an inappropriate use of either can have 
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counterproductive or even fatal outcomes.124 There have been, and will most 
likely always be, requests for SOF in missions that do not really need SOF. 
Likewise, there will be conventional units that want to conduct SOF-like missions 
or start using SOF procedures to improve their operational results. Even though 
Norwegian forces tend to do a good job in out-of-area operations (e.g., 
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Gulf of Aden), general knowledge about the 
contemporary non-conventional environments, dominated by insurgencies, 
terrorism, and non-state actors, is still lacking in Norway. At some point, a special 
operation may change into a conventional operation, for instance if the enemy 
changes its tactics, or if special equipment has been made available for 
conventional units. It is paramount that SOF are not improperly used, either 
being retained unnecessarily in-theater or, even worse, being returned 
unnecessarily to the theater, based on “old political habits” and lack of proper 
advice on the correct use of SOF. SOF are valuable resources that have little 
endurance, especially if they are repeatedly misused. Strategic decision-makers 
need direct and continuous advice from knowledgeable personnel on the 
appropriate employment and deployment of SOF. 
Other crossover areas between SOF and conventional forces are combat 
support and combat service support to SOF. Properly managed, such support 
from conventional forces can be crucial in future operations, since NORSOF are 
not big enough to embed every required asset in terms of combat support and 
combat service support. However, these forces need to be organized, trained, 
manned, and equipped to support special operations. Developing such 
capabilities requires guidance and sometimes demands from SOF. This can be 
properly executed by a joint special operations commander who coordinates 
such efforts with the supporting services. 
                                            
124 The United States, the United Nations, NATO, and other organizations do not have a 
common term that describes the environments, threats, and conflicts that are antonyms of 
conventional wars, or state-to-state conflicts. Some of the terms used are asymmetric 
threats/warfare, irregular threats/warfare, unconventional threats/warfare, low-intensity conflicts, 
small wars, new wars, etc. Some nuances differ between these terms, and they may be used in a 
variety of ways to describe different aspects of the environment. 
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Recent operations in irregular environments have demonstrated the 
increasing demands for information operations capabilities within the special 
operations realm. Capabilities like psychological operations (PSYOP), computer 
network operations (CNO), and electronic warfare (EW) are repeatedly 
demonstrated as vital in contemporary operations, like counterinsurgencies and 
counterterrorist operations. While other parts of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
have developed information operations capabilities, the main focus within 
NORSOF is the development of capabilities that are needed in direct action 
missions. In order to provide Norwegian decision-makers with a more versatile 
NORSOF, information operations capabilities should be integrated in the future 
NORSOF organization. Appendix A will examine how information operations may 
be included and/or integrated in the NORSOF organization. 
 Deduction 9: A national special operations command should have 
the capacity to focus on the differences between special operations 
and conventional operations, and to educate and advise national 
decision-makers and the conventional services on the proper use of 
SOF, as well as the improper use of conventional forces in irregular 
warfare. Developing special operations-like capabilities within the 
conventional forces, including combat support and combat service 
support to NORSOF, must be carefully monitored and guided by 
the SOF custodian. 
 Deduction 10: NORSOF should include and/or implement 
information operations capabilities within its future organization. 
Some capabilities should be organic, while others may be 
supported by dedicated conventional units. 
4. The Three Types of SOF Custodian 
The NATO SOF Study lists three models of national SOF leadership. The 
current Norwegian organizational arrangements for NORSOF are a combination 
of two of them: the Special Operations Section in the Defense Staff is a national 
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military staff element for special operations (Model One) and the J-3 SOF in 
NJHQ resembles a special operations component command (Model Three).125 
However, neither of these two is dimensioned to conduct the respective duties 
that are listed in the NATO SOF Study.126 The numbers of officers within the two 
above-mentioned entities have developed independently, and the distribution is 
probably not optimal for NORSOF. Additionally, they are too few all together, and 
therefore not able to provide appropriate leadership for NORSOF. There are 
three main courses of action to further develop a NORSOF custodian in 
accordance with the NATO SOF Study: 
a. Bolstering the Current Arrangement 
The first course of action is to bolster the Special Operations 
Section within the Defense Staff with additional personnel, so it has the capability 
to follow up all the responsibilities of a national military staff element for special 
operations. This might turn out to be the easiest and cheapest course of action, 
since the organizational arrangements already exist, and the main effort is to find 
more billets in the Defense Staff. The downside with this model is clear: the two 
case studies of CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM indicate that it is difficult to 
utilize SOF optimally with this model, since the staff element is not given the 
required power to coordinate, or rather command, the efforts. Not reporting 
directly to the Chief of Defense causes a systemic inertia, since more layers 
need to be involved in the strategic decision-making processes. The analysis so 
far in this study strongly indicates that a national military staff element for special 
operations is not an appropriate model for Norway.  
                                            
125 NJHQ J-3 SOF is not a special operations component command in accordance with the 
NATO SOF Study, but functions as an “organic” component under Commander NJHQ, who 
normally assumes operational command (OPCOM) over all Norwegian military forces that are 
either employed or deployed. 
126 It is more accurate to say that the Special Operations Section does a little bit of 
everything, but is not adequately manned to continuously follow up all its tasks. NJHQ J-3 SOF 
generally focuses on preparation and conduct of SOF deployments and combined and joint SOF 
exercises. 
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b. Creating a Joint Special Operations Command 
The second course of action is to create a joint special operations 
command that reports directly to the Chief of Defense, while the respective 
services are still responsible for some of the force production. The model calls for 
more personnel than what the Special Operations Section and NJHQ J-3 SOF 
have today, but the main challenge is to remove power and authority from the 
services. However, this model is preferable to NORSOF, in terms of integrating 
and harmonizing the individual capabilities of the units, and to increase 
NORSOF’s leverage as a strategic asset. Creating a joint special operations 
command, headed by a SOF commander, would give NORSOF a unified power 
that has the authority to promote jointness and cooperation. This model ensures 
jointness better than the two other models, since it combines a joint focus with a 
service-oriented force production. This means that the services still have a strong 
stake in the focus and the development of their respective units, and will focus on 
their own requirements, in terms of support and coordination with SOF. Including 
special operations air assets in the NORSOF organization is less problematic 
with this model than with the two other models. A joint special operations 
command should either be co-located with the Defense Staff, or at least within 
“walking distance” from the latter (i.e., within the Oslo region), in order to 
maintain the relationship with the strategic levels. As the two case studies 
mentioned above indicate, the rank of a NORSOF commander should be in 
accordance with the equal commanders at his level (i.e., two-star). 
c. Creating a Special Operations Service 
The third course of action is to create a special operations service 
that reports directly to the Chief of Defense, and has equal force production 
responsibilities as the other services (the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the 
Home Guard). The advantage of this model is that SOF becomes its own entity, 
and can focus entirely on developing a common NORSOF culture. NORSOF 
would be responsible for its own career management, but this also implies that 
this new service has to assume responsibilities that are well-established in the 
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“conventional” services today, such as professional military education, human 
resource management, and project management. As the NATO SOF Study 
indicates, the focus may shift from an operational to an administrative mindset, 
since the amount of obligatory administrative tasks often consumes the 
organization. Moreover, such a model may weaken the links between SOF and 
the conventional services in a negative way; as soon as the latter have no 
influence in SOF’s focus areas, operations, and force production, they lose 
interest in cooperation and joint operations with SOF. The high standards for 
operations security, personnel security, etc., will additionally create a distance 
between SOF and the other services. Going directly to Model Three from the 
current model is not recommended; the two cases of CANSOFCOM and 
POLSOCOM point out the drawbacks of creating a big SOF organization that 
assumes all the duties of a service. The organization will quickly need a high 
number of personnel without any knowledge about, or relationship with, SOF. 
This may hamper crucial processes within the community, and result in 
dissatisfaction among the tactical units and lack of confidence in the staff. 
d. Recommending a Model 
Of the three models mentioned above, Model Two, joint special 
operations command, according to this study appears to be the best option for 
Norway. The model should be combined with representation in the Defense Staff 
and the Norwegian Armed Forces Operational Headquarters (NJHQ), similar to 
the representation that exists today, i.e., the Special Operations Section and the 
J-3 SOF. Further research should be conducted to examine if the two should be 
liaison officers, permanently detached from the special operations command, or if 
they should belong to their respective host units, like today. A joint special 
operations command can both deploy and employ NORSOF independently for 
domestic and out-of-area operations, or it can support Commander NJHQ if the 
Chief of Defense delegates OPCOM to the latter.  
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Model One, National Military Staff Element for Special Operations, 
is not suited to provide coherence and proper authority and direction over the 
NORSOF units. The units would continue to conduct high-level special 
operations like before, but the organizational design and the limitations of the 
model would prevent NORSOF from functioning optimally as strategic assets. 
Increasing the number of SOF personnel in the Defense Staff and NJHQ will 
definitely improve NORSOF’s situation, in terms of increasing the capacity of the 
action officers. However, just an increase of personnel probably will not change 
NORSOF’s leverage or ability to influence decision-making at the strategic level. 
Model Three, special operations service, is not a bad model for 
NORSOF, as it would provide the SOF commander with the authority to develop 
and exercise all aspects of special operations. However, several uncertainties 
and challenges deny it from being the recommended model. First, being fully 
responsible for all aspects of NORSOF’s force production, as well as planning 
and execution of all special operations, requires manpower that is difficult to find. 
Such personnel need a minimum of experience from special operations, and they 
cannot be taken from the two SOF units (or three, if one includes 137 Air Wing) 
or other conventional units, without hurting unit strength severely. Second, such 
a model may isolate the SOF community from the conventional community more 
than desired, as the other services most likely would lose interest in supporting a 
newly created service that focuses on its own development rather than joint 
cooperation. Third, the primary focus of the special operations service will have 
to be administrational issues, such as personnel management, logistics, and 
other non-operational responsibilities that have been taken away from the other 
services. Ultimately, this might hamper the organization’s goal: to optimize the 
strategic utilization of NORSOF. It a special operations service becomes a long-
term goal, it should only develop from an already established and experienced 
joint special operations command and at a point when the latter has the capacity 
to take over the full range of force production responsibilities. 
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 Deduction 11: Norway should establish a joint special operations 
command (Model Two). This command should be located within the 
Oslo region, and the commander should have the appropriate rank 
of his level of command, which is O-8 (major general or rear 
admiral). 
5. Countering Some of the Counter Arguments 
Traditional counter arguments always have been mentioned when the 
issue of a separate joint special operations command or service has been 
addressed in Norway. The main arguments are that such an additional command 
is unnecessary and expensive. The NATO SOF Study makes good counter-
arguments in these cases. The point about necessity is thoroughly explained in 
this thesis; in order to properly utilize NORSOF as strategic assets, a separate 
command is necessary. In contemporary environments, SOF most often 
operates as a separate component, it is joint by nature, and depends utterly on 
organizational mechanisms that allow the forces to function properly. Many 
people have argued that it is natural that NJHQ directs all Norwegian Armed 
Forces domestic and out-of-area operations to coordinate and synchronize all 
operational efforts. However, the effect of this arrangement is that SOF is not 
utilized as a strategic asset. It is important to remember that even though 
NORSOF has been deployed to somewhat “conventional” theaters, like the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden, future special operations may not 
look like any operations Norway has deployed its forces to before. Monitoring 
operations where NORSOF is detached to a joint force commander is “easy,” but 
future special operations could be far more complex, sensitive, and politically 
risky. The example of Norwegian Intelligence Service can be used to understand 
the necessity of autonomy to be a strategic asset. The intelligence service plans, 
deploys, and employs its own forces independently, but in liaison with NJHQ 
where this is necessary. In order to ensure synchronization between NORSOF 
and Norwegian conventional forces in a future model, the existing J-3 SOF must 
persist as a part of NJHQ, or be redesignated as a permanently detached liaison 
 113
element from SOF to NJHQ. Notwithstanding, the creation of a joint special 
operations command does not mean that NORSOF cannot be commanded from 
NJHQ, if that continues to be the prevailing model. Creating a SOF command will 
facilitate more jointness, better coordination, and better economy of force; 
moreover, it will supply the Chief of Defense and Commander NJHQ with more 
versatile and robust SOF than those available today. 
The argument about costs needs some additional attention. Expenditure 
to a proper development of SOF as a national strategic capability is only a small 
fraction of a nation’s larger defense budget when compared to “conventional” 
defense systems and platforms. The NATO SOF Study also points out that the 
critical difference between the latter investments and SOF investments is the 
capability achieved relative to the security environment that is anticipated. “For a 
relatively inconsequential investment, a nation can equip a world class SOF 
organization and enable a significant national strategic capability.” 127 
                                            
127 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 32. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Norway needs to optimize their special operations forces (SOF) as 
strategic assets to support national interests and to provide the national political 
leadership with better grounds for decision-making and a greater space for 
freedom of action. For optimal utilization of the Norwegian Special Operations 
Forces (NORSOF) as strategic assets, the Norwegian Armed Forces should 
establish a joint special operations command, resembling the model that the 
NATO SOF Study refers to as a Special Operations Component Command 
(Model Two).128 Governing Norwegian documents, as well as NATO doctrine, 
support organizational improvements that facilitate more effective special 
operations capabilities. The current organizational design is not optimal because 
the NORSOF representation at the strategic and operational levels is 
fragmented, and remains without authority to develop and coordinate Norway’s 
national special operations efforts. The NATO SOF Study concludes that “the 
critical ingredient to optimize SOF is a dedicated national special operations 
organization to provide coherent, long-term stewardship, authority, and direction 
over all aspects of special operations.”129 Only a separate joint special 
operations command or service can execute effective authority and directions 
over NORSOF. A strengthening, but continuation of the current organization is 
not sufficient; the NORSOF community will continue to suffer from lack of proper 
stewardship, coordination, and economy of force. Going from the current 
organizational arrangements directly to a special operations service (Model 
Three) is not recommended, as the total portfolio of force production 
responsibilities would most likely overwhelm the organization. 
                                            
128 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2008), 25–27. 
129 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, ii. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In accordance with the conclusion, multiple actions should be taken to 
optimize the strategic utilization of NORSOF. The following recommendations are 
based on the deductions from the case study of NORSOF and the analysis of the 
indicators that were used in the case studies of the Canadian Special Operations 
Forces (CANSOF) and the Polish Special Operations Forces (POLSOF). 
1. Create a Joint Special Operations Command 
a. Norway should establish a joint special operations command 
(Model Two) at the strategic/operational level. The division of force 
production responsibilities between the other services and the joint 
special operations command must be agreed upon in the process 
of establishing the command. The size of the command should be 
based on availability and development, and not on absolute 
requirements. The division of billets between the services needs to 
be balanced, in order to avoid skewed interests from the start. All 
decision-making positions need to be filled with experienced SOF 
personnel. It is not recommended to fill up a large number of billets 
with inexperienced personnel, but rather to develop the command 
in line with what the NORSOF community has available and is able 
to comprehend (“evolution, not revolution”).  
b. This command should be located within the Oslo region, close to 
the political- and military-strategic decision-makers. The Polish 
case shows that only a few hours of travel distance from the 
decision-makers hampers the relationship between the strategic 
level and the SOF command. The Canadian case demonstrates the 
opposite: co-location fosters a good and daily relationship with the 
military strategic level. 
c. The commander of the joint special operations command must 
have the appropriate rank of his level of command, which is O-8 
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(major general or rear admiral), and he must be directly subordinate 
to the Chef of Defense, like the chiefs of the services. Both the 
Canadian and the Polish cases confirm that even if the SOF 
commander is only one or two ranks below the equally leveled 
commanders, SOF loses a lot of influence and prestige among the 
other commanders and services, and will always be viewed as the 
junior service/component, despite its high relevance in 
contemporary operations and its strategic importance. 
2. Roles of the Joint Special Operations Command 
d. The joint special operations command should normally be 
delegated OPCOM over NORSOF assets, and be able to deploy 
and employ NORSOF, both independently and in cooperation with 
NJHQ. The division of labor and responsibilities for SOF 
deployments between the joint special operations command and 
NJHQ must be scrutinized, and subject to national interests, not a 
turf war between commanders. In some operations, OPCON may 
be delegated to NJHQ, or OPCOM/OPCON over support assets 
may be retained, e.g., special air operations assets or submarines. 
In other cases, especially in covert and/or clandestine operations, 
the command may deploy and employ SOF independently, and 
informs NJHQ or other units as appropriate. It is important to note 
that the establishment of a joint special operations command does 
not exclude a potential continuation of the current command and 
control arrangements: the Chief of Defense may continue to 
delegate OPCOM to Commander NJHQ over all national assets, 
including the joint special operations commander. 
e. The roles as advisors and SOF action officers should persist within 
the strategic and operational organizations; either as permanent 
liaison officer detachments from the joint special operations 
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command, or as part of the Defense Staff and NJHQ, like in the 
current arrangements. The current NJHQ J-3 SOF may be 
redesignated as a Special Operations Command and Control 
Element (SOCCE), subordinate to the Joint Special Operations 
Command, but permanently detached to NJHQ to “synchronize, 
deconflict, and coordinate operations with conventional [air,] land or 
maritime forces.”130 
f. A national special operations command should have the capacity to 
focus on the differences between special operations and 
conventional operations, and to educate and advise national 
decision-makers and the conventional services on the proper use of 
SOF, as well as the improper use of conventional forces in irregular 
warfare. Developing special operations-like capabilities within the 
conventional forces, including combat support and combat service 
support to NORSOF, must be carefully monitored and guided by 
the SOF custodian. A joint special operations commander will be 
the services’ primary advisor on understanding special operations 
and to facilitate good rapport between the communities, as well as 
the development of new capabilities, enablers, special operations 
combat support, and combat service support capabilities within the 
services.  
g. The joint special operations command should control a separate 
budget for joint special operations. The case studies of 
CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM demonstrate the significant 
advantage of a separate budget. The SOF commanders can make 
decisions that leverage the joint capabilities instead of suboptimal 
                                            
130 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) 
(Mons, Belgium: NSCC, 2009), LEX-5. Normally, a Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) 
would do the same tasks as a SOCCE, but to the air component commander. In a Norwegian 
model, a SOCCE with experienced special air operations personnel would be adequate. 
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service-biased capabilities. A separate budget also protects 
operational security issues, since it only goes through the SOF 
chain of command. The parent services can still have force 
production responsibilities, such as professional military education, 
base management, and safety quality control, but the SOF units 
must be allocated a certain amount of funds that cannot be 
redistributed or cut by the services. 
h. The joint special operations command should have the authority 
and means to expedite the rapid acquisition of SOF-specific items. 
However, the case studies of CANSOFCOM and POLSOCOM 
demonstrate that this issue requires particular attention. The 
current procurement arrangements for NORSOF are already 
elevated from the tactical level and should be better prepared for a 
creation of a joint special operations command. The latter will make 
the cross-service decisions on what and how much to procure, and 
which procurements be prioritized. The current procurement 
organization is undermanned, especially the action officers in the 
Defense Logistics Organization, and has little capacity to follow up 
multiple rapid procurements at the same time as multiple project 
timelines are maintained. Hence, the procurement organization 
should be augmented, and key personnel in the current 
organization must be kept to maintain continuity as well. 
i. The joint special operations command should consist of a training 
and education branch (J-7) that assumes the responsibility to 
facilitate and/or direct joint training, exercise, and education. The 
case studies of POLSOF and CANSOF indicated that joint training 
is a means, not the ends. Facilitating joint concepts, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures through training and exercises is 
important, but a critical aspect is to ensure that a sufficient number 
of special operations personnel get relevant professional military 
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education. The training centers/wings in the tactical units should 
have some joint responsibilities, in addition to the responsibilities 
they have within their own services. For instance, one training 
center/wing is responsible for facilitating annual operations planning 
process courses, while another training center/wing is responsible 
for annual sniper courses, etc. J-7, together with the tactical 
units/training centers, should derive the division of labor and 
responsibilities between the units and the command. 
j. The joint special operations command must have the ability to 
either manage or influence the career development of SOF 
personnel. Career paths that are flexible and do not discourage 
personnel from choosing special operations as a branch must be 
established. Personnel should from the start of their careers know 
that there actually are career paths, and incentives that make 
personnel choose positions outside the traditional operator realm 
(such as operations, command staff, training wing, etc.) must exist. 
k. Job descriptions and requirements for billets at the joint special 
operations command should be carefully developed. In order to 
maintain integrity within the NORSOF community, as well as 
with other nations’ SOF communities, some billets must have 
“badged” personnel, while other billets need “experienced” SOF 
personnel, i.e., personnel with service in one of the units, but 
not necessarily badged. Finally, some billets may not need such 
requirements, and should rather call for experts within the job’s 
domain (e.g., roles within finances, administration, that are not 
key roles). The two case studies from Canada and Poland 
emphasize the importance of having a sufficient number of 
badged and experienced SOF personnel within their respective 
commands. In order to sustain integrity, it is recommended that 
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the commander and the deputy commander of a joint special 
operations command are badged officers. 
3. Increase Norway’s Influence in NATO 
l. In order to increase the nation’s influence within NATO, Norway 
should consider developing a special operations framework nation 
capability for NATO operations. A national joint special operations 
command can facilitate the personnel and infrastructure of a future 
Norwegian-led CJFSOCC and coordinate national strategic 
interests with the deployed assets.  
m. In order to increase the nation’s influence within NATO, NORSOF 
should increase its focus on fostering adequate NORSOF 
personnel for decision-making billets throughout the NATO SOF 
community, such as NSHQ and in NATO operations. A joint special 
operations command must be able to prioritize, control and 
coordinate NORSOF’s relationship with other nations’ SOF 
commands and units, and develop these relationships in a manner 
that supports Norway’s national interests. 
4. Ensure Special Air Operations Capabilities 
n. Special air operations capabilities must be optimized by including 
competent Air Force personnel in the NORSOF community, 
including a future joint special operations command or service. The 
division of force production and operational responsibilities between 
the joint NORSOF leadership and the Air Force must be as perfect 
and functional as possible. Further assessments are necessary to 
ensure the proper use of special air operations capabilities, 
including special air operations contribution to domestic and out of 
area operations. 
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5. Reorganize the Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Group 
o. MJK’s level in the Navy’s administrative chain of command should 
be similar to FSK-HJK’s level; the Commander of MJK should 
report directly to the Chief of the Navy. 
p. Commander MJK’s rank should be equivalent to the Commander 
FSK-HJK’s rank, i.e., Navy Captain (O-6). 
q. Combat support to special operations (as well as conventional 
operations) should be formalized in the Norwegian Naval Special 
Warfare Group’s mission statement and in its subordinate units’ 
mission essential task lists. 
r. In concurrence with Recommendation o, The Special Division in the 
Norwegian Naval Special Warfare Training Center should be 
dispatched from the latter, and transferred to MJK as an organic 
training wing, but with direct access to the Joint Special Operations 
Command’s J-7, in terms of joint responsibilities.131 
6. Establish Combat Support and Enabling Capabilities 
s. NORSOF should include and/or implement information operations 
capabilities within its future organization. Some capabilities should 
be organic, while others may be supported by dedicated 
conventional units. 
t. With the creation of a joint special operations command, a thorough 
assessment must be carried out to map the future combat support 
forces and enabling capabilities for NORSOF. Certain forces within 
the current conventional organizations might have capabilities that 
are better utilized if they are directly subordinate to the SOF 
                                            
131 The Special Division is one of four divisions/training wings at the Norwegian Naval 
Special Warfare Training Center. The other four serve the conventional units in the Norwegian 
Naval Special Warfare Group. The Special Division is responsible for selection of special 
operators and special boat operators, as well as advanced special operations training for MJK. 
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commander, or if they have a formalized dual-hatted role toward 
both special operations and conventional forces (like 137 Air Wing 
has currently). Examples of directly subordinate or dual-hatted 
forces could be improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) 
experts, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons experts, computer network operations (CNO) experts, the 
Coastal Ranger Commando (combat support) and dedicated 
medical support units. 
Figure 14 shows the recommended model, where the Commander of Joint 
Special Operations Command is the twelfth commander directly subordinate to 
the Chief of Defense. For special operations, the Chief of Defense will delegate 
OPCOM to the joint special operations commander over the tactical SOF units, 
as well as supporting units. In some cases, e.g., special air operations conducted 
by 137 Air Wing or submarine support operations, OPCOM/OPCON may be 
retained by the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, and coordinated by a SOCCE 
(see command relationship in Figure 15). Alternatively, Commander NJHQ may 
continue to assume OPCOM (delegated from Chief of Defense), and be 
supported by the joint special operations commander. 
 
Figure 14.   Joint Special Operations Command: the Twelfth Commander 
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Figure 15 shows the recommended model with NORSOF representation 
at all three levels: 
 Strategic level: a Special Operations Section, similar to the current 
arrangement in the Defense Staff. Its primary roles are advising 
and action officers. 
 Operational level: a separate joint special operations command, 
with delegated operational command over national SOF. 
 Operational level: a Special Operations Command and Control 
Element (SOCCE), subordinate to the joint special operations 
commander, or a SOF cell subordinate to the Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters. Its role is to coordinate and deconflict special 
operations and conventional operations. In the SOCCE model, the 
joint special operations command may delegate OPCON to the 
SOCCE when appropriate. 
 Tactical level: FSK-HJK (NORASOC) and MJK (NORNAVSOC). 
 
Figure 15.   NORSOF Representation in the Recommended Model 
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APPENDIX A. INFORMATION OPERATIONS FOR NORSOF 
Information operations should be a seamlessly integrated capability in 
every special operations forces (SOF) organization, because such capabilities 
are necessary for strategic assets to possess in order to conduct the full range of 
special operations. In today’s irregular warfare environments, with the inherent 
battle for the “hearts and minds” or, more precisely, the “trust and confidence” of 
a population, the psychological and informational aspects are vital, and often 
referred to as more important than combat actions.132 By utilizing their own 
information operations capabilities, SOF can to a much larger degree separate 
insurgents from the local population and neutralize terrorists with non-lethal 
means instead of lethal means. Additionally, information operations are also an 
important part of conventional warfare, and cannot be disregarded as capabilities 
that are highly needed by SOF during their conduct of special operations in such 
types of war. Regardless of the warfare’s nature, today’s globalization and 
numerous channels of communication have made control over the information 
one of the most strategically important parts of warfare. 
As with many other SOF organizations within NATO, Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces’ (NORSOF) comprehension of information operations is still 
nascent. Although assumed future threats and recent experience from operations 
should precipitate a broader focus on information operations, NORSOF selection, 
training, education, and organization are primarily optimized for traditional special 
operations tasks. Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) lists three 
“principle tasks of Allied Joint Special Operations Forces”: Direct Action, 
Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SR&S), and Military Assistance 
                                            
132 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, 2008), A9. 
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(MA).133 AJP-3.5 also lists four “Additional Activities of Allied Joint Special 
Operations Forces”: support to counter-irregular threat activities; countering 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; hostage release 
operations; and faction liaison.134 Recognizing that NATO SOF organizations do 
not have the full range of capabilities needed to conduct all the activities above 
independently, the NATO SOF Study has identified a number of enablers and 
force structure implications for SOF.135 The NATO SOF Study notes that ad hoc 
attachments of enabling capabilities fail to function appropriately, and that 
habitual relationships with the supported SOF units are necessary.136 This 
appendix will suggest measures to implement some information operations 
capabilities within NORSOF, while current special operations capabilities are 
maintained. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
NATO, Norway, and the United States define and explain information 
operations differently. The main difference is in how the doctrines of the three 
entities perceive information operations. The United States sees them as 
integrated military capabilities, while NATO and Norway see them as coordinated 
activities in support of political and military objectives. Moreover, there are some 
differences in the subdivision of activities/capabilities between the three entities. 
1. NATO: Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations 
NATO defines information operations as “a military function to provide 
advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired 
                                            
133 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 2–1; 2–3.  
134 Ibid., 2–3; 2–5. 
135 The identified enablers from the NATO SOF Study are: Mobility (Air, Maritime, and 
Ground); Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons; Liaison; 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV); All-Source Intelligence; Medical; Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD); Logistics; Psychological and Information Operations; and Air Force Ground SOF 
Personnel. See NSCC, NATO SOF Study, A1–A10. 
136 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, A1. 
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effects on the will, understanding and capabilities of adversaries and other [North 
Atlantic Council] approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.”137 
NATO sees information operations as an integrating function that focuses 
on the information environment, and not as a capability in its own right.138 Allied 
Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (AJP-3.10) does not divide information 
operations into sub-categories, but lists “examples of capabilities, tools, and 
techniques used in support of information objectives”:139 
 Psychological operations 
 Presence, Posture, and Profile 
 Operations Security 
 Information Security 
 Deception 
 Electronic Warfare 
 Physical Destruction 
 Key Leader Engagement 
 Computer Network Operations 
 Civil-Military Cooperation 
AJP-3.10 recognizes that “civil-military cooperation is a capability that can 
be used to achieve information objectives.” Public affairs, however, is considered 
as a related, but separate function.140 
                                            
137 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Allied Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations (AJP-3.10) (2009), 1–3. 
138 NATO, AJP-3.10, 1–8. 
139 Ibid., 1–8; 1–12. 
140 Ibid., 1–12; 1–13. 
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2. Norway: Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 
The Norwegian definition of information operations is stated in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine. The doctrine delineates 
information operations as coordinated activities, and emphasizes that these 
activities support strategic objectives: 
Information operations are coordinated activities and which are 
implemented to achieve desired effects on the understanding, will 
and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other target 
groups. Information operations support the strategic objectives by 
influencing other parties’ information, information-based processes 
and systems, while at the same time making use of and protecting 
own information, information-based processes and systems.141  
The Norwegian doctrine lists six information operations core activities:142 
 Psychological operations 
 Deception  
 Information security143 
 Electronic Warfare 
 Computer Network Operations 
 Physical destruction of the information infrastructure 
The Norwegian doctrine states that public affairs and civil affairs are 
related to, but not part of, information operations, as it is paramount to preserve 
the integrity and credibility of these two activities.144 
                                            
141 Forsvarsstaben [The Defense Staff], Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 
2007 [Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine], trans. The Defense Staff (Oslo: The Defense Staff, 
2007), 134. 
142 Ibid., 137–138. 
143 Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine refers to Information Security as an 
important part of OPSEC. See p. 137. 
144 Forsvarsstaben, Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, 139. 
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3. United States: Joint Publication 3-13 – Information Operations 
The U.S. definition of information operations is stated in Joint Publication 3-
13–Information Operations (JP 3-13). While NATO uses the term “examples of 
capabilities, tools, and techniques in support of information objectives,” and Norway 
refers to the term “information operations core activities,” the U.S. doctrine divides 
information operations into core capabilities. Moreover, it does not emphasize that 
information operations have to apply specifically to the strategic level: 
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 
warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, 
military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while 
protecting our own.145 
The U.S. doctrine refers to five distinct core capabilities within information 
operations: 
 Psychological operations 
 Military Deception 
 Operational security 
 Electronic Warfare 
 Computer Network Operations 
JP 3-13 also refers to supporting capabilities and related capabilities. 
Supporting capabilities are information assurance, physical security, physical 
attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera.146 Related capabilities are 
public affairs, civil-military operations, and defense support to public 
diplomacy.147 
                                            
145 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13 Information Operations [JP 3-13] (Washington 
D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), GL-9. 
146 Ibid., x. 
147 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-13, x. 
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4. Scope 
In this research, information operations will be considered as capabilities, 
since the purpose is to map out additional capabilities for NORSOF that require 
organizational changes to NORSOF and other units in the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. The capabilities that will be examined are: 
 Psychological operations 
 Computer network operations 
 Military deception 
The above-mentioned core capabilities are represented in all three 
doctrines, either as capabilities or as activities. Some capabilities have been 
omitted due to classification reasons, particularly EW. Additionally, this research 
will focus on the information operations capabilities that can enhance NORSOF’s 
efforts to become a “world-class special operations force,” not the capabilities 
that are supposed to protect one’s own forces from an adversary. Hence, 
capabilities like operational security (OPSEC) and computer network defense 
(CND) will not be discussed in this research, even though they are very relevant 
capabilities for NORSOF to possess. Other capabilities have been omitted 
because they are either already implemented in NORSOF, or they are only 
matters of activities, for instance: 
 Physical attack/destruction of the information infrastructure has 
always been a part of SOF’s core tasks (DA), and does not need to 
be examined as an additional capability. 
 Presence, posture, and profile (PPP) are not capabilities, but 
activities. Knowledge about the importance and impact of PPP is 
crucial, also to SOF, but this should rather be implemented as part 
of the Norwegian professional military education pipeline. 
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B. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL 
Due to restrictions in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ personnel policy and 
its budget limitations, a crucial question is how new capabilities can be 
implemented to NORSOF. In general, there are four avenues to implement 
additional information operations capabilities: 
1. Extra personnel are added to NORSOF 
o Within the tactical units 
o As an additional tactical unit (requires a joint special 
operations command) 
2. The NORSOF organization learns, assimilates, and develops the 
new capability with the existing personnel. Personnel modify their 
tasks by either adding or changing them. 
3. The NORSOF organization utilizes existing environments outside 
its own. Designated personnel from external units are earmarked 
for special operations, and are subject to NORSOF requirements in 
terms of selection, training, notice-to-move, etc. 
4. The NORSOF organization utilizes existing services and/or units 
outside itself, but on ad hoc basis. 
These four different approaches come with advantages and 
disadvantages, and adding new units to NORSOF is not always a viable option, 
even though it usually appears to be the best one. Of course, adding sufficient 
information operations personnel and/or units would benefit NORSOF most. By 
giving NORSOF the full authority over such units/personnel, an implementation 
would not depend on other entities. NORSOF could organize, train, and tailor its 
information operations capabilities, and good OPSEC would be maintained. On 
the contrary, adding more personnel or creating new units costs more money, 
counters the stringent personnel limitations, and requires adequate priority and 
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supervision from the NORSOF (or tactical units’) leadership, in order to prevent 
the new capabilities from being sub-optimized. 
The NATO SOF Study notes that NATO SOF units often find augmented 
conventional psychological operations augmentees “completely unsuited to the 
operational environment.” Moreover, the document states that SOF units need 
trained information operations personnel with the required expertise to assist 
special operations.148 Hence, it is very likely to believe that ad hoc 
augmentations from the conventional forces are inappropriate for special 
operations. 
As mentioned earlier, the defense budget and the personnel situation in 
the Norwegian Armed Forces do not allow an unconditioned build-up of required 
information operations capabilities within NORSOF. Therefore, smart solutions 
must be sought, and an acceptable organizational design that allows NORSOF to 
carry out high-quality information operations integrated with special operations 
must be facilitated. The three core capabilities must be implemented and 
developed individually, based on the required skills and knowledge that are 
necessary in the special operations environment in each case. The challenge is, 
of course, to find the very few people who have exactly what NORSOF needs; 
the appropriate traits, skills, knowledge, and special operations mindset. 
C. TRAITS, SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE 
All human beings are different, and cannot become experts, or at least 
equally good, at every type of activity. Several theories have been proposed to 
explain how humans differ from each others: While traits can be seen as 
personality qualities or characteristics (e.g., introvert/extrovert, honest, shy, and 
impatient), skills are knowledge and abilities that can be learned over time and 
eventually utilized (e.g., read maps, drive a car, or solve mathematical 
                                            
148 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, A9. 
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problems).149 Moreover, skills can be seen as the ability to utilize knowledge. In 
general, there are two types of knowledge: 
 Explicit knowledge, which is knowledge that can be explained in 
written language, like manuals and mathematical expressions. 
 Tacit knowledge, which is personal knowledge that is hard to share 
or describe to others, for instance how to ride a bike.150 
If information operations capabilities are being added to NORSOF’s 
portfolio, it is important to understand that the special operations realm requires 
high-quality personnel with the traits and skills that are necessary in sensitive 
operations at the strategic and operational levels. Finding the right personnel to 
do the right job, and organizing these wisely, will be a challenge. In order to 
successfully implement information operations capabilities, NORSOF must to a 
large degree look for other types of personnel than those they have today. 
Special operators in the two tactical NORSOF units have been carefully 
picked out through a number of selection processes and forged into assaulters 
with the proficient skills of conducting offensive, lethal operations. The selection 
processes in the two units continuously develop, based on the lessons learned 
from previous selections, and feedback from the operational squadrons on what 
the required skills of a new operator should be. The two units have somewhat 
different selection criteria, as well as different selection processes. Still, they both 
seem to be able to identify and develop personnel who have the skills and 
knowledge required to be assaulters in the units. The units also divide the 
assaulters into more subtle roles, based on their traits and skills. Hence, there 
will be operators who are excellent communicators, but maybe not fit to be good 
snipers. Others may turn out to be supreme breachers, but they lack what it 
                                            
149 See for instance Donald R. Clark, “Leadership—Character and Traits” in Big Dog and 
Little Dog’s Performance Juxtaposition, http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/leader/leadchr.html. 
150 See for instance Ikujiro Nonaka and Noboru Konno, “The Concept of ‘Ba’: Building a 
Foundation for Knowledge Creation,” in The Knowledge Management Yearbook 2009–2010, ed. 
James W. Cortada and John A. Woods (Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1999), 39. 
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takes to be a certified joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). The NORSOF units 
usually spend some time during and after the selection period to identify the 
individual operators’ interests, skills, and traits, in order to find out what types of 
specialties each individual should get. 
The problem occurs when some assaulters are told to carry out tasks that 
are completely different from direct action (DA) or some of the other tasks that 
have been focused on during selection and training, for instance raids or 
reconnaissance missions. Even though a “traditional” special operator might be 
perceived as computer savvy among his peers, it is not likely that he will be able 
to develop the skills that are required to carry out a delicate computer network 
attack (CNA) on a terrorist’s computer. In order to carry out such a task, one will 
need to utilize personnel with the traits and skills that go beyond “computer 
savvy.” In fact, what NORSOF would need for such operations are people with 
the skills of a hacker.151 And, just as it is difficult to tell someone how to ride a 
bike, it is almost impossible to teach someone how to conduct sophisticated 
cyber attacks. When information operations capabilities are implemented in a 
SOF organization, the need for traits, skills, and especially tacit knowledge will be 
different from those that exist among the assaulters. In some cases, special 
operators can be trained to carry out new tasks. In other cases, however, 
NORSOF must find its experts externally. 
                                            
151 There is no official definition of the terms hacker, hack, and hacking. Even though most 
people might associate hackers and hacking with illicit activities, this research does not 
necessarily assume that all hackers conduct illegal activities. Professor Dorothy E. Denning of 
The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School describes a hack as “tinkering with hardware or software,” 
“clever programming trick,” and “breaking security controls—hardware or software.” Dorothy E. 
Denning, (Conflict and Cyberspace, course in Joint Information Operations Curriculum, The U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July—September 2009). Professor Brian Harvey at 
University of California tries to explain the meaning of the word hacker: “A ‘computer hacker’ . . . 
is someone who lives and breathes computers, who knows all about computers, who can get a 
computer to do anything. Equally important, though, is the hacker's attitude. . . . A hacker is an 
aesthete.” http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~bh/hacker.html.  
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D. INFORMATION OPERATIONS CORE CAPABILITIES 
This research will explore NORSOF’s demands for the various information 
operations capabilities, and the organizational potential that exists in Norway. 
This section recommends where or how to find the right personnel within each 
capability, and also how the personnel can be implemented in NORSOF’s 
organization. The recommendations are based on the assumption that one 
cannot create separate information operations units, and that the economic 
situation does not allow a large increase in the number of personnel. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the recommendation of adding 
capabilities does not imply exchanging current capabilities with new ones. The 
number of personnel dedicated for core special operations activities (DA, SR&S, 
and MA) still needs to be developed in accordance with NORSOF’s own plans, 
and should not be affected by recommendations from this research. 
1. Implementing an Information Operations Environment in 
NORSOF 
As defined in the three doctrines above, information operations are 
coordinated and/or integrated activities, and should be seen as a holistic system 
that applies additional capabilities to the decision-makers. Therefore, knowing 
how to use these capabilities in concert with the other special operations 
capabilities must be manifested within the whole organization, and especially 
within its leadership. A creation of a NORSOF joint special operations command 
would facilitate integration of dedicated external (outside the tactical units) 
information operations assets, as well as leverage information operations as an 
integrated and force-multiplying component within Norwegian special operations. 
Moreover, an implementation of information operations capabilities would require 
personnel with general knowledge about information operations, and specialized 
personnel with skills and knowledge within particular information operations 
activities. 
Information operations knowledge should be implemented at all levels of 
professional military education, in order to increase the general understanding of 
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the subject matters. For instance, the Norwegian Naval SOF community has 
already established special operations curricula at various levels of its 
professional military education. The Special Operations Curriculum at the Royal 
Norwegian Naval Academy produces future platoon leaders and junior 
operations officers, and the one-year Special Operations Curriculum at the 
Principle Warfare Officers Course educates senior staff officers and future 
squadron (and platoon) commanders. By implementing/increasing the impact of 
information operations in these curricula, NORSOF (especially the Naval SOF 
community) can raise its number of personnel with general knowledge on 
information operations capabilities. 
a. Personnel Required 
As the Norwegian Armed Forces does not have an information 
operations service or component, NORSOF will have to find suitable officers 
within the small communities that possesses one of the capabilities, or current 
special operations personnel that have special interests or talents within 
information operations. Some staff members should be designated as 
information operations officers, and possess a comprehensive knowledge about 
utilization of information operations and its integration with special operations. 
These staff officers should have extensive education, training, and operational 
experience from information operations. An example of relevant education could 
be the master’s degree program in information operations at the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School (18 months). By introducing information operations to naval 
cadets and Principle Warfare Officers Course students, it is likely that the 
increased amount of relevant education also leads to increased understanding 
and interest of the subject matters. The appropriate locus of an information 
operations officer would be in the operations section and the plans section, but 
having other officers with information operations interest and understanding 
throughout the entire organization would be of significant value. 
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All personnel within NORSOF should a minimum of knowledge that 
explains the characteristics, employment, and integration of the various 
capabilities within information operations. The higher up in the organization, the 
more understanding is required. The commander, deputy commander, central 
staff members, as well as the leaders within the assault squadrons, should have 
a basic level knowledge about information operations. Examples of relevant 
education for commanders and staff members could be NATO Planners 
Information Operations Course (two weeks) at NATO School Oberammergau, 
Joint Information Operations Course (one week), or Joint Information Operations 
Planning Course (four weeks), both at Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, 
Virginia. Examples of education for all members of NORSOF could be internal 
courses or seminars (one to five days), occasionally arranged by the respective 
training wings in the units, or the information operations officer in the staff.  This 
type of education could be in concert, or a part of the education that is 
recommended at the special operations curricula at the Royal Norwegian Naval 
Academy and the Principle Warfare Officers Course. Designated NORSOF 
personnel should get relevant on-the-job training with external SOF units that use 
information operations to solve their missions, to learn how NORSOF can apply 
similar activities to its own operations. 
One of the most important things is to implement an understanding 
of the importance of information operations throughout the entire organization. 
Assigning and developing only one staff officer, and leaving the rest of the 
organization without any knowledge about the use of information operations, is 
not a viable solution. Information operations are a critical part of NORSOF 
operations in the future, and the understanding of its importance and 
characteristics should be implemented at all levels of the NORSOF community. 
b. Organizational Issues 
As recommended earlier, a joint special operations command 
should be established for NORSOF, also because it can synchronize the 
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information operations efforts in the special operations sphere. A centralized 
NORSOF command can control and coordinate all assets that support special 
operations, even though they are administrative controlled by other parent units. 
Limited parts of external units can be designated for special operations support, 
and maintain their standards based on the requirements that are issued by the 
joint special operations command. A command will facilitate memorandums of 
agreement or understanding between supporting units and NORSOF’s tactical 
units, facilitate OPSEC measures, facilitate joint exercises, and streamline the 
communication between the communities. A command will also be responsible 
for developing the standards within information operations that the different levels 
of NORSOF personnel must obtain and maintain. Finally, a joint special 
operations commander will be a crucial advisor to the strategic and operational 
levels, including the Minister of Defense, Chief of Defense, and Commander of 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters, and assist these with more versatile 
employments of special operations, to include information operations activities, in 
support of strategic objectives. 
2. Implementing Psychological Operations Capabilities 
Even though correctly applied psychological operations (U.S. acronym is 
“PSYOP,” while NATO acronym is “PSYOPS”) is a very effective way to employ 
influence and other non-lethal impacts on a large and important audience, 
Norway has no units or capabilities that are dedicated to carry out PSYOP. It can 
be assumed that the term PSYOP is (wrongly) viewed as lying and brainwashing, 
or confused with the term deception, and often perceived as perfidy or deceitful 
actions. In fact, PSYOP is a very useful tool that could support Norwegian values 
(non-lethal) in out-of-area operations. It is necessary in both conventional and 
irregular warfare, but the use of SOF in PSYOP activities may differ.  
PSYOP is described somewhat differently in the U.S. and the Norwegian 
doctrines. The Norwegian doctrine focuses on the processes that facilitate 
PSYOP, while the U.S. doctrine focuses on the target audience and the impact 
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PSYOP has on it. Interestingly, the Norwegian doctrine, which is based on the 
NATO doctrine, does not mention that PSYOP only can be directed toward a 
foreign audience, like the U.S. doctrine does.  
JP 3-13 defines PSYOP as: 
[p]lanned operations to convey selected information and indicators 
to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes 
and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 
The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine leans to NATO 
in its description of PSYOP. Interestingly, the Norwegian doctrine states that only 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decides which target audiences PSYOP is to be 
directed at.  
Psychological operations (PSYOPS) has the objective of 
influencing perceptions, attitudes and conduct and in this way 
achieving desired political and military effects. Influence can be 
actively exerted both clandestinely and openly – in times of peace, 
crisis and armed conflict. In NATO the political leadership ([NAC]) 
lays down guidelines for psychological operations and approves 
which target groups such operations are to be directed against. In 
order to carry out an effective psychological operation it is 
necessary to have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the 
target groups. It is often necessary to possess competence in such 
fields as psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, graphic 
design, printing and publishing, and to have the capability for 
broadcasting or mass distribution in some other way. [PSYOP] 
messages can be disseminated using all forms of printed matter, 
radio, TV, loudspeakers directed at the adversary, direct 
conversations, the Internet, fax and mobile phones.152 
PSYOP is a crucial capability for NORSOF to possess, especially in 
counterinsurgencies, where the objective is to earn a population’s trust and 
confidence. Overt movements around in Afghanistan, for instance, require 
NORSOF attitudes and actions that convey carefully selected information to the 
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local population that supports the strategic objectives of International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF) or Norway. Assets with PSYOP capability can convey 
such messages correctly, and in accordance with these objectives. 
a. Personnel Required 
Norwegian Armed Forces has a limited PSYOP capability. The 
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College has a pool of approximately 15 
men and women complementing its Forsvarets PSYOPS enhet [Joint Norwegian 
PSYOPS Group] (FPOE). FPOE is a stand-by unit, which means that its 
personnel have other jobs (military or civilian), but can be tasked to participate in 
PSYOP deployments when needed. 
In general, there are four ways NORSOF can develop its PSYOP 
capability.153 The first way is to create a new, joint PSYOP unit within the 
NORSOF organization with external practitioners and the pertinent extra funding 
required to develop such a unit. The natural place would be to create such a unit 
within the Army SOF unit, Forsvarets spesialkommando/Hærens jegerkommando 
(FSK-HJK). Even though there might be several good arguments why the 
Norwegian government should reallocate resources from other parts of the 
military forces to a PSYOP capability build-up, it is not likely that that will happen 
soon. The next two ways of developing NORSOF PSYOP capabilities are 
described in Commander Petter Hellesen’s Counterinsurgency and Its 
Implications for the Norwegian Special Operations Forces. He notes that 
NORSOF either can give some of its own personnel adequate PSYOP training, 
or it can utilize other nations’ PSYOP capabilities.154 Of course, the latter implies 
a bilateral agreement with a nation that has available PSYOP forces that can 
carry out operations that concur with Norwegian values and objectives. This 
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might not always be feasible, and can in most cases not be developed beyond ad 
hoc arrangements with somewhat random relationships between the two 
communities. Moreover, this option was based on the situation in Norway in 
2008, when Norway did not have a designated PSYOP group. The last way to 
implement PSYOP in NORSOF is to utilize personnel from FPOE’s pool, and 
select and train these for special operations support. 
A viable option seems to be to select and utilize personnel from 
FPOE, but NORSOF should also develop a limited capability within its own 
personnel. As earlier suggested, not all assaulters will possess the traits and 
skills needed to be an efficient PSYOP operator. Developing good PSYOP 
assets within NORSOF might take some time, as the domestic resources are 
lacking. In order to start the development of such assets, NORSOF should send 
some of its personnel to countries that have well-established PSYOP 
organizations, either to attend a full version of a PSYOP specialist course, or at 
least get insight in how such personnel are selected and trained. Historically, the 
NORSOF units have sent some of its personnel to some short PSYOP courses 
(one-to-two weeks), domestically and abroad. These courses have merely been 
superficial, and are supposedly not adequate to build tactical assets that are 
supposed to support strategic objectives. 
In his research, Hellesen also suggests additional steps to build up 
a NORSOF capability. He emphasizes that there is a need to increase regional 
expertise, as well as to cultivate cultural understanding and awareness. This can 
be done by connecting external expertise, such as anthropologists, sociologists, 
and regional experts to the NORSOF community. Hellesen notes that extra 
efforts should be made to recruit NORSOF candidates among Norwegians with 
cultural background from areas that NORSOF is likely to operate in.155 Based on 
some of the experiences NORSOF already has with embedding civilians in other 
functions (ex-special operators for staff functions, or intelligence experts), there 
                                            
155 Hellesen, Counterinsurgency, 69–70. 
 142
should be circumstances where NORSOF can connect itself to personnel with 
regional expertise and/or relevant education, for instance cultural 
anthropologists. These could either function as advisors to the task group 
commander (requiring some preparation) or be embedded in the operational 
squadrons (requiring thorough preparation, including combat training). 
b. Organizational Issues 
As mentioned above, the optimal solution, a designated NORSOF 
PSYOP unit, might not be feasible, due to budget constraints and limitations on 
NORSOF personnel. A viable option is to select, educate, and train a few special 
operators to become PSYOP specialists within the tactical units. The way to 
organize PSYOP capabilities will strongly depend on the number of personnel 
the units are able to select and train for these tasks. A good start could be to 
dedicate an existing patrol/team or create a small task force to PSYOP 
development, and give it specific tasks and a timeline. They can attend national 
and external PSYOP officer or specialist education (for instance at U.S. Army 
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School), seminars and courses, 
connect with FPOE and other military and civilian experts (anthropologists, 
sociologists, regional experts, research institutes, etc.). Because the team needs 
to keep up with other core skills (shooting, medic, mobility, etc), it is 
recommended that the project is given a timeline that renders flexibility and long-
term investments possible. The team must come up with recommendations on 
how NORSOF can further develop PSYOP in its capability portfolio, and how 
connections with external actors and experts, like FPOE personnel, can be 
formalized. Additionally, the team should be able to develop a limited PSYOP 
capability that can be utilized in current operations, if needed. 
If none of the tactical units have the resources to designate some of 
its personnel to a PSYOP development program, efforts should be made to 
formalize a relationship with FPOE, so it can provide NORSOF with PSYOP 
personnel qualified for special operations support. 
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3. Implementing Computer Network Operations Capabilities 
Computer network operations (CNO) capabilities have become a 
necessity for NORSOF. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 demonstrated that 
computer network attacks were carried out from the Russian side, even though it 
has not been officially proved that the military forces were behind the attacks. It 
should be clear, though, that CNO tends to be a crucial part of almost any 
nation’s military capabilities and is likely to be used in any conflict. Moreover, the 
use of computer networks among terrorists and insurgents has become 
increasingly sophisticated and supposedly made them more effective. 
Notwithstanding, this has also opened up for additional avenues to target them. 
Access to any of the adversary’s computers can reveal significant amounts of 
crucial intelligence, and his use of communication in cyberspace leaves 
compromising footprints that can be traced. By not being able to exploit the 
overwhelming source of intelligence that the use of computers and cyberspace 
create, NORSOF will be forced to limit its actions to more dangerous activities 
while gathering intelligence and targeting adversaries. CNO allows units to 
discover, monitor, and disrupt terrorist or insurgent networks, and therefore 
complements (and sometimes substitutes) lethal activities that jeopardize the 
lives of special operators and civilians, infrastructure, and public attitude. 
The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine defines CNO as 
measures to influence the adversary’s computer network and to 
protect own networks. In the NATO context, the terms used are 
attack, exploit and defence. Such operations can be used both as 
strategic and as operational tools, and in recent years have gained 
increased significance as a contribution to joint operations. 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) involves attacking the adversary’s 
computer system for the purpose of disruption or manipulation. The 
attack may include infiltration of the adversary’s computer system 
with incorrect or infectious code, so-called “viruses” and “Trojan 
horses”. The impact of this type of operation has increased due to 
the widespread use of civil standards and civil software for military 
purposes. Computer Network Exploitation consists of measures to 
gain access to the adversary’s computer system, tap it for 
information and then make use of the information without the 
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adversary being aware of it. Computer Network Defence (CND), 
consists of measures for the active protection of information by 
monitoring, analyzing and implementing countermeasures to defeat 
attacks on own information systems. Increased use of information 
infrastructure brings increased complexity and thereby a greater 
risk that foreign CNA will disrupt the Armed Forces’ operations and 
so prevent achievement of the desired effects. It is essential that 
one should have one’s own CND in order to counter foreign 
CNA.156  
As earlier described, this research will focus on the CNA and Computer 
Network Exploitation (CNE) capabilities needed within NORSOF, even though 
CND capabilities are inherently required to protect NORSOF’s own capabilities 
and forces.  
a. Personnel Required 
CNO is capability that most likely cannot be developed within 
NORSOF’s current human resources. To be able to conduct CNA or CNE in 
special operations, very special traits and skills are required among the CNO 
operators. As mentioned above, a lot of the knowledge needed to conduct CNO 
as part of special operations is tacit knowledge, and is not easily acquired 
through regular education. NORSOF needs to search for those individuals who 
meet the minimum requirements to become members of the special operations 
community, as well as the requirements that are needed to conduct time 
sensitive, high-end CNO as part of, or in support of, special operations. 
Unfortunately, acquiring competent personnel for such jobs raises 
several questions, and some of them are ethical: unless the candidate has 
extensive service from a similar job in the police, defense, or other governmental 
agencies, it is possible that he or she has a background as an illicit hacker. In 
order to find the right type of personnel that fits the SOF community and 
requirements, dialogues between NORSOF and relevant institutions should be 
established. Some of NORSOF’s partner units abroad that have established 
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CNO capabilities would provide useful information on how their personnel is 
selected and trained, while various Norwegian units and establishments, such as 
Forsvarets ingeniørhøgskole (Norwegian Defense Engineering Academy), 
Innovasjon, nettverkskapasiteter og informasjonsstruktur (Innovation, Network 
Capabilities, and Information Infrastructure), Etterretningstjenesten (Norwegian 
Intelligence Service), Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet (Norwegian National 
Security Authority), and Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment), can assist in developing an overview over potential 
Norwegian CNO personnel for NORSOF, and in creating and developing a 
personnel selection and training program. The tactical units will have to develop 
their own requirements for physical and psychological aptitude, as well as special 
operations skills that are needed for CNO operators to join a tactical team on 
missions (for instance parachute jumping, immediate action drills, and medical 
training). 
Lastly, a recruitment program that targets young CNO talents 
should be developed, in order to motivate potential candidates to make the 
correct and lawful efforts to become future operators. Serving in a special 
operations unit and doing what one likes to do the most would probably inspire 
young computer talents to take appropriate actions to prepare themselves for 
CNO service in NORSOF. Since Norway has compulsory military service for all 
males who meet the armed forces’ minimum requirements, it should be easy to 
identify and select potential candidates from the large number of personnel that 
is subject to the draft. NORSOF could develop further test systems to narrow 
down the amount of candidates to a small number of people with qualities that 
are required to continue in a training program. It is likely that an instrumental 
factor in the success of a recruitment campaign will be that the SOF-related CNO 
program is publicly known. 
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b. Organizational Issues 
There are many ways to integrate CNO capabilities into the 
NORSOF organization, but the most important organizational issue is to create a 
community that is able to maintain and develop the high skills that are needed. 
Since maintenance and development of operator skills require live training on big 
networks, arrangements to avoid illegal training on real networks must be 
established. Such training could be training with and observation of national 
agencies with CNO capabilities, on-the-job training with allied forces that 
currently utilize CNO capabilities, and laboratory training. The latter might call for 
a centralized CNO organization within NORSOF, since such laboratories are 
complex and supposedly very expensive. Moreover, a small CNO community 
would probably benefit from centralizing its personnel and activities, since this 
creates better grounds for effective and unified efforts in the development of the 
capabilities. However, since CNO should be an inseparable part of special 
operations in support of counterterrorism, counterinsurgencies, and other types 
of conflicts, there are good arguments claiming that both NORSOF units should 
have these capabilities permanently embedded for regular training and in order 
to achieve unit cohesion. CNO will not be some capabilities that are being used 
occasionally or seldom; they are more likely to be an important part of most 
exercises and operations in the future. Hence, it will be difficult to find the right 
solution on how to attach CNO capabilities in a way that benefits both tactical 
units and that also develops the CNO personnel properly. Under a joint special 
operations command, this can be solved by tasking the existing CNO community 
in Norway to support the development of NORSOF assets by creating a unit that 
is earmarked special operations. This unit could be administratively controlled by 
its parent unit, but operational commanded (OPCOM) or controlled (OPCON) by 
the joint special operations command or Norwegian Joint Headquarters when 
NORSOF is employed. 
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4. Implementing Military Deception Capabilities 
The Norwegian Armed Forces does not have a designated deception 
capability at the strategic or operational level. Although deception has been (and 
probably will be) used in almost every conflict, western military organizations 
tend not to create separate units that are solely dedicated to plan and carry out 
military deception. Deception is part of standard military tactics, and both 
conventional and special operations forces constantly conduct deception through 
the use of camouflage, concealment, feints, and the like. At the operational and 
strategic levels, however, deception often appears to be a capability that is being 
utilized too late, and is seldom systematically integrated in the military structure 
as a branch, or looked upon as an art.  
The U.S., NATO, and Norwegian doctrines define deception somewhat 
differently. U.S. doctrine differs between deception and military deception. 
Deception is defined as “those measures designed to mislead the enemy by 
manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react 
in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests.”157 Military deception, however, 
is defined more narrowly, and describes the target audience only as the 
adversary’s decision-makers. Moreover, the deceiving message is restricted to 
“friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations.”158 The JP 3.13 defines 
military deception as: 
Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision 
makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and 
operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions 
(or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 
friendly forces mission.159 
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The Norwegian doctrine does not define military deception specifically. 
However, the definition of deception states that it involves influencing the 
adversary’s decision-makers: 
Deception has the objective of misleading an adversary through the 
manipulation, distortion or falsification of information. Deception 
involves influencing the adversary’s decisionmakers in order to give 
them a false understanding of the actual situation, or a false 
understanding of the kind of intentions one has. For example a 
deception operation can mislead the adversary into taking 
measures against what he believes (wrongly) is coming. By taking 
such measures the adversary will in the first place either disperse 
or gather his resources on an incorrect basis.160 
The NATO definition does not specify that deception is exclusively aimed 
at the adversary’s decision-makers, and borders to a certain degree to the 
definition of PSYOP, particularly since it uses “influencing perceptions of 
adversary audiences” as an example.161 NATO’s definition states that: 
Deception involves measures designed to mislead adversaries by 
manipulation, distortion or falsification. Deception is a complex art, 
which demands considerable effort, a high level of security and a 
sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking. In 
operations, it can directly contribute to the achievement of surprise 
and, indirectly, to security and economy of effort. Within a 
deception plan both information and traditional physical means and 
methods (such as demonstrations and show of force) can be 
applied. Consequently, deception is not considered exclusively an 
Info Ops responsibility, but coordinated information activities can 
contribute to deception operations at all levels, for example, by 
influencing perceptions of adversary audiences. Info Ops planners 
must be involved in deception planning in order to ensure that 
deception objectives and information activities are employed in 
support of Information Objectives.162 
The Norwegian Armed Forces, like any modern military forces, should 
have deception capabilities that are able to provide the decision-makers at the 
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strategic and operational levels with viable deception plans, as well as with 
counter-deception capabilities. As mentioned in Chapter II, the Norwegian 
Minister of Defense, Grete Faremo wants NATO nations, including Norway, to 
balance between out-of-area operations and traditional operations in defense of 
NATO countries’ territories.”163 As history proves, most wars over territory have 
been carried out and won by an extensive use of deception. As described by the 
defense strategist, Professor Walter Jajko, deception should be inseparable from 
all parts of military planning and operations, both in peacetime and wartime.164 
Moreover, he states that “[d]eception is an exceptional instrument of national 
security policy and an essential element of military operations that can contribute 
significantly to the achievement of policy and the success of operations.”165  
With a joint special operations command, NORSOF can have a role as 
deception advisors, planners, and operators at the strategic and operational 
levels. Of course, they cannot be the only deception practitioners, as deception is 
not a core SOF task. However, NORSOF can supplement other strategic and 
operational deception planners, and contribute with operators when particularly 
sensitive or difficult deception operations are carried out. Jaiko describes 
deception practitioners as hand-picked personnel with the exceptional 
combination of practical skills, mental talents, and operational craft.166 These 
characteristics are often found among SOF operators, as the latter are selected 
and trained to meet those criteria. Moreover, deception can only be successfully 
carried out in organizations where the leadership is tolerant of unorthodoxy.167 A 
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joint special operations command would provide the strategic and operational 
decision-makers with advisors, planners and operators who have the mindset 
that is required for such unorthodox thinking and methods. 
Even without a goal to develop deception capabilities at the strategic level 
in Norway, NORSOF should increase its academic approach to deception as an 
art, and not only a tactic. Tactical deception is constantly being used during 
planning and execution of special operations; however, as NORSOF takes part in 
counterterrorist operations and counterinsurgencies, operational deception is 
also required.  
a. Personnel Required 
As mentioned above, one can assume that NORSOF already 
consist of creative personnel who possess many of the traits and skills that are 
required from deception practitioners. Notwithstanding, NORSOF personnel have 
usually focused on planning and performing tactical deception. While it is likely to 
believe that the tactical deception capabilities are well developed, there is a large 
potential to develop capabilities that go beyond the tactical level. A joint special 
operations command, as well as the tactical NORSOF units should have some 
staff officers with special education and training within strategic and operational 
deception, as well as counter-deception, embedded in their operations and/or 
plans sections. Some deception related courses are offered as part of the various 
master’s degree programs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.168  
b. Organizational Issues 
A joint special operations commander and his staff would be an 
important deception advisor to the Chief of Defense and the Chief of Norwegian 
Joint Headquarters. Strategic or operational deception operations should always 
                                            
168 See The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s official Web site for Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS). 595 (Information Warfare), 698 (Joint Information Operations), and 699 (Special 
Operations), are some of the curricula that offer deception-related courses. 
http://www.nps.edu/adminsrv/igpo/Content/FMS.html 
 151
be centralized and controlled by the highest level, in order to “paint a complex 
and delicate picture” that one wants the adversary’s decision-makers to see.169 
These efforts, to synchronize the employment of multiple messages through 
multiple channels, and to tightly monitor feedback coming back through 
intelligence, should be done by the highest level in the pertinent area of 
operation, to avoid uncoordinated activities or messages that may blow the cover 
story and damage the entire deception operation. Although SOF are not 
supposed to be the only service dedicated to carry out deception operations, a 
NORSOF command would have some of the assets required to plan, conduct, 
and monitor deception operations of strategic or operational importance. 
Within the special operations command staff, military deception 
should be an integrated part of the operations (J-3) and planning (J-5) 
directorates, but not necessarily its own section within the staff. It is rather 
recommended that the entire staff gets familiar with military deception through 
the continuous use of it during planning and execution of exercises and 
operations. With the recommended designated information operations staff 
officers mentioned above, a few additional staff officers with deception education 
and training would increase the level of NORSOF’s deception capabilities. These 
deception proponents would elevate NORSOF ability to advise or augment the 
strategic and operational levels in deception planning, as well as lead or support 
the planning and execution of NORSOF operations when deception is needed. 
Moreover, by studying and practicing various techniques, like Richards J. Heuer 
Jr.’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, staff officers should also develop 
necessary skills within counter-deception.170 Such techniques are valuable tools 
in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations, as well as in traditional 
warfare. 
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Since the art of deception by its nature cannot always be trained 
like standard operations procedures, NORSOF should rather develop and 
maintain the special mindset that is needed for staff members to thrive as military 
deception planners and operators. By studying military deception and counter-
deception from history, as well as including strategic and operational deception 
during exercise planning and execution, the level of deception skills within 
NORSOF will increase. 
E. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to meet the intrinsic challenges of the information age, NORSOF 
should implement its own information operations capabilities. The NATO SOF 
Study lists psychological operations and information operations as critical 
enablers for successful execution of special operations, and suggests force 
structure modifications for NATO nations’ SOF organizations to meet 
contemporary and future demands. It is of high importance that the NORSOF 
community understands the inevitability of information operations capabilities in 
support or in concert with special operations, and that future organizational 
changes, as well as educational measures, reflect the importance of these 
capabilities. 
Acknowledging that budget constraints and personnel limitations in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces deny an optimal development of enabling capabilities 
for NORSOF, some low-cost solutions are recommended. NORSOF should 
implement information operations capabilities through several courses of action, 
depending on the types of traits, skills, and knowledge that are required in each 
discipline and the available capabilities within NORSOF and the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ structure. NORSOF cannot afford to spend time and money on 
unqualified personnel or an inappropriate organizational design. Therefore, the 
implementation of information operations capabilities should be taken very 
seriously, and given extra attention. 
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This appendix underscores the importance of the establishment of a joint 
special operations command, since such a command would have the authority to 
proactively direct, coordinate, and harmonize NORSOF capabilities, including its 
information operations capabilities. Moreover, it would have the overall 
responsibility to coordinate the implementation of information operations assets 
from the other services within the Norwegian Armed Forces, and to assist and 
advise senior leadership on special operations and its use of information 
operations. 
NORSOF should develop four different information operations capabilities 
that would increase combat efficiency, reduce risk of own lives, and mitigate 
unwanted violent impact on civilians and adversaries, in almost any type of 
operations that NORSOF is involved in: 
1. General information operations capabilities within the staffs at the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This will increase the 
general understanding of information operations and indirect 
approaches, and teach the NORSOF community to operate as a 
more versatile capacity. 
2. General and specialized PSYOP capabilities that are mainly self-
developed at the tactical level, and possibly a formalized 
relationship with selected FPOE personnel. This will increase the 
NORSOF community’s opportunity to influence local populations in 
the areas of operations and to conduct low-profile influence 
operations in support of strategic and operational objectives. 
3. Specialized CNO capabilities that are carefully selected from 
various external environments, and trained at the highest level of 
relevant competence to conduct and support special operations. 
CNO operators should be organizationally attached to the unit(s) or 
facilities where they can maintain their high-end skills through 
appropriate training and relationships with similar national 
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capabilities. It is also important, however, to establish a well-
functioning relationship with the tactical NORSOF operators that 
the CNO capabilities will work closely with during training and 
operations. These two diametrical opposites (centralized vs. 
decentralized) should call for a discussion on how CNO should be 
organized and interact with the rest of the NORSOF community. 
4. General deception capabilities, built on the special operations 
mindset that already exists within the NORSOF community, but 
with an additional academic application of the subject matter. An 
increased focus on deception and counter-deception as an art 
would increase NORSOF’s ability to carry out tactical deception 
operations, as well as to advise and assist national and NATO 
decision-makers in their planning and conduct of strategic and 
operational deception operations. 
Finally, it is recommended that the NORSOF community makes its own 
efforts to find out how far it wants to go in the implementation of information 
operations, and how heavily these capabilities and activities should impact its 
organization and missions. The above-mentioned recommendations are based 
on certain assumptions regarding the economic and personnel situation in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, and should only be seen as examples of low-cost 
implementations, not optimal solutions. 
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APPENDIX B.  STATISTICS FROM CANSOFCOM INTERVIEWS  
The graphs below (Figures 13 to 30) show the distribution of answers to 
each question given to the Canadian interviewees in Chapter III. The bottom line 
shows the scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (0 = not 
applicable), and the colored bars indicate the number of interviewees who gave 
the indicated score. In the cases of half numbers, one or more of the 
interviewees could not decide between two numbers (e.g., Question 2C—After: 
an interviewee responded 3-4, as he could not decide whether he wanted to give 
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APPENDIX C.  STATISTICS FROM POLSOCOM INTERVIEWS 
The graphs below (Figure 31 to 48) show the distribution of answers to 
each question given to the Polish interviewees in Chapter IV. The bottom line 
shows the scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (0 = not 
applicable), and the colored bars indicate the number of interviewees who gave 
the indicated score. In the cases of half numbers, one or more of the 
interviewees could not decide between two numbers (e.g., Question 1B—After: 
an interviewee responded 3-4, as he could not decide whether he wanted to give 
a “3” or a “4.” His answer was then distributed with 0.5 on “3” and 0.5 on “4”). 
Question 2A was answered by only six interviewees, as interviewee number 1 
did not have the opportunity to continue the interview after Question 1F.  
Questions 2B—2C were answered by only five interviewees, as interviewee 
number 6 abstained from answering the two questions. As mentioned above, 
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